Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198530794
- eISBN:
- 9780191712982
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198530794.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This book provides an introduction to, and analysis of, the use of Bayesian nets in causal modelling. It puts forward new conceptual foundations for causal network modelling: The book argues that ...
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This book provides an introduction to, and analysis of, the use of Bayesian nets in causal modelling. It puts forward new conceptual foundations for causal network modelling: The book argues that probability and causality need to be interpreted as epistemic notions in order for the key assumptions behind causal models to hold. Under the epistemic view, probability and causality are understood in terms of the beliefs an agent ought to adopt. The book develops an objective Bayesian notion of probability and a corresponding epistemic theory of causality. This yields a general framework for causal modelling, which is extended to cope with recursive causal relations, logically complex beliefs and changes in an agent's language.Less
This book provides an introduction to, and analysis of, the use of Bayesian nets in causal modelling. It puts forward new conceptual foundations for causal network modelling: The book argues that probability and causality need to be interpreted as epistemic notions in order for the key assumptions behind causal models to hold. Under the epistemic view, probability and causality are understood in terms of the beliefs an agent ought to adopt. The book develops an objective Bayesian notion of probability and a corresponding epistemic theory of causality. This yields a general framework for causal modelling, which is extended to cope with recursive causal relations, logically complex beliefs and changes in an agent's language.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues against the widespread epistemic theory of memory which consists of two interrelated claims. The first claim is that to remember a proposition is to know it, where this knowledge ...
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This chapter argues against the widespread epistemic theory of memory which consists of two interrelated claims. The first claim is that to remember a proposition is to know it, where this knowledge was previously acquired and preserved. The second claim is that memory can only preserve knowledge from one time to another but cannot generate new justification and knowledge. Both aspects of the epistemic theory of memory are shown to be mistaken. It is possible to remember something in the present that one didn't justifiably believe in the past. Likewise one may acquire in the meantime some plausible but misleading evidence that destroys the status as justified belief of the once‐genuine justified belief that one still remembers. Moreover, cases of ignorant remembering show that one can remember something that one doesn't believe. In sum then, knowledge supervenes on some but not all cases of propositional remembering. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification. But the epistemic theory of memory is not only wrong in holding that memory is a form of knowledge. It is also mistaken in assuming that memory cannot alter the epistemic status of a belief. Memory doesn't merely have the capacity to preserve epistemic features generated by other sources but that it is also a generative epistemic source.Less
This chapter argues against the widespread epistemic theory of memory which consists of two interrelated claims. The first claim is that to remember a proposition is to know it, where this knowledge was previously acquired and preserved. The second claim is that memory can only preserve knowledge from one time to another but cannot generate new justification and knowledge. Both aspects of the epistemic theory of memory are shown to be mistaken. It is possible to remember something in the present that one didn't justifiably believe in the past. Likewise one may acquire in the meantime some plausible but misleading evidence that destroys the status as justified belief of the once‐genuine justified belief that one still remembers. Moreover, cases of ignorant remembering show that one can remember something that one doesn't believe. In sum then, knowledge supervenes on some but not all cases of propositional remembering. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification. But the epistemic theory of memory is not only wrong in holding that memory is a form of knowledge. It is also mistaken in assuming that memory cannot alter the epistemic status of a belief. Memory doesn't merely have the capacity to preserve epistemic features generated by other sources but that it is also a generative epistemic source.
Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198530794
- eISBN:
- 9780191712982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198530794.003.0009
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This chapter develops an epistemic theory of causality. The origins of such a theory may be found in the writings of Kant and Ramsey. According to the epistemic theory, we think in terms of cause and ...
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This chapter develops an epistemic theory of causality. The origins of such a theory may be found in the writings of Kant and Ramsey. According to the epistemic theory, we think in terms of cause and effect because it is convenient to do so, not because our causal claims latch on to a physical causal connection. A formal causal epistemology is put forward, and it is argued that this approach provides a synthesis of the hypothetico-deductive and inductive accounts of causal discovery. Analogies between epistemic causality and objective Bayesianism are highlighted.Less
This chapter develops an epistemic theory of causality. The origins of such a theory may be found in the writings of Kant and Ramsey. According to the epistemic theory, we think in terms of cause and effect because it is convenient to do so, not because our causal claims latch on to a physical causal connection. A formal causal epistemology is put forward, and it is argued that this approach provides a synthesis of the hypothetico-deductive and inductive accounts of causal discovery. Analogies between epistemic causality and objective Bayesianism are highlighted.
TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198268406
- eISBN:
- 9780191714795
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268406.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations, Philosophy of Law
This chapter addresses the epistemic theory of vagueness, which claims that there are sharp, unknowable boundaries to the application of vague expressions. Some features of Timothy Williamson's ...
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This chapter addresses the epistemic theory of vagueness, which claims that there are sharp, unknowable boundaries to the application of vague expressions. Some features of Timothy Williamson's elaboration of the epistemic theory are discussed, and reasons not to take the epistemic view are proposed. The epistemic theory confronts and rejects the claim that there are indeterminacies in the application of vague language. If it succeeds, the indeterminacy claim is false. If it fails, its failure may help us to understand the indeterminacy claim. In his account of the relation between meaning and use, Williamson claims that use determines meaning, but that the correct application of words depends on the dispositions of speakers. That view of meaning and use supports what is called the ‘boundary model’, which is a theory of meaning because it explains the application of vague words as determined by a social choice function.Less
This chapter addresses the epistemic theory of vagueness, which claims that there are sharp, unknowable boundaries to the application of vague expressions. Some features of Timothy Williamson's elaboration of the epistemic theory are discussed, and reasons not to take the epistemic view are proposed. The epistemic theory confronts and rejects the claim that there are indeterminacies in the application of vague language. If it succeeds, the indeterminacy claim is false. If it fails, its failure may help us to understand the indeterminacy claim. In his account of the relation between meaning and use, Williamson claims that use determines meaning, but that the correct application of words depends on the dispositions of speakers. That view of meaning and use supports what is called the ‘boundary model’, which is a theory of meaning because it explains the application of vague words as determined by a social choice function.
Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160849
- eISBN:
- 9781400851348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0004
- Subject:
- Sociology, Economic Sociology
This chapter deals with the implications of rationality in normal form games. It first explores the ramifications of the rationalizability assumption and shows that in many cases rational individuals ...
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This chapter deals with the implications of rationality in normal form games. It first explores the ramifications of the rationalizability assumption and shows that in many cases rational individuals will not play rationalizable strategies. It argues that the informal reasoning supporting rationalizability must be replaced by a more rigorous analytical framework. This framework is known as epistemic game theory. Using epistemic game theory, it presents the argument that not rationality, but rather common knowledge of rationality, implies that players will only use rationalizable strategies. The chapter concludes by showing that there is no justification of the common knowledge of rationality assumption, and hence there is no reason to believe that in general rational players will choose rationalizable strategies. It strengthens this conclusion by showing that even assuming common knowledge of rationality, there is no reason for a rational player to conform to the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies.Less
This chapter deals with the implications of rationality in normal form games. It first explores the ramifications of the rationalizability assumption and shows that in many cases rational individuals will not play rationalizable strategies. It argues that the informal reasoning supporting rationalizability must be replaced by a more rigorous analytical framework. This framework is known as epistemic game theory. Using epistemic game theory, it presents the argument that not rationality, but rather common knowledge of rationality, implies that players will only use rationalizable strategies. The chapter concludes by showing that there is no justification of the common knowledge of rationality assumption, and hence there is no reason to believe that in general rational players will choose rationalizable strategies. It strengthens this conclusion by showing that even assuming common knowledge of rationality, there is no reason for a rational player to conform to the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies.
Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160849
- eISBN:
- 9781400851348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0008
- Subject:
- Sociology, Economic Sociology
This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion ...
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This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.Less
This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.
Mihnea Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804777919
- eISBN:
- 9780804789455
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Knowledge Management
What must human agents know about what other humans – with whom they are connected – know, in order for the resulting web of ties among them to function as a social network? The explanatory success ...
