Svetla Slaveva-Griffin
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195377194
- eISBN:
- 9780199869572
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377194.001.1
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This book examines Plotinus’ concept of number, one of the most difficult and obscure topics in Neoplatonism. The book argues that Plotinus is the first philosopher who explains the Platonic “true ...
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This book examines Plotinus’ concept of number, one of the most difficult and obscure topics in Neoplatonism. The book argues that Plotinus is the first philosopher who explains the Platonic “true number” and the quantitative mathematical numbers in a conceptually informed relationship as between an intelligible paradigm and its sense-perceptible image. Throughout the Enneads and especially in Ennead VI.6, the treatise On Numbers, Plotinus systematically peels off the layers of mathematical and quantitative perception from the concept of number to reveal that real number is the primary activity of substance (ousia), which orders the unfolding of the universe from its absolute source into a finite multiplicity. The book traces the development of Plotinus’ concepts of number and multiplicity in Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s view of number, and Neopythagoreanism. This analysis establishes number to be the building block of the intelligible realm and the architecture of the universe in Plotinus. For him, as for his Platonic and Neopythagorean predecessors, the universe has a meaning, enciphered by number. In this light, Plotinus’ concept of number is the fundamental link between the number theories of the Neopythagoreans and the later Neoplatonists.Less
This book examines Plotinus’ concept of number, one of the most difficult and obscure topics in Neoplatonism. The book argues that Plotinus is the first philosopher who explains the Platonic “true number” and the quantitative mathematical numbers in a conceptually informed relationship as between an intelligible paradigm and its sense-perceptible image. Throughout the Enneads and especially in Ennead VI.6, the treatise On Numbers, Plotinus systematically peels off the layers of mathematical and quantitative perception from the concept of number to reveal that real number is the primary activity of substance (ousia), which orders the unfolding of the universe from its absolute source into a finite multiplicity. The book traces the development of Plotinus’ concepts of number and multiplicity in Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s view of number, and Neopythagoreanism. This analysis establishes number to be the building block of the intelligible realm and the architecture of the universe in Plotinus. For him, as for his Platonic and Neopythagorean predecessors, the universe has a meaning, enciphered by number. In this light, Plotinus’ concept of number is the fundamental link between the number theories of the Neopythagoreans and the later Neoplatonists.
Svetla Slaveva-Griffin
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195377194
- eISBN:
- 9780199869572
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377194.003.0008
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
The concept of number is the troublemaker in the history of Platonism. It separated the followers of Plato and Aristotle into two camps for generations. For Plotinus, however, the concept becomes the ...
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The concept of number is the troublemaker in the history of Platonism. It separated the followers of Plato and Aristotle into two camps for generations. For Plotinus, however, the concept becomes the peacemaker, which reconciles the camps. The importance of this reconciliation is central to Plotinus’ philosophical system because it not only uses Aristotle to defend Plato from Aristotle himself, but establishes Plotinus’ concept of number as the fundamental link between the number theories of the Neopythagoreans and the later Neoplatonists.This book demonstrates that the subject of number should be considered among the most important concepts for understanding Plotinus’ philosophy and therefore deserves greater scholarly attention than it has received. Plotinus adopts and adapts Platonic and Neopythagorean cosmology to place number in the foundation of the intelligible realm and the construction of the universe. Throughout the Enneads and especially in Ennead VI.6, he systematically peels off the layers of mathematical and quantitative perception from the concept of number to reveal that real intelligible number is the primary activity of substance, which orders the unfolding of the universe from its absolute source into a finite multiplicity.Less
The concept of number is the troublemaker in the history of Platonism. It separated the followers of Plato and Aristotle into two camps for generations. For Plotinus, however, the concept becomes the peacemaker, which reconciles the camps. The importance of this reconciliation is central to Plotinus’ philosophical system because it not only uses Aristotle to defend Plato from Aristotle himself, but establishes Plotinus’ concept of number as the fundamental link between the number theories of the Neopythagoreans and the later Neoplatonists.This book demonstrates that the subject of number should be considered among the most important concepts for understanding Plotinus’ philosophy and therefore deserves greater scholarly attention than it has received. Plotinus adopts and adapts Platonic and Neopythagorean cosmology to place number in the foundation of the intelligible realm and the construction of the universe. Throughout the Enneads and especially in Ennead VI.6, he systematically peels off the layers of mathematical and quantitative perception from the concept of number to reveal that real intelligible number is the primary activity of substance, which orders the unfolding of the universe from its absolute source into a finite multiplicity.
Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195143744
- eISBN:
- 9780199835317
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143744.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book presents 12 essays that illustrate the current state of scholarship on Leibniz’s metaphysics. Essays 1 and 2 tackle the different aspects of one of the main topics of Leibniz’s metaphysics ...
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This book presents 12 essays that illustrate the current state of scholarship on Leibniz’s metaphysics. Essays 1 and 2 tackle the different aspects of one of the main topics of Leibniz’s metaphysics — the relation of unity and multiplicity. Essays 3 and 4 focus on the ontological status of body in Leibniz’s middle period. Essays 5 and 6 challenge the features of Leibniz’s hypothesis of preestablished harmony. Essay 7 surveys Leibniz’s claims on behalf of teleological concepts in the explanation of nature and harmony. Essay 8 explores the conception of spontaneity or self-determination. Essays 9 and 10 examine Leibniz’s doctrine of moral necessity. Essays 11 and 12 address the role of “intelligence” in Leibniz’s account of freedom.Less
This book presents 12 essays that illustrate the current state of scholarship on Leibniz’s metaphysics. Essays 1 and 2 tackle the different aspects of one of the main topics of Leibniz’s metaphysics — the relation of unity and multiplicity. Essays 3 and 4 focus on the ontological status of body in Leibniz’s middle period. Essays 5 and 6 challenge the features of Leibniz’s hypothesis of preestablished harmony. Essay 7 surveys Leibniz’s claims on behalf of teleological concepts in the explanation of nature and harmony. Essay 8 explores the conception of spontaneity or self-determination. Essays 9 and 10 examine Leibniz’s doctrine of moral necessity. Essays 11 and 12 address the role of “intelligence” in Leibniz’s account of freedom.
Christopher Shields
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253074
- eISBN:
- 9780191598401
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253072.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his ...
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Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his philosophical methodology. In this book, Christopher Shields offers the first full‐length investigation of homonymy in Aristotle's work, in which he explicates and assesses Aristotle's commitment to homonymy in both critical and constructive contexts. Shields identifies homonymy as both a critical tool, with Plato as the target, by means of which Aristotle can emphasize the complexity of core philosophical concepts; and as a constructive method for the discovery of order in multiplicity, which is crucial for genuine scientific inquiry and philosophical progress. In Part I, Shields establishes and examines the general theoretical framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. In Ch. 1, Shields discusses the first characterization of homonymy in the Categories, with a view to assessing the role of homonymy in Aristotle's later works; in Chs. 2 to 4 Shields examines some objections to Aristotle's reliance to homonymy, the connection between homonymy and signification, and the notion of core‐dependent homonymy. Part II is an examination of five cases in which we see homonymy at work: Ch. 5 discusses Aristotle's appeal to the homonymy of the body, Ch. 6 to the concept of life, Ch 7, to the concepts of oneness and sameness, and Ch. 8 to goodness. Shields argues that Aristotle is successful in each of these endeavours, particularly so in the case of the homonymy of life, but only partially so in the case of goodness. In Ch. 9, Shield argues that Aristotle fails to establish that being is homonymous. Shields argues that, aside from the attempt to apply homonymy to being, Aristotle's commitment to homonym is well motivated, and it introduces a method of definition that is of genuine and lasting importance. Shields argues that Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis, and that it is a framework of enduring value and with prospects for genuine philosophical progress.Less
Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his philosophical methodology. In this book, Christopher Shields offers the first full‐length investigation of homonymy in Aristotle's work, in which he explicates and assesses Aristotle's commitment to homonymy in both critical and constructive contexts. Shields identifies homonymy as both a critical tool, with Plato as the target, by means of which Aristotle can emphasize the complexity of core philosophical concepts; and as a constructive method for the discovery of order in multiplicity, which is crucial for genuine scientific inquiry and philosophical progress. In Part I, Shields establishes and examines the general theoretical framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. In Ch. 1, Shields discusses the first characterization of homonymy in the Categories, with a view to assessing the role of homonymy in Aristotle's later works; in Chs. 2 to 4 Shields examines some objections to Aristotle's reliance to homonymy, the connection between homonymy and signification, and the notion of core‐dependent homonymy. Part II is an examination of five cases in which we see homonymy at work: Ch. 5 discusses Aristotle's appeal to the homonymy of the body, Ch. 6 to the concept of life, Ch 7, to the concepts of oneness and sameness, and Ch. 8 to goodness. Shields argues that Aristotle is successful in each of these endeavours, particularly so in the case of the homonymy of life, but only partially so in the case of goodness. In Ch. 9, Shield argues that Aristotle fails to establish that being is homonymous. Shields argues that, aside from the attempt to apply homonymy to being, Aristotle's commitment to homonym is well motivated, and it introduces a method of definition that is of genuine and lasting importance. Shields argues that Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis, and that it is a framework of enduring value and with prospects for genuine philosophical progress.
