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Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated ... More


Macromolecular Crystallization and Crystal Perfection

Naomi E. Chayen, John R. Helliwell, and Edward H. Snell

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199213252
eISBN:
9780191707575
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213252.001.0001
Subject:
Physics, Crystallography

Structural crystallography provides key information to understand the mechanism involved for biological processes. The technique requires high‐quality crystals. The book Macromolecular ... More


 Private Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0012
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter introduces and illustrates the basic issues that arise in games with private monitoring. It discusses and presents the two basic approaches to equilibrium analysis in games with private ... More


Overall summary and future thoughts

Naomi E. Chayen, John R. Helliwell, and Edward H. Snell

in Macromolecular Crystallization and Crystal Perfection

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199213252
eISBN:
9780191707575
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213252.003.0020
Subject:
Physics, Crystallography

This chapter summarizes the state‐of‐the‐art in the field and discusses upcoming techniques to solve and to improve the current problems.


Research Questions

Luis Correia Da Silva, Marc Goergen, and Luc Renneboog

in Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
April 2004
ISBN:
9780199259304
eISBN:
9780191600852
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259305.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

Discusses the research questions that will be addressed in the next chapters. The research questions relate to the link between dividend levels and corporate control, and dividend flexibility and ... More


 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0007
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides the basic technical tools for working with games of imperfect public monitoring, with games of perfect monitoring as a special case. It introduces the central notions of a ... More


 Almost Public Monitoring Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides a detailed treatment of work on games with almost-public monitoring. The chapter introduces the key distinction between strategies with bounded and unbounded recall, showing ... More


 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to ... More


 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual ... More


 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter shows that in many situations with patient players, the payoffs bounds from Chapter 8 are tight. It then proves various folk theorems for games of public monitoring, including games with ... More


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