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What must human agents know about what other humans – with whom they are connected – know, in order for the resulting web of ties among them to function as a social network? The explanatory success of social network theories depends critically on assumptions about what agents know, what they know about what other agents with whom they are connected know, and the extent to which they trust what they and the others know. This book develops a method for representing these states of knowledge, awareness, ignorance, etc., jointly, epistemic states, and the epistemic ties connecting the epistemic states of agents in a social network to one another. What each agent knows of and about the others and their knowledge comprise an epistemic network, more compactly, epinet, a symbolic representation of the epistemic glue that underlies and shapes the interactions within a social network. The study of epinets permits development of new theory about the structure and dynamics of social networks, as well as of more precise measurement instruments and techniques for testing and validating the theory. The result is a toolkit for modeling, measuring, and manipulating the epistemic structures underlying human interaction in ways that are as accessible to social network analysts as they are engaging to logicians and epistemic game theorists.Less
What must human agents know about what other humans – with whom they are connected – know, in order for the resulting web of ties among them to function as a social network? The explanatory success of social network theories depends critically on assumptions about what agents know, what they know about what other agents with whom they are connected know, and the extent to which they trust what they and the others know. This book develops a method for representing these states of knowledge, awareness, ignorance, etc., jointly, epistemic states, and the epistemic ties connecting the epistemic states of agents in a social network to one another. What each agent knows of and about the others and their knowledge comprise an epistemic network, more compactly, epinet, a symbolic representation of the epistemic glue that underlies and shapes the interactions within a social network. The study of epinets permits development of new theory about the structure and dynamics of social networks, as well as of more precise measurement instruments and techniques for testing and validating the theory. The result is a toolkit for modeling, measuring, and manipulating the epistemic structures underlying human interaction in ways that are as accessible to social network analysts as they are engaging to logicians and epistemic game theorists.
Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804777919
- eISBN:
- 9780804789455
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Knowledge Management
This chapter introduces a modeling language for representing the epistemic states of networked human agents at both the individual and collective levels. The new ‘epistemic description language’, or ...
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This chapter introduces a modeling language for representing the epistemic states of networked human agents at both the individual and collective levels. The new ‘epistemic description language’, or ‘EDL’, has a graphical component and a syntactical component. The language is used to articulate the relationships between individuals and their beliefs as elementary blocks of interactive epistemic networks. The chapter shows how epinets can be used to capture causally relevant states of social networks, and argue for the compilation of an epistemic description language for social interactions and networks.Less
This chapter introduces a modeling language for representing the epistemic states of networked human agents at both the individual and collective levels. The new ‘epistemic description language’, or ‘EDL’, has a graphical component and a syntactical component. The language is used to articulate the relationships between individuals and their beliefs as elementary blocks of interactive epistemic networks. The chapter shows how epinets can be used to capture causally relevant states of social networks, and argue for the compilation of an epistemic description language for social interactions and networks.
JOSEPH RAZ
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198260691
- eISBN:
- 9780191682148
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198260691.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter indicates some of the leading elements in the philosophical climate of opinion which look to coherence-based accounts. It considers the merit and relevance of coherence in explaining the ...
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This chapter indicates some of the leading elements in the philosophical climate of opinion which look to coherence-based accounts. It considers the merit and relevance of coherence in explaining the nature of law and of adjudication. In doing so, it mentions some points derived from the writings of theorists who favour coherence. The discussion suggests that coherence is everywhere. But it is local rather than global coherence, and it comes into its own mostly once questions of principle are resolved on other grounds. The appendix of this chapter tackles Dworkin's view on integrity and coherence.Less
This chapter indicates some of the leading elements in the philosophical climate of opinion which look to coherence-based accounts. It considers the merit and relevance of coherence in explaining the nature of law and of adjudication. In doing so, it mentions some points derived from the writings of theorists who favour coherence. The discussion suggests that coherence is everywhere. But it is local rather than global coherence, and it comes into its own mostly once questions of principle are resolved on other grounds. The appendix of this chapter tackles Dworkin's view on integrity and coherence.
Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804777919
- eISBN:
- 9780804789455
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0005
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Knowledge Management
This chapter extends the use of epinets to the characterization of dynamic processes in networks. Epinets are employed in two distinct ways: first as instruments for specifying changes in the ...
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This chapter extends the use of epinets to the characterization of dynamic processes in networks. Epinets are employed in two distinct ways: first as instruments for specifying changes in the epistemic states of linked or interacting agents, and second as a toolkit for representing strategic interactions. Using epinets to represent interactions among epistemically-linked agents resolves ambiguities inherent in game theoretic approaches and enables explicit modeling of subtle phenomena including mind games, dialogical games, and information brokerage games.Less
This chapter extends the use of epinets to the characterization of dynamic processes in networks. Epinets are employed in two distinct ways: first as instruments for specifying changes in the epistemic states of linked or interacting agents, and second as a toolkit for representing strategic interactions. Using epinets to represent interactions among epistemically-linked agents resolves ambiguities inherent in game theoretic approaches and enables explicit modeling of subtle phenomena including mind games, dialogical games, and information brokerage games.
Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804777919
- eISBN:
- 9780804789455
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Knowledge Management
This chapter considers the Epistemic Description Language (EDL) introduced in the previous chapters through an epistemic prism, offering an interpretation of the development of an epistemic approach ...
