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Retributivism I: Fair Play Theory

Matt Matravers

in Justice and Punishment: The Rationale of Coercion

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198295730
eISBN:
9780191599828
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198295731.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

A recent attempt to revive retributive theories of punishment, pioneered by Herbert Morris and Jeffrie Murphy, argues that punishment restores the balance of benefits and burdens in a society; a ... More


The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis

in A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691151250
eISBN:
9781400838837
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought

This chapter focuses on the evolution of strong reciprocity. A predisposition to cooperate and a willingness to punish defectors is known as strong reciprocity, and it is the combination of the two ... More


The Logic of <i>Logic</i>, and Beyond

Lee Cronk and Beth L. Leech

in Meeting at Grand Central: Understanding the Social and Evolutionary Roots of Cooperation

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691154954
eISBN:
9781400845484
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691154954.003.0003
Subject:
Sociology, Comparative and Historical Sociology

This chapter examines Mancur Olson's arguments, which he articulated in The Logic of Collective Action, and compares them with those of his supporters and detractors. It also reviews the social ... More


Cooperation and the Individual

Lee Cronk and Beth L. Leech

in Meeting at Grand Central: Understanding the Social and Evolutionary Roots of Cooperation

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691154954
eISBN:
9781400845484
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691154954.003.0004
Subject:
Sociology, Comparative and Historical Sociology

This chapter examines the evolutionary roots of the proximate psychological mechanisms that underlie cooperation. The idea that there are specific biological mechanisms behind at least some aspects ... More


Bridging Reality and the Theory of International Environmental Agreements

Charles D. Kolstad

in Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199692873
eISBN:
9780191738371
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692873.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

The literature on the economics of international environmental agreements has been developing for two decades. Some significant progress has been made. But some simple and fundamental questions ... More


The Sylvania Free Rider Justification for Downstream-Power Vertical Restraints: Truth or Invitation for Pretext?

Warren S. Grimes

in How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780195372823
eISBN:
9780199871773
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This paper argues that free riding is a pretext. It offers a detailed analysis of fact and law in Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, a Supreme Court decision in which Justice Scalia ignored ... More


Epistemic Failures of Majority Rule: Real and Imagined

Hélène Landemore

in Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691155654
eISBN:
9781400845538
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691155654.003.0007
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

This chapter addresses a series of objections to the claimed epistemic properties of majority rule and, more generally, aggregation of judgments. It first considers a general objection to the ... More


Laying the Theoretical Foundations for the Study of Development Aid

Clark C. Gibson

in The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199278855
eISBN:
9780191602863
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199278857.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

This chapter focuses on the problem of collective action as it relates to development at the operational level. It first explores how individuals’ motivation may hamper their incentive to work ... More


Optimal Adherence Rules

Jeffrey Brand-Ballard

in Limits of Legality: The Ethics of Lawless Judging

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780195342291
eISBN:
9780199867011
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342291.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Political Philosophy

This chapter asks whether the members of Group O (see chapter 11) have individual reasons to contribute to the group’s efforts by adhering in at least some suboptimal-result cases. It is argued that ... More


Voluntary Associations

Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit

in The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
November 2004
ISBN:
9780199246489
eISBN:
9780191601460
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199246483.003.0012
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

Although esteem cannot readily be the object of direct exchange, something rather like exchange can be secured in the economy of esteem via associations. By being ‘associated’ with B, A can earn ... More


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