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Warrant

John Skorupski

in The Domain of Reasons

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199587636
eISBN:
9780191595394
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Self‐determining actors must be able to know what reasons they have. They must be able to audit those reasons, to assess whether they have warrant for a particular response. Chapter 5 defines warrant ... More


Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

Mihnea Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780804777919
eISBN:
9780804789455
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:
10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.001.0001
Subject:
Business and Management, Knowledge Management

What must human agents know about what other humans – with whom they are connected – know, in order for the resulting web of ties among them to function as a social network? The explanatory success ... More


An Epistemic Description Language for Social Interactions and Networks

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780804777919
eISBN:
9780804789455
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:
10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0002
Subject:
Business and Management, Knowledge Management

This chapter introduces a modeling language for representing the epistemic states of networked human agents at both the individual and collective levels. The new ‘epistemic description language’, or ... More


“I Know You Think She Thinks I Trust You—But I Don't”: Moves, Tactics, and Strategies Defined and Played in Epinets

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780804777919
eISBN:
9780804789455
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:
10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0005
Subject:
Business and Management, Knowledge Management

This chapter extends the use of epinets to the characterization of dynamic processes in networks. Epinets are employed in two distinct ways: first as instruments for specifying changes in the ... More


Why We Need an Epistemic Model of Social Networks

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780804777919
eISBN:
9780804789455
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:
10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0001
Subject:
Business and Management, Knowledge Management

Using examples and unstructured intuitions that highlight the importance of knowledge, beliefs, and mutual beliefs to the outcomes of social situations and interpersonal relations, this chapter ... More


“What You May Think We Think We Are Doing Here”: By Way of Conclusion

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780804777919
eISBN:
9780804789455
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:
10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0006
Subject:
Business and Management, Knowledge Management

This chapter considers the Epistemic Description Language (EDL) introduced in the previous chapters through an epistemic prism, offering an interpretation of the development of an epistemic approach ... More


Beliefs and Believing

in Inside Man: The Discipline of Modeling Human Ways of Being

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
June 2013
ISBN:
9780804773041
eISBN:
9780804777421
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:
10.11126/stanford/9780804773041.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter examines the modeling of human beliefs and the act of believing. It considers the probabilistic models of the personal degrees of belief that an individual holds regarding the truth ... More


“I Think You Think I Think You're Lying”: Trust, Secrecy, Covertness, and Authentication in Social Networks

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780804777919
eISBN:
9780804789455
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:
10.11126/stanford/9780804777919.003.0004
Subject:
Business and Management, Knowledge Management

This chapter analyzes the epistemic structure of trust in social networks. Trust is defined in terms of the epistemic states of networked agents, and a model of trust is advanced in which trust is ... More


Counterfactuals: philosophical and psychological difficulties

Jonathan St B T Evans and David E Over

in If

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
April 2010
ISBN:
9780198525134
eISBN:
9780191728174
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198525134.003.07
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology

This chapter looks in some detail at the important topic of counterfactual conditionals, examining both philosophical and psychological contributions. It argues that there may be a significant ... More


Mental Acts as Natural Kinds 1

Joëlle Proust

in Decomposing the Will

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199746996
eISBN:
9780199332502
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746996.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot ... More


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