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This chapter considers the Epistemic Description Language (EDL) introduced in the previous chapters through an epistemic prism, offering an interpretation of the development of an epistemic approach to social network analysis as a set of brokering and closure-producing moves, where brokering happens across research communities with different representational and methodological commitments (epistemic game theory, network sociology) and closure acts at the level of a nascent group interested in the epistemic structure and dynamics of networks. The chapter concludes with a discussion of future directions for research and development.Less
This chapter considers the Epistemic Description Language (EDL) introduced in the previous chapters through an epistemic prism, offering an interpretation of the development of an epistemic approach to social network analysis as a set of brokering and closure-producing moves, where brokering happens across research communities with different representational and methodological commitments (epistemic game theory, network sociology) and closure acts at the level of a nascent group interested in the epistemic structure and dynamics of networks. The chapter concludes with a discussion of future directions for research and development.
Hannes Leitgeb
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198732631
- eISBN:
- 9780191796852
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732631.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter presents two reformulations of the theory in this book that derive from the ‘aiming at the truth’ aspect of belief. The chapter demonstrates that the stability conception of belief makes ...
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This chapter presents two reformulations of the theory in this book that derive from the ‘aiming at the truth’ aspect of belief. The chapter demonstrates that the stability conception of belief makes rational belief not just aim at the truth but even ‘get sufficiently close to the truth’. And the other way around: the stability conception of belief can be recovered from belief ‘getting sufficiently close to the truth’ if taken together with some additional assumptions. In the first part of the chapter, rational all-or-nothing belief is determined to ‘get sufficiently close to the truth’ in a sense that is made precise by a rational agent’s belief set having positive expected epistemic utility, along the lines of epistemic decision theory. The second part characterizes belief with respect to a different ‘aiming property’: an agent’s belief set aiming at the same agent’s degree-of-belief function. Given that function itself aims at the truth, belief also aims at the truth, but indirectly so. That second part continues Chapter 4 in so far as belief is assumed to be conditional or corresponding to a doxastic ranking of worlds and propositions.Less
This chapter presents two reformulations of the theory in this book that derive from the ‘aiming at the truth’ aspect of belief. The chapter demonstrates that the stability conception of belief makes rational belief not just aim at the truth but even ‘get sufficiently close to the truth’. And the other way around: the stability conception of belief can be recovered from belief ‘getting sufficiently close to the truth’ if taken together with some additional assumptions. In the first part of the chapter, rational all-or-nothing belief is determined to ‘get sufficiently close to the truth’ in a sense that is made precise by a rational agent’s belief set having positive expected epistemic utility, along the lines of epistemic decision theory. The second part characterizes belief with respect to a different ‘aiming property’: an agent’s belief set aiming at the same agent’s degree-of-belief function. Given that function itself aims at the truth, belief also aims at the truth, but indirectly so. That second part continues Chapter 4 in so far as belief is assumed to be conditional or corresponding to a doxastic ranking of worlds and propositions.
Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804777919
- eISBN:
- 9780804789455
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Knowledge Management
Using examples and unstructured intuitions that highlight the importance of knowledge, beliefs, and mutual beliefs to the outcomes of social situations and interpersonal relations, this chapter ...
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Using examples and unstructured intuitions that highlight the importance of knowledge, beliefs, and mutual beliefs to the outcomes of social situations and interpersonal relations, this chapter argues for the usefulness of epistemic models of human interactions and networks. The notions of an epistemic state – a link between individuals and propositions they may know or believe – and an epistemic tie among individuals – a link connecting individuals’ epistemic states to one another, are introduced. The chapter shows how the structure of epistemic networks formed by such links are relevant to the dynamics of human interactions, and how the dynamics of these networks are critical elements of complex interpersonal narratives.Less
Using examples and unstructured intuitions that highlight the importance of knowledge, beliefs, and mutual beliefs to the outcomes of social situations and interpersonal relations, this chapter argues for the usefulness of epistemic models of human interactions and networks. The notions of an epistemic state – a link between individuals and propositions they may know or believe – and an epistemic tie among individuals – a link connecting individuals’ epistemic states to one another, are introduced. The chapter shows how the structure of epistemic networks formed by such links are relevant to the dynamics of human interactions, and how the dynamics of these networks are critical elements of complex interpersonal narratives.
Kevin Scharp
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199653850
- eISBN:
- 9780191760631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653850.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter contains a brief survey of work on truth in the analytic tradition. The chapter distinguishes between theories of the nature of truth, philosophical approaches to the aletheic paradoxes, ...