David Schlosberg
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256419
- eISBN:
- 9780191600203
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256411.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
An examination is made of a genealogy of pluralist approaches to multiplicity and difference in the twentieth century, starting with William James (1976 [1912], 1977 [1909]), who began his study of ...
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An examination is made of a genealogy of pluralist approaches to multiplicity and difference in the twentieth century, starting with William James (1976 [1912], 1977 [1909]), who began his study of pluralism with a ‘radical empiricism’ that is opposed to a more singular, monist position. James argued that our experiences of empirical events diverge, and one explanation could never encompass all of those experiences; other political pluralists (Arthur Bentley, Ernest Barker, Harold Laski, Mary Parker Follett) took James’s critique of absolutism and applied it to the state. Post-Second World War pluralists used the concept of heterogeneity in a much more constricted sense to defend and promote self-interested interest groups. However, more recently, there has been a return to multiplicities, and Donna Haraway’s (1988) description of ‘situated knowledges’ and ‘embodied objectivity’, in which she argues for ‘epistemologies of location’ where claims of knowledge can only be considered partial, resurrects James. The argument here is that a return to such original notions of pluralism helps validate the diversity of experiences and knowledges that grow out of the variety of ways we are all situated in any number of experiences, including environmental degradation.Less
An examination is made of a genealogy of pluralist approaches to multiplicity and difference in the twentieth century, starting with William James (1976 [1912], 1977 [1909]), who began his study of pluralism with a ‘radical empiricism’ that is opposed to a more singular, monist position. James argued that our experiences of empirical events diverge, and one explanation could never encompass all of those experiences; other political pluralists (Arthur Bentley, Ernest Barker, Harold Laski, Mary Parker Follett) took James’s critique of absolutism and applied it to the state. Post-Second World War pluralists used the concept of heterogeneity in a much more constricted sense to defend and promote self-interested interest groups. However, more recently, there has been a return to multiplicities, and Donna Haraway’s (1988) description of ‘situated knowledges’ and ‘embodied objectivity’, in which she argues for ‘epistemologies of location’ where claims of knowledge can only be considered partial, resurrects James. The argument here is that a return to such original notions of pluralism helps validate the diversity of experiences and knowledges that grow out of the variety of ways we are all situated in any number of experiences, including environmental degradation.
David Schlosberg
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256419
- eISBN:
- 9780191600203
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256411.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
The acceptance of multiplicity as the precondition of political action is central to the new generation of theorists and activists that the author designates as ‘critical pluralists’. In political ...
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The acceptance of multiplicity as the precondition of political action is central to the new generation of theorists and activists that the author designates as ‘critical pluralists’. In political and social theory, a range of authors has finally begun to respond to a lament broached by Mary Parker Follett in 1918: pluralists early in the century had acknowledged difference, she noted, but they had not arrived at the heart of the question – what is to be done with this diversity? This chapter examines some of the contemporary responses to Follett’s question and constructs a list of practices necessary to build political relations across difference. These get at issues of justice beyond the material, concerning both recognition and participatory process, and it is argued that agonistic respect (William Connolly 1991), attempts at intersubjective understanding (Seyla Benhabib 1992; Jurgen Habermas 1970; Axel Honneth 1992), inclusive, open discourse free from domination and the possibility of reprisals (John Dryzek 1990; John Forester 1989; Habermas 1984, 1987), and the development of a particular form of solidarity are all crucial to the practices suggested by a new generation of pluralist theory. Solidarity (unity without uniformity) is complex in that it centres on the process of reconciling difference with the need for concerted political action. The author focuses on how the notion of unity suggested by Follett was discarded by the second generation of pluralism, but is now mirrored by numerous contemporary theorists, including Richard Rorty (1989), Donna Haraway (1991), and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987).Less
The acceptance of multiplicity as the precondition of political action is central to the new generation of theorists and activists that the author designates as ‘critical pluralists’. In political and social theory, a range of authors has finally begun to respond to a lament broached by Mary Parker Follett in 1918: pluralists early in the century had acknowledged difference, she noted, but they had not arrived at the heart of the question – what is to be done with this diversity? This chapter examines some of the contemporary responses to Follett’s question and constructs a list of practices necessary to build political relations across difference. These get at issues of justice beyond the material, concerning both recognition and participatory process, and it is argued that agonistic respect (William Connolly 1991), attempts at intersubjective understanding (Seyla Benhabib 1992; Jurgen Habermas 1970; Axel Honneth 1992), inclusive, open discourse free from domination and the possibility of reprisals (John Dryzek 1990; John Forester 1989; Habermas 1984, 1987), and the development of a particular form of solidarity are all crucial to the practices suggested by a new generation of pluralist theory. Solidarity (unity without uniformity) is complex in that it centres on the process of reconciling difference with the need for concerted political action. The author focuses on how the notion of unity suggested by Follett was discarded by the second generation of pluralism, but is now mirrored by numerous contemporary theorists, including Richard Rorty (1989), Donna Haraway (1991), and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987).
