Daniel M. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781503605053
- eISBN:
- 9781503606401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9781503605053.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter explores the inherited incumbency advantage in elections, the mechanisms behind the advantage, and how it differs in the prereform and postreform electoral environments of Japan. New ...
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This chapter explores the inherited incumbency advantage in elections, the mechanisms behind the advantage, and how it differs in the prereform and postreform electoral environments of Japan. New legacy candidates are decidedly advantaged over non-legacy candidates in both SNTV and FPTP elections. However, there is also a selection effect in terms of where legacy candidates emerge. In the prereform period, legacy candidates followed strong incumbents, whose exit freed up votes and encouraged the entry of competitive challengers. In the postreform period, legacy candidates are most likely to get nominated in party strongholds where any new candidate might be similarly successful, and challengers tend to be weaker. Evidence from traditional surveys and a conjoint survey experiment suggests that voters in Japan do not like the idea of dynasties in the abstract sense, even as they continue to elect specific legacy candidates in their own local districts.Less
This chapter explores the inherited incumbency advantage in elections, the mechanisms behind the advantage, and how it differs in the prereform and postreform electoral environments of Japan. New legacy candidates are decidedly advantaged over non-legacy candidates in both SNTV and FPTP elections. However, there is also a selection effect in terms of where legacy candidates emerge. In the prereform period, legacy candidates followed strong incumbents, whose exit freed up votes and encouraged the entry of competitive challengers. In the postreform period, legacy candidates are most likely to get nominated in party strongholds where any new candidate might be similarly successful, and challengers tend to be weaker. Evidence from traditional surveys and a conjoint survey experiment suggests that voters in Japan do not like the idea of dynasties in the abstract sense, even as they continue to elect specific legacy candidates in their own local districts.
F. Daniel Hidalgo and Renato Lima
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190462888
- eISBN:
- 9780190492885
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190462888.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Economy
This chapter examines the evolution of mass participation and elite contestation across 17 elections for Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. While participation has increased dramatically through this ...
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This chapter examines the evolution of mass participation and elite contestation across 17 elections for Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. While participation has increased dramatically through this period, de facto universal suffrage was not achieved until 2002 when enfranchisement barriers due to ballot construction were finally removed. Yet as political participation has universalized, elections have grown less competitive, at least as measured by the incumbency advantage. The chapter shows that the electoral advantage that accrues to incumbents was initially negligible, but began to grow during the military dictatorship and has recently reached historically high levels. More reassuringly, it documents that the proportion of family dynasties within the chamber has not grown and that incumbency plays little or role in their formation.Less
This chapter examines the evolution of mass participation and elite contestation across 17 elections for Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. While participation has increased dramatically through this period, de facto universal suffrage was not achieved until 2002 when enfranchisement barriers due to ballot construction were finally removed. Yet as political participation has universalized, elections have grown less competitive, at least as measured by the incumbency advantage. The chapter shows that the electoral advantage that accrues to incumbents was initially negligible, but began to grow during the military dictatorship and has recently reached historically high levels. More reassuringly, it documents that the proportion of family dynasties within the chamber has not grown and that incumbency plays little or role in their formation.
Daniel M. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781503605053
- eISBN:
- 9781503606401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9781503605053.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter introduces a comparative theory of dynastic candidate selection based on a framework of supply and demand within the institutional contexts of electoral systems and candidate selection ...
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This chapter introduces a comparative theory of dynastic candidate selection based on a framework of supply and demand within the institutional contexts of electoral systems and candidate selection methods. On the supply side, incumbents who serve longer terms in office, and who are themselves part of an existing dynasty, will be more likely to have family members who select into politics. However, relative demand for their potential successors will be higher where electoral institutions generate candidate-centered elections, and in parties where candidate selection processes are exclusive and decentralized, leaving much of the decision up to local party actors—in Japan’s case, primarily the support groups of exiting candidates. Demand for legacy candidates should also be higher in parties with weak organizational linkages to groups in civil society and when the previous incumbent dies in office. Comparative evidence is presented in support of the theory.Less
This chapter introduces a comparative theory of dynastic candidate selection based on a framework of supply and demand within the institutional contexts of electoral systems and candidate selection methods. On the supply side, incumbents who serve longer terms in office, and who are themselves part of an existing dynasty, will be more likely to have family members who select into politics. However, relative demand for their potential successors will be higher where electoral institutions generate candidate-centered elections, and in parties where candidate selection processes are exclusive and decentralized, leaving much of the decision up to local party actors—in Japan’s case, primarily the support groups of exiting candidates. Demand for legacy candidates should also be higher in parties with weak organizational linkages to groups in civil society and when the previous incumbent dies in office. Comparative evidence is presented in support of the theory.
Daniel M. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781503605053
- eISBN:
- 9781503606401
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9781503605053.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Democracy is supposed to be the antithesis of hereditary rule by family dynasties. And yet “democratic dynasties” continue to persist in democracies around the world. They have been conspicuously ...
