Gila Sher
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195387469
- eISBN:
- 9780199332427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
The chapter delineates a new approach to truth that falls under the category of ’pluralism within the bounds of correspondence’ and illustrates it with respect to mathematical truth. Mathematical ...
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The chapter delineates a new approach to truth that falls under the category of ’pluralism within the bounds of correspondence’ and illustrates it with respect to mathematical truth. Mathematical truth, like all other truths, is based on correspondence; but the route of mathematical correspondence differs from other routes of correspondence in (i) connecting mathematical truths to a special aspect of reality, namely, its formal aspect, and (ii) doing so in a complex, indirect way, rather than in a simple and direct way. The underlying idea is that an intricate mind is capable of creating intricate routes from language to reality, and this enables it to apply correspondence principles in areas for which correspondence is traditionally thought to be problematic.Less
The chapter delineates a new approach to truth that falls under the category of ’pluralism within the bounds of correspondence’ and illustrates it with respect to mathematical truth. Mathematical truth, like all other truths, is based on correspondence; but the route of mathematical correspondence differs from other routes of correspondence in (i) connecting mathematical truths to a special aspect of reality, namely, its formal aspect, and (ii) doing so in a complex, indirect way, rather than in a simple and direct way. The underlying idea is that an intricate mind is capable of creating intricate routes from language to reality, and this enables it to apply correspondence principles in areas for which correspondence is traditionally thought to be problematic.
Robert Barnard and Terence Horgan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195387469
- eISBN:
- 9780199332427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This chapter articulates a version of correspondence theory that holds that truth is always correspondence. Separating questions about the nature of truth from questions about the correct ontology ...
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This chapter articulates a version of correspondence theory that holds that truth is always correspondence. Separating questions about the nature of truth from questions about the correct ontology permits a metaphysically neutral position. When assertoric language is deployed in such a way that its singular terms and unnegated existential quantifications carry ontological commitment to particulars that putatively belong to the right ontology and its predicates carry ontological commitment to properties and relations that putatively belong to the right ontology, then correspondence functions in what is called a direct way. The chapter holds that truth is always correspondence, but is rarely direct, and propositions native to different discourses can all be literally true via correspondence, although very often their truth constitutes an indirect kind of correspondence that does not require the right ontology to include objects, properties, or relations answering to the proposition’s singular, predicative, or existential-quantificational constituents.Less
This chapter articulates a version of correspondence theory that holds that truth is always correspondence. Separating questions about the nature of truth from questions about the correct ontology permits a metaphysically neutral position. When assertoric language is deployed in such a way that its singular terms and unnegated existential quantifications carry ontological commitment to particulars that putatively belong to the right ontology and its predicates carry ontological commitment to properties and relations that putatively belong to the right ontology, then correspondence functions in what is called a direct way. The chapter holds that truth is always correspondence, but is rarely direct, and propositions native to different discourses can all be literally true via correspondence, although very often their truth constitutes an indirect kind of correspondence that does not require the right ontology to include objects, properties, or relations answering to the proposition’s singular, predicative, or existential-quantificational constituents.
Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262083768
- eISBN:
- 9780262275682
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262083768.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter continues with the synthesis stage in the dialectic of reflective common sense as started in the previous chapter. It sets forth the theses of austere realism in a way that draws ...
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This chapter continues with the synthesis stage in the dialectic of reflective common sense as started in the previous chapter. It sets forth the theses of austere realism in a way that draws directly upon what is said about truth in the previous chapter, and explains how austere realism can provide natural and reflectively plausible solutions to the problems that undermine simple realism. The specific version of austere realism promoted here incorporates the wider framework of contextual semantics—although the defining theses of austere realism do not presuppose this entire framework, and in principle these theses could be embraced even without embracing all of contextual semantics. The distinction between direct and indirect correspondence fits especially well within this wider semantic framework because the framework treats numerous terms and concepts as governed by implicit contextual parameters, making it natural to treat truth itself this way within the framework.Less
This chapter continues with the synthesis stage in the dialectic of reflective common sense as started in the previous chapter. It sets forth the theses of austere realism in a way that draws directly upon what is said about truth in the previous chapter, and explains how austere realism can provide natural and reflectively plausible solutions to the problems that undermine simple realism. The specific version of austere realism promoted here incorporates the wider framework of contextual semantics—although the defining theses of austere realism do not presuppose this entire framework, and in principle these theses could be embraced even without embracing all of contextual semantics. The distinction between direct and indirect correspondence fits especially well within this wider semantic framework because the framework treats numerous terms and concepts as governed by implicit contextual parameters, making it natural to treat truth itself this way within the framework.
Terence E. Horgan and Matjaž Potrč
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262083768
- eISBN:
- 9780262275682
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262083768.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book describes and defends an ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements ...
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This book describes and defends an ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. The chapters argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, the chapters consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call “blobjectivism”—the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos (“the blobject”), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts.Less
This book describes and defends an ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. The chapters argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, the chapters consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call “blobjectivism”—the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos (“the blobject”), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts.
Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262083768
- eISBN:
- 9780262275682
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262083768.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter expands on the defense of austere realism by addressing the three challenges most likely to be raised against it. The first challenge relates to austere realism's support of austere ...
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This chapter expands on the defense of austere realism by addressing the three challenges most likely to be raised against it. The first challenge relates to austere realism's support of austere ontology; this makes austere realism contrary to common sense beliefs about the world or to what facts science puts forth about the world. The second challenge concerns the problems faced by the appeal to contextual variability of semantic standards, which will be discussed in detail here. Finally, the third challenge concerns the skeptical doubts apt to arise regarding whether an adequate general account can be given of matters like the variety of indirect correspondence semantic standards and the dynamics of contextual variation in semantic standards.Less
This chapter expands on the defense of austere realism by addressing the three challenges most likely to be raised against it. The first challenge relates to austere realism's support of austere ontology; this makes austere realism contrary to common sense beliefs about the world or to what facts science puts forth about the world. The second challenge concerns the problems faced by the appeal to contextual variability of semantic standards, which will be discussed in detail here. Finally, the third challenge concerns the skeptical doubts apt to arise regarding whether an adequate general account can be given of matters like the variety of indirect correspondence semantic standards and the dynamics of contextual variation in semantic standards.