Maarten A. Hajer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199281671
- eISBN:
- 9780191713132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281671.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Using the example of the Nobel Peace Prize for Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), this chapter explores a conceptualization of authority as the possibility for reasoned ...
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Using the example of the Nobel Peace Prize for Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), this chapter explores a conceptualization of authority as the possibility for reasoned elaboration. It is seen as a possible alternative for what is called ‘classical modernist’ politics: the politics of democratically elected leaders using their ‘de jure’ authority. The chapter argues that the quasi-natural authority of classical-modernist government suffers from a triple deficit: of implementation, of its capacity to learn, and increasingly also of creating legitimacy. It discusses the new ‘repertoire’ of network governance that has become more important in answer to this triple deficit. Yet is also relates the challenge of governance to the growing importance of the media in the conduct of politics. The combination of these factors complicates the achievement of authority because the politics of meaning has become far more difficult to control. Instead of a political centre we have a politics of multiplicity; there are multiple, often unexpected political stages and multiple, actively interpreting interconnected publics. The book calls this ‘the politics of multiplicities’. This creates a structural instability in the political space.Less
Using the example of the Nobel Peace Prize for Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), this chapter explores a conceptualization of authority as the possibility for reasoned elaboration. It is seen as a possible alternative for what is called ‘classical modernist’ politics: the politics of democratically elected leaders using their ‘de jure’ authority. The chapter argues that the quasi-natural authority of classical-modernist government suffers from a triple deficit: of implementation, of its capacity to learn, and increasingly also of creating legitimacy. It discusses the new ‘repertoire’ of network governance that has become more important in answer to this triple deficit. Yet is also relates the challenge of governance to the growing importance of the media in the conduct of politics. The combination of these factors complicates the achievement of authority because the politics of meaning has become far more difficult to control. Instead of a political centre we have a politics of multiplicity; there are multiple, often unexpected political stages and multiple, actively interpreting interconnected publics. The book calls this ‘the politics of multiplicities’. This creates a structural instability in the political space.
Maarten A. Hajer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199281671
- eISBN:
- 9780191713132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281671.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The decision what and how to rebuild at ‘Ground Zero’ is a highly symbolic and contentious act, with high financial stakes, in which the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, Port Authority, ...
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The decision what and how to rebuild at ‘Ground Zero’ is a highly symbolic and contentious act, with high financial stakes, in which the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, Port Authority, private stakeholders, mourning families, and inhabitants compete about the meaning of the site. Examining the stories of Ground Zero the chapter makes out four different discourses: (1) The Programme (2) Memorial Discourse, (3) Revitalization, and (4) Phoenix. The chapter studies the policy process focusing on two policy practices through which the meaning of rebuilding Ground Zero gets enacted in a particularly interesting way for the book. Listening to the city and the subsequent Design study constitute examples of opening up a closed process. The empirical analysis shows how new techniques of deliberation were employed, allowing many publics into the policy conversation. It also reveals interesting examples of how to recombine expertise and participation, and design experts cooperating with various audiences. However, by the lack of a creative follow-up, and a script that would have kept the public involved, the ‘rebuilding as a democracy’ in the end turns out to be an unhappy performative. In the end the oyster of classical-modernist politics that was forced open, closed again. A chance for an authoritative governance based on the story line of ‘we must rebuild as a democracy’ was missed.Less
The decision what and how to rebuild at ‘Ground Zero’ is a highly symbolic and contentious act, with high financial stakes, in which the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, Port Authority, private stakeholders, mourning families, and inhabitants compete about the meaning of the site. Examining the stories of Ground Zero the chapter makes out four different discourses: (1) The Programme (2) Memorial Discourse, (3) Revitalization, and (4) Phoenix. The chapter studies the policy process focusing on two policy practices through which the meaning of rebuilding Ground Zero gets enacted in a particularly interesting way for the book. Listening to the city and the subsequent Design study constitute examples of opening up a closed process. The empirical analysis shows how new techniques of deliberation were employed, allowing many publics into the policy conversation. It also reveals interesting examples of how to recombine expertise and participation, and design experts cooperating with various audiences. However, by the lack of a creative follow-up, and a script that would have kept the public involved, the ‘rebuilding as a democracy’ in the end turns out to be an unhappy performative. In the end the oyster of classical-modernist politics that was forced open, closed again. A chance for an authoritative governance based on the story line of ‘we must rebuild as a democracy’ was missed.