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Democracy is supposed to be the antithesis of hereditary rule by family dynasties. And yet “democratic dynasties” continue to persist in democracies around the world. They have been conspicuously prevalent in Japan, where more than a third of all legislators and two-thirds of all cabinet ministers in recent years have come from families with a history in parliament. Such a high proportion of dynasties is unusual and has sparked concerns over whether democracy in Japan is functioning properly. This book introduces a comparative theory to explain the causes and consequences of dynasties in democracies like Japan. Members of dynasties enjoy an “inherited incumbency advantage” in all three stages of a typical political career: selection, election, and promotion. However, the nature and extent of this advantage, as well as its consequences for elections and representation, varies by the institutional context of electoral rules and candidate selection methods within parties. In the late 1980s, roughly half of all new candidates in Japan’s long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party were political legacies. However, electoral system reform in 1994 and subsequent party reforms have changed the incentives for party leaders to rely on dynastic politics in candidate selection. A new pattern of party-based competition is slowly replacing the old pattern of competition based on localized family fiefdoms.Less
Democracy is supposed to be the antithesis of hereditary rule by family dynasties. And yet “democratic dynasties” continue to persist in democracies around the world. They have been conspicuously prevalent in Japan, where more than a third of all legislators and two-thirds of all cabinet ministers in recent years have come from families with a history in parliament. Such a high proportion of dynasties is unusual and has sparked concerns over whether democracy in Japan is functioning properly. This book introduces a comparative theory to explain the causes and consequences of dynasties in democracies like Japan. Members of dynasties enjoy an “inherited incumbency advantage” in all three stages of a typical political career: selection, election, and promotion. However, the nature and extent of this advantage, as well as its consequences for elections and representation, varies by the institutional context of electoral rules and candidate selection methods within parties. In the late 1980s, roughly half of all new candidates in Japan’s long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party were political legacies. However, electoral system reform in 1994 and subsequent party reforms have changed the incentives for party leaders to rely on dynastic politics in candidate selection. A new pattern of party-based competition is slowly replacing the old pattern of competition based on localized family fiefdoms.
Daniel M. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781503605053
- eISBN:
- 9781503606401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9781503605053.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter introduces the puzzle of “democratic dynasties” and Japan’s unusually high level of dynastic politics compared to other democracies. The chapter briefly reviews the existing explanations ...
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This chapter introduces the puzzle of “democratic dynasties” and Japan’s unusually high level of dynastic politics compared to other democracies. The chapter briefly reviews the existing explanations for the causes of dynastic politics, and then summarizes the new theoretical argument that is offered in the book, as well as the background context of the case of Japan and the research design used to test the argument. Finally, the chapter discusses the potential positive and negative consequences of democratic dynasties and provides an outline of the book’s remaining chapters.Less
This chapter introduces the puzzle of “democratic dynasties” and Japan’s unusually high level of dynastic politics compared to other democracies. The chapter briefly reviews the existing explanations for the causes of dynastic politics, and then summarizes the new theoretical argument that is offered in the book, as well as the background context of the case of Japan and the research design used to test the argument. Finally, the chapter discusses the potential positive and negative consequences of democratic dynasties and provides an outline of the book’s remaining chapters.
Kathryn A. DePalo
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813060484
- eISBN:
- 9780813050744
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813060484.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Chapter two assesses whether term limits have increased electoral competition. Forced turnover has facilitated more competition but only for open seat races. Legislators now effectively “own” their ...
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Chapter two assesses whether term limits have increased electoral competition. Forced turnover has facilitated more competition but only for open seat races. Legislators now effectively “own” their seats once elected and competition precipitously declines or is even nonexistent until the seat is vacated. Most candidates time these vacancies and plan a run for office when a seat opens. This has created a new kind of incumbency advantage. Incumbents face little to no serious opposition and remain the beneficiaries of campaign fundraising.Less
Chapter two assesses whether term limits have increased electoral competition. Forced turnover has facilitated more competition but only for open seat races. Legislators now effectively “own” their seats once elected and competition precipitously declines or is even nonexistent until the seat is vacated. Most candidates time these vacancies and plan a run for office when a seat opens. This has created a new kind of incumbency advantage. Incumbents face little to no serious opposition and remain the beneficiaries of campaign fundraising.
David K. Twigg
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780813041889
- eISBN:
- 9780813043890
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813041889.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
It is a well-documented phenomenon that incumbents are generally advantaged when running for reelection. Various anecdotes about the effects of disaster on elections and public officials indicate a ...
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It is a well-documented phenomenon that incumbents are generally advantaged when running for reelection. Various anecdotes about the effects of disaster on elections and public officials indicate a range of possible outcomes. New players may enter the field or incumbents may be blamed for disaster-related problems. Incumbents also may be perceived as effective leaders. Chapter 1 announces the trajectory of the entire book, which explores municipal and statewide elections after Hurricane Andrew in three distinct zones of damage: severe, moderate, and mild. By analyzing election results and utilizing interviews with incumbent elected officials and their key supporters, this study determines how officials responded to the hurricane, how they adjusted their campaigns, and how they perceived their reelection chances.Less
It is a well-documented phenomenon that incumbents are generally advantaged when running for reelection. Various anecdotes about the effects of disaster on elections and public officials indicate a range of possible outcomes. New players may enter the field or incumbents may be blamed for disaster-related problems. Incumbents also may be perceived as effective leaders. Chapter 1 announces the trajectory of the entire book, which explores municipal and statewide elections after Hurricane Andrew in three distinct zones of damage: severe, moderate, and mild. By analyzing election results and utilizing interviews with incumbent elected officials and their key supporters, this study determines how officials responded to the hurricane, how they adjusted their campaigns, and how they perceived their reelection chances.
