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Parliamentary Democracy and Delegatio n

Kaare Strøm

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of ... More


 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0008
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency ... More


Delegation and its Peril s

Arthur Lupia

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0002
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

Presents a formal theoretical framework that clarifies when principals can, and cannot, use delegation to accomplish desired ends. It shows the conditions (having to do with preferences and ... More


Parliamentary Democracy: Promise and Problems

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0001
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

Parliamentary government is the most common way to organize delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Parliamentary government is a system of government in which the prime minister ... More


The Gods of Risk

Witham Larry

in Marketplace of the Gods: How Economics Explains Religion

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780195394757
eISBN:
9780199777372
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394757.003.0004
Subject:
Religion, Religion and Society

Religion is a form of risk management in human lives and in religious groups. Pascal’s Wager famously illustrates the calculation of loss and benefit in religious belief. But there are other economic ... More


The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Pranab Bardhan (ed.)

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198287629
eISBN:
9780191595912
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198287623.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

In this book, the authors theorize about the rationale and consequences of some economic institutions and contractual arrangements that are particularly predominant in poor agrarian economies. The ... More


Obstacles to Trade, Enhanced Models of Selection, and the Impact of Policy Variation

Robert M. Townsend

in Financial Systems in Developing Economies: Growth, Inequality and Policy Evaluation in Thailand

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199533237
eISBN:
9780191594892
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199533237.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, South and East Asia, Development, Growth, and Environmental

This chapter establishes that moral hazard, limited commitment, transaction costs, and other obstacles to trade are salient features of the Thai financial landscape. Structural choice models and data ... More


Open Issues

Michael Chui and Prasanna Gai

in Private Sector Involvement and International Financial Crises: An Analytical Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199267750
eISBN:
9780191602504
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199267758.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

Explores the circumstances under which the imposition of statutory debt restructuring mechanisms and/or debt standstills can trigger a ‘rush for the exits’ by creditors. Given the possibility of such ... More


The Mirage of Private Unemployment Insurance

Nicholas Barr

in The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199246595
eISBN:
9780191595936
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199246599.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare

Chapter 3 discusses unemployment insurance. Actuarial insurance faces a series of problems including adverse selection and – particularly – moral hazard. It is, therefore, not surprising that private ... More


Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Amy Finkelstein

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780231163804
eISBN:
9780231538688
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Columbia University Press
DOI:
10.7312/columbia/9780231163804.001.0001
Subject:
Business and Management, Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility

Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 ... More


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