Rushmir Mahmutćehajić
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823227518
- eISBN:
- 9780823237029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823227518.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
There is no thought that does not tend toward the question of love. Although this is the case from the beginning to the end of existence, it is worth testifying that love remains indefinable by ...
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There is no thought that does not tend toward the question of love. Although this is the case from the beginning to the end of existence, it is worth testifying that love remains indefinable by thought. The fullness of love is the same as emptiness of thought. In all the descriptions and accounts of love, there is no definition that would make its essence known to reason. Whatever the factors defining love, they do not contribute to knowledge of it. All discourse about love is the attribution of power to reason. It is so because love cannot be separated from being. Even so, the indefinability of love is the way in which it eludes all power outside itself. Knowledge is the aim of love that comes from indivisible oneness, but oneness too is its aim that comes from divergence in existence. Oneness sees itself through multiplicity. And the other way around, multiplicity sees itself through oneness. They are two aspects of one and the same essence.Less
There is no thought that does not tend toward the question of love. Although this is the case from the beginning to the end of existence, it is worth testifying that love remains indefinable by thought. The fullness of love is the same as emptiness of thought. In all the descriptions and accounts of love, there is no definition that would make its essence known to reason. Whatever the factors defining love, they do not contribute to knowledge of it. All discourse about love is the attribution of power to reason. It is so because love cannot be separated from being. Even so, the indefinability of love is the way in which it eludes all power outside itself. Knowledge is the aim of love that comes from indivisible oneness, but oneness too is its aim that comes from divergence in existence. Oneness sees itself through multiplicity. And the other way around, multiplicity sees itself through oneness. They are two aspects of one and the same essence.
Rushmir Mahmutćehajić
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823227518
- eISBN:
- 9780823237029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823227518.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
Thought remains forever caught in the tension between the elements of duality. It knows only duality and functions only within it. However, duality is nothing other than the proclamation and ...
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Thought remains forever caught in the tension between the elements of duality. It knows only duality and functions only within it. However, duality is nothing other than the proclamation and confirmation of oneness. But oneness is neither comparable nor similar. In addition, it is present in everything that is duality, and that means in the totality of existence. Consequently, to think means to compare. And that is possible only in a world of multiplicity, where phenomena are forms in movement. Thought can bring one to the border, where comparability ends or begins. If thought has a purpose, if it becomes meaning, then God is its foundation. If oneness is infinitely close to everything, then it entails multiplicity as its need. In oneness are all possibilities, but indivisible and unrevealed. Just as the hiddenness of fullness demands or loves oneness as its confirmation, so oneness too loves its revelation in countless multiplicity. Thought is possible only with reason, while loving almost does not care for the help and cooperation of thought.Less
Thought remains forever caught in the tension between the elements of duality. It knows only duality and functions only within it. However, duality is nothing other than the proclamation and confirmation of oneness. But oneness is neither comparable nor similar. In addition, it is present in everything that is duality, and that means in the totality of existence. Consequently, to think means to compare. And that is possible only in a world of multiplicity, where phenomena are forms in movement. Thought can bring one to the border, where comparability ends or begins. If thought has a purpose, if it becomes meaning, then God is its foundation. If oneness is infinitely close to everything, then it entails multiplicity as its need. In oneness are all possibilities, but indivisible and unrevealed. Just as the hiddenness of fullness demands or loves oneness as its confirmation, so oneness too loves its revelation in countless multiplicity. Thought is possible only with reason, while loving almost does not care for the help and cooperation of thought.