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This chapter contains a brief survey of work on truth in the analytic tradition. The chapter distinguishes between theories of the nature of truth, philosophical approaches to the aletheic paradoxes, and logical approaches to the aletheic paradoxes. Logical approaches offer a mathematical model for our language and truth predicate, while philosophical approaches provide an empirical interpretation of the mathematical model. The distinction is new, but without it, one is likely to be confused about which theories are genuine rivals. Once these three types of theories are on the table, The chapter considers combinations of philosophical approaches and logical approaches; then the focus turns to what the chapter calls unified theories of truth, which include a view on the nature of truth, a philosophical approach, and a logical approach as components.Less
This chapter contains a brief survey of work on truth in the analytic tradition. The chapter distinguishes between theories of the nature of truth, philosophical approaches to the aletheic paradoxes, and logical approaches to the aletheic paradoxes. Logical approaches offer a mathematical model for our language and truth predicate, while philosophical approaches provide an empirical interpretation of the mathematical model. The distinction is new, but without it, one is likely to be confused about which theories are genuine rivals. Once these three types of theories are on the table, The chapter considers combinations of philosophical approaches and logical approaches; then the focus turns to what the chapter calls unified theories of truth, which include a view on the nature of truth, a philosophical approach, and a logical approach as components.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199572809
- eISBN:
- 9780191809866
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572809.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents further arguments about reasons, including the all or none argument and the incoherence argument. We have reasons to have certain telic desires, such as a reason to want to ...
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This chapter presents further arguments about reasons, including the all or none argument and the incoherence argument. We have reasons to have certain telic desires, such as a reason to want to avoid all future agony. We can also ask whether, as subjectivists claim, our telic desires give us reasons. When we want to avoid some future period of agony, or lesser pain, it is often true that, even after ideal deliberation, we would have no other present desire or aim whose fulfilment would be prevented by this future pain, and no present desire or aim that could be claimed to give us a desire-based or aim-based reason to want to avoid this pain. If we accept some subjective theory about reasons, we cannot use ‘best for someone’ in this reason-implying sense. This chapter also considers two kinds of epistemic theory: the reason-based theory and the belief-based theory. Finally, it discusses objective reason-based theories; subjective aim-based theories; reasons, motives, and well-being; and arguments for subjectivism.Less
This chapter presents further arguments about reasons, including the all or none argument and the incoherence argument. We have reasons to have certain telic desires, such as a reason to want to avoid all future agony. We can also ask whether, as subjectivists claim, our telic desires give us reasons. When we want to avoid some future period of agony, or lesser pain, it is often true that, even after ideal deliberation, we would have no other present desire or aim whose fulfilment would be prevented by this future pain, and no present desire or aim that could be claimed to give us a desire-based or aim-based reason to want to avoid this pain. If we accept some subjective theory about reasons, we cannot use ‘best for someone’ in this reason-implying sense. This chapter also considers two kinds of epistemic theory: the reason-based theory and the belief-based theory. Finally, it discusses objective reason-based theories; subjective aim-based theories; reasons, motives, and well-being; and arguments for subjectivism.
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198809517
- eISBN:
- 9780191846854
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
To conclude the discussion, the author turns to James’s defense of the will to believe. Philosophers have tended to focus on the normative question of whether it is ever OK to adopt beliefs for ...
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To conclude the discussion, the author turns to James’s defense of the will to believe. Philosophers have tended to focus on the normative question of whether it is ever OK to adopt beliefs for pragmatic reasons. The “evidentialists” are prepared to criticize those who would resort to this sort of thing, and the intellectualists go further to argue that pragmatists are self-deceived. The author argues against these epistemic scolds. The social science of “positive illusions” confirms the coherence of James’s doctrine and provides an evidential basis for Bain’s theory of belief. Sometimes, we can ignore the evidence and believe what we want to believe knowing full well that this is what we are doing. The will to believe is real. Within limits, it can even be a good thing.Less
To conclude the discussion, the author turns to James’s defense of the will to believe. Philosophers have tended to focus on the normative question of whether it is ever OK to adopt beliefs for pragmatic reasons. The “evidentialists” are prepared to criticize those who would resort to this sort of thing, and the intellectualists go further to argue that pragmatists are self-deceived. The author argues against these epistemic scolds. The social science of “positive illusions” confirms the coherence of James’s doctrine and provides an evidential basis for Bain’s theory of belief. Sometimes, we can ignore the evidence and believe what we want to believe knowing full well that this is what we are doing. The will to believe is real. Within limits, it can even be a good thing.
