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The Evolution of the Rules of the Societal Games

Masahiko Aoki

in Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutional Rules

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199218530
eISBN:
9780191711510
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218530.003.0004
Subject:
Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability, Strategy

Based on the recent development of epistemic game theory, this chapter attempts to resolve longstanding contested issues across social science disciplines about the nature and origin of institutions. ... More


The Golden Rule

Ken Binmore

in Natural Justice

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195178111
eISBN:
9780199783670
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter reviews the relevant anthropology, starting with the apparent universality of the golden rule — do as you would be done by — in hunter-gatherer societies. It points out that all pure ... More


Mechanism Design

Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro

in An Introduction to Auction Theory

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199275984
eISBN:
9780191602214
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019927598X.003.0006
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter discusses how auction theory under independent types can be presented as a mechanism design problem. It is shown that any two mechanisms that allocate the object in the same way and ... More


 Getting Locked In

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real: Game Theory

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195300574
eISBN:
9780199783748
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as the linking idea in an overview of many of the topics covered later in the book. The basic ideas are that of a dominated strategy and a Pareto-efficient ... More


Dynamic Allocation and Pricing: A Mechanism Design Approach

Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780262028400
eISBN:
9780262327732
Item type:
book
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262028400.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

Dynamic allocation and pricing problems appear in numerous frameworks such as the retail of seasonal/style goods, the allocation of fixed capacities in the travel and leisure industries (e.g., ... More


School Choice

Atıla Abdulkadıroğlu

in The Handbook of Market Design

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199570515
eISBN:
9780191765957
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570515.003.0006
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

School choice has presented economists with opportunities to study and design student assignment systems, which in turn have helped push forward the frontiers of mechanism design theory. This chapter ... More


A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems

Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman

in The Handbook of Market Design

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199570515
eISBN:
9780191765957
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570515.003.0019
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

The chapter describes a mechanism design framework that could help identify a set of procedural mechanisms that would minimize the resources used to achieve one of the main goals of the court system, ... More


Market Design for Kidney Exchange

Tayfun SÖnmez and Utku M. Ünver

in The Handbook of Market Design

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199570515
eISBN:
9780191765957
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570515.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This chapter begins by summarizing the mechanics governing kidney donations. There are two sources of donation: deceased donors and living donors. It then analyzes the kidney exchange problem as a ... More


Robust Mechanism Design

Börgers Tilman, Krähmer Daniel, and Strausz Roland

in An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199734023
eISBN:
9780190244699
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

A new and general framework for informationally robust mechanism design is developed. Standard results are integrated into this framework. Paradoxes that arise in this framework are explained. The ... More


Introduction

Börgers Tilman, Krähmer Daniel, and Strausz Roland

in An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199734023
eISBN:
9780190244699
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.003.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides an informal survey of the key questions of the theory of mechanism design. The chapter then outlines the analytical approach that the theory of mechanism design takes to address ... More


Optimal Incentives in Core‐Selecting Auctions

Robert Day and Paul Milgrom

in The Handbook of Market Design

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199570515
eISBN:
9780191765957
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570515.003.0012
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This chapter describes a new auction for differentiated goods — the ‘Product-Mix Auction’ — that was designed and implemented after the 2007 Northern Rock bank-run to help the Bank of England fight ... More


An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Tilman Börgers

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199734023
eISBN:
9780190244699
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? This book addresses these ... More


Mechanism Design

Thomas A. Weber

in Optimal Control Theory with Applications in Economics

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262015738
eISBN:
9780262298483
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262015738.003.0005
Subject:
Mathematics, Probability / Statistics

This chapter reviews the basics of static mechanism design in settings where a principal faces a single agent of uncertain type. The aim of the resulting screening contract is for the principal to ... More


Fragmented Credit Markets

Pranab Bardhan and Christopher Udry

in Development Microeconomics

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198773719
eISBN:
9780191595929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198773714.003.0007
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

One aspect of financial markets that is of great relevance to economic development is the study of credit mechanism design by lenders facing private information. This chapter first develops a model ... More


The Incentive‐Compatibility Desideratum

Christian List and Philip Pettit

in Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199591565
eISBN:
9780191725494
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A second desideratum of good organizational design is incentive compatibility. This is satisfied to the extent that group members are given incentives to act in a way that supports an expected mode ... More


Bayesian Mechanism Design: Examples

Börgers Tilman, Krähmer Daniel, and Strausz Roland

in An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199734023
eISBN:
9780190244699
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

The classic Bayesian theory of mechanism design is developed in three simple examples: auctions, public goods, and bilateral trade. The classic results, such as the revelation principle and the ... More


Eric Maskin

Roger W. Spencer and David A. Macpherson

in Lives of the Laureates: Twenty-three Nobel Economists

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780262027960
eISBN:
9780262325868
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262027960.003.0020
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Economic History

This chapter looks at the career of Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Prize recipient in 2007. Maskin was born in 1950 and completed his doctorate in mathematics at Harvard University in 1976. Ken Arrow, Leo ... More


Taking Charge

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real Coursepack Edition: A Text on Game Theory

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
April 2015
ISBN:
9780199924530
eISBN:
9780190261399
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199924530.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter deals with auctions and mechanism design commonly referred to as the rules of the game. In problems concerning bidding and public auction, many principles should be considered as part of ... More


Dreams of a Final Theory

Paul Erickson

in The World the Game theorists Made

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780226097039
eISBN:
9780226097206
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:
10.7208/chicago/9780226097206.003.0007
Subject:
History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine

The appearances of game theory in evolutionary biology in the 1970s foreshadowed the theory’s widespread adoption in the social sciences in the 1980s. During this latter period, the analysis of ... More


Optimal Control Theory with Applications in Economics

Thomas A. Weber

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262015738
eISBN:
9780262298483
Item type:
book
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262015738.001.0001
Subject:
Mathematics, Probability / Statistics

This book bridges optimal control theory and economics, discussing ordinary differential equations (ODEs), optimal control, game theory, and mechanism design in one volume. Technically rigorous and ... More


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