SWINBURNE RICHARD
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The theme of this volume is the extent to which humans have a free choice of which actions to perform, and what kind of free choice would make them morally responsible for their actions. This ...
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The theme of this volume is the extent to which humans have a free choice of which actions to perform, and what kind of free choice would make them morally responsible for their actions. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the contributions to this volume.Less
The theme of this volume is the extent to which humans have a free choice of which actions to perform, and what kind of free choice would make them morally responsible for their actions. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the contributions to this volume.
Richard Swinburne (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the ...
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Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe — if neuroscience does not rule this out — there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Gödel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). This book considers what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events?Less
Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe — if neuroscience does not rule this out — there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Gödel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). This book considers what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events?
Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free ...
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Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.Less
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.
Gregory Graybill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199589487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594588
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589487.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? ...
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If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? Initially, Philipp Melanchthon concurred with Martin Luther—that the human will is completely bound by sin, and that the choice of faith can flow only from God's unilateral grace. But if this is so, what about those whom God has not chosen? Is he not casting people into hell who never even had a chance? What are the pastoral implications for believers thinking about the nature of God and their own relationship to him? As a result of practical concerns such as these, aided by an intellectual aversion to paradox, Melanchthon came to believe that the human will does play a key role in the origins of a saving faith in Jesus Christ. This was not the Roman Catholic free will of Erasmus, however. It was a limited free will tied to justification by faith alone. It was an evangelical free will.Less
If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? Initially, Philipp Melanchthon concurred with Martin Luther—that the human will is completely bound by sin, and that the choice of faith can flow only from God's unilateral grace. But if this is so, what about those whom God has not chosen? Is he not casting people into hell who never even had a chance? What are the pastoral implications for believers thinking about the nature of God and their own relationship to him? As a result of practical concerns such as these, aided by an intellectual aversion to paradox, Melanchthon came to believe that the human will does play a key role in the origins of a saving faith in Jesus Christ. This was not the Roman Catholic free will of Erasmus, however. It was a limited free will tied to justification by faith alone. It was an evangelical free will.
Isaiah Berlin
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199249893
- eISBN:
- 9780191598807
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924989X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Berlin's position in ‘Political Ideas’ postulated a human ability to make free choices. His lecture ‘Historical Inevitability’ attacked determinism as a foundation of the view that ‘the world has a ...
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Berlin's position in ‘Political Ideas’ postulated a human ability to make free choices. His lecture ‘Historical Inevitability’ attacked determinism as a foundation of the view that ‘the world has a direction’ and that society is governed by deterministic laws. Instead, Berlin suggested that determinism was implausible, because it would require radical changes in our ‘moral and psychological categories.’Less
Berlin's position in ‘Political Ideas’ postulated a human ability to make free choices. His lecture ‘Historical Inevitability’ attacked determinism as a foundation of the view that ‘the world has a direction’ and that society is governed by deterministic laws. Instead, Berlin suggested that determinism was implausible, because it would require radical changes in our ‘moral and psychological categories.’
Richard McCarty
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567720
- eISBN:
- 9780191721465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567720.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
The assumption that actions are explained by motive forces implies the doctrine of psychological determinism; and many doubt that Kant accepted that doctrine. This chapter argues that he did, and ...
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The assumption that actions are explained by motive forces implies the doctrine of psychological determinism; and many doubt that Kant accepted that doctrine. This chapter argues that he did, and disputes textual evidence usually cited to prove otherwise, such as the so-called “incorporation thesis”. It argues further that the problem of justification and explanation cannot be solved without the assumption of psychological determinism. The so-called “power of free choice” (Willkür) is neither capable of explaining action, nor is it the way Kant assumed that our actions are explained.Less
The assumption that actions are explained by motive forces implies the doctrine of psychological determinism; and many doubt that Kant accepted that doctrine. This chapter argues that he did, and disputes textual evidence usually cited to prove otherwise, such as the so-called “incorporation thesis”. It argues further that the problem of justification and explanation cannot be solved without the assumption of psychological determinism. The so-called “power of free choice” (Willkür) is neither capable of explaining action, nor is it the way Kant assumed that our actions are explained.
Gregory B. Graybill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199589487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594588
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589487.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
In the late 1530s, Melanchthon's new formulation of the will's role in justification came under criticism from Conrad Cordatus and John Calvin. As the 1540s began, Melanchthon continued to clarify ...
