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Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated ... More


Macromolecular Crystallization and Crystal Perfection

Naomi E. Chayen, John R. Helliwell, and Edward H. Snell

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199213252
eISBN:
9780191707575
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213252.001.0001
Subject:
Physics, Crystallography

Structural crystallography provides key information to understand the mechanism involved for biological processes. The technique requires high‐quality crystals. The book Macromolecular ... More


 Private Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0012
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter introduces and illustrates the basic issues that arise in games with private monitoring. It discusses and presents the two basic approaches to equilibrium analysis in games with private ... More


Research Questions

Luis Correia Da Silva, Marc Goergen, and Luc Renneboog

in Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
April 2004
ISBN:
9780199259304
eISBN:
9780191600852
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259305.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

Discusses the research questions that will be addressed in the next chapters. The research questions relate to the link between dividend levels and corporate control, and dividend flexibility and ... More


Overall summary and future thoughts

Naomi E. Chayen, John R. Helliwell, and Edward H. Snell

in Macromolecular Crystallization and Crystal Perfection

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199213252
eISBN:
9780191707575
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213252.003.0020
Subject:
Physics, Crystallography

This chapter summarizes the state‐of‐the‐art in the field and discusses upcoming techniques to solve and to improve the current problems.


 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0007
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides the basic technical tools for working with games of imperfect public monitoring, with games of perfect monitoring as a special case. It introduces the central notions of a ... More


 Almost Public Monitoring Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides a detailed treatment of work on games with almost-public monitoring. The chapter introduces the key distinction between strategies with bounded and unbounded recall, showing ... More


 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to ... More


 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual ... More


 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter shows that in many situations with patient players, the payoffs bounds from Chapter 8 are tight. It then proves various folk theorems for games of public monitoring, including games with ... More


 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides examples in which private strategies, where a player’s behavior can depend nontrivially on his or her own privately observed past action, open up new payoff possibilities that ... More


 Applications

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, ... More


 Belief‐Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0014
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents belief-free equilibria in private monitoring games. The chapter provides examples based on the prisoners’ dilemma and develops the notion of self-generation for private ... More


Implementing management for long-term sustainability

E. J. Milner-Gulland and Marcus Rowcliffe

in Conservation and Sustainable Use: A Handbook of Techniques

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780198530367
eISBN:
9780191713095
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198530367.003.0007
Subject:
Biology, Biodiversity / Conservation Biology

This chapter looks at how to implement management plans, monitor their conservation effectiveness and value for money, and ensure that they are resilient for the long term. Effective decision-making ... More


 “No Net Loss”: Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection

James Salzman and J. B. Ruhl

in Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation: Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195189650
eISBN:
9780199783694
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189650.003.0012
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

This essay evaluates wetlands mitigation banking (WMB) as a tool for accomplishing the policy of no net loss of the nation's wetlands. The first part describes the legal and historical background to ... More


The View from the Community

Devi Sridhar

in The Battle Against Hunger: Choice, Circumstance, and the World Bank

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199549962
eISBN:
9780191720499
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199549962.003.0005
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Economy

This chapter presents findings on the impact of the Bank framework of women as ‘agents of change’ on the Bank's projects and the communities at which they are aimed, using TINP. It is a critical ... More


All Bark, No Bite? The Regulation of Prisons in England and Wales

Christopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George Jones, and Tony Travers

in Regulation Inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleazebusters

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198280996
eISBN:
9780191599491
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198280998.003.0006
Subject:
Political Science, UK Politics

Examines regulation of prison standards by arms‐length oversight bodies, which generally had much stronger capacities for monitoring than enforcement. Prisons in England and Wales are subject to one ... More


From Secret Garden to Reign of Terror? the Regulation of State Schools in England

Christopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George Jones, and Tony Travers

in Regulation Inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleazebusters

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198280996
eISBN:
9780191599491
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198280998.003.0007
Subject:
Political Science, UK Politics

Explores the complex institutional jungle of regulators involved in regulating state schools in England. In this sector, in contrast with the prisons sector, regulators were able to link their ... More


Self‐Attribution

Alvin I. Goldman

in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195138924
eISBN:
9780199786480
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195138929.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Most cognitive scientists and many philosophers of mind resist the traditional notion that the mind has a special method of monitoring or accessing its own current mental states. We review the ... More


Dialogue With European States

Michael Banton

in International Action against Racial Discrimination

Published in print:
1996
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198280613
eISBN:
9780191598760
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198280610.003.0009
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics

More detailed consideration is given to CERD's jurisprudence on particular articles, such as the recommendation that Article 3 constitutes a general prohibition of racial segregation and not just of ... More


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