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In the late 1530s, Melanchthon's new formulation of the will's role in justification came under criticism from Conrad Cordatus and John Calvin. As the 1540s began, Melanchthon continued to clarify his new doctrinal system. Of particular significance was his redefinition of predestination not as God's election of individuals, but as God's corporate election of the church as body—a body which individuals could freely join or leave through the choice of faith in Christ. Meanwhile, at the Council of Trent, the Roman Catholic Church affirmed a transformational model of justification similar to that which Erasmus had advocated.Less
In the late 1530s, Melanchthon's new formulation of the will's role in justification came under criticism from Conrad Cordatus and John Calvin. As the 1540s began, Melanchthon continued to clarify his new doctrinal system. Of particular significance was his redefinition of predestination not as God's election of individuals, but as God's corporate election of the church as body—a body which individuals could freely join or leave through the choice of faith in Christ. Meanwhile, at the Council of Trent, the Roman Catholic Church affirmed a transformational model of justification similar to that which Erasmus had advocated.
Isaiah Berlin
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199249893
- eISBN:
- 9780191598807
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924989X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This lecture explored the tension between liberty and one view of knowledge. Berlin presented Mill not only as an exponent of determinism and an associated consequentialism, but also as someone who ...
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This lecture explored the tension between liberty and one view of knowledge. Berlin presented Mill not only as an exponent of determinism and an associated consequentialism, but also as someone who came to recognize that this doctrine did not fit the facts of experience, and who emphasized, especially, free choice and the importance of negative liberty in society.Less
This lecture explored the tension between liberty and one view of knowledge. Berlin presented Mill not only as an exponent of determinism and an associated consequentialism, but also as someone who came to recognize that this doctrine did not fit the facts of experience, and who emphasized, especially, free choice and the importance of negative liberty in society.
Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This chapter sets out a positive case for regarding On Free Choice as a text to be read as a coherent and consistent whole. On Free Choice is a single unified piece of work. The case for reading it ...
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This chapter sets out a positive case for regarding On Free Choice as a text to be read as a coherent and consistent whole. On Free Choice is a single unified piece of work. The case for reading it as such is one of elucidating something that is self-evident; it is a dialogue. The manuscript evidence and what is known of ancient literary practice suggests that the interlocutors should not be identified as ‘Augustine’ and ‘Evodius’, an identification that has obscured the significance of the role of the reader as part of the argumentative strategy of the work as a whole. It consists of three books, the argument, subject matter, and style of which are developed in a programmatic and interrelated progression. This progression is illustrated in the deployment of some technical theological terms and the overall architecture of the argument.Less
This chapter sets out a positive case for regarding On Free Choice as a text to be read as a coherent and consistent whole. On Free Choice is a single unified piece of work. The case for reading it as such is one of elucidating something that is self-evident; it is a dialogue. The manuscript evidence and what is known of ancient literary practice suggests that the interlocutors should not be identified as ‘Augustine’ and ‘Evodius’, an identification that has obscured the significance of the role of the reader as part of the argumentative strategy of the work as a whole. It consists of three books, the argument, subject matter, and style of which are developed in a programmatic and interrelated progression. This progression is illustrated in the deployment of some technical theological terms and the overall architecture of the argument.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199271672
- eISBN:
- 9780191709357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Evidence e renders a hypothesis h more probable in so far as both the prior probability of h is high and so is its explanatory power (that is it predictive power which is the probability of the ...
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Evidence e renders a hypothesis h more probable in so far as both the prior probability of h is high and so is its explanatory power (that is it predictive power which is the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis, divided by the prior probability of the evidence). There cannot be a best of all possible worlds; but in virtue of his perfect goodness, God will bring about a very good world. A world containing ‘humanly free persons’, such as humans, with a free choice to bring about limited good or evil would contain a kind of goodness not possessed by any other world, and so it is quite probable that God would bring about such a world. Persons of this kind need to be embodied.Less
Evidence e renders a hypothesis h more probable in so far as both the prior probability of h is high and so is its explanatory power (that is it predictive power which is the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis, divided by the prior probability of the evidence). There cannot be a best of all possible worlds; but in virtue of his perfect goodness, God will bring about a very good world. A world containing ‘humanly free persons’, such as humans, with a free choice to bring about limited good or evil would contain a kind of goodness not possessed by any other world, and so it is quite probable that God would bring about such a world. Persons of this kind need to be embodied.
