Eoin Carolan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199568673
- eISBN:
- 9780191721588
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568673.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
This book develops a new model of the separation of powers theory for the administrative state. The traditional tripartite separation of powers theory does not reflect the way in which modern ...
More
This book develops a new model of the separation of powers theory for the administrative state. The traditional tripartite separation of powers theory does not reflect the way in which modern government actually works. Accordingly this book argues for the replacement of the traditional theory with a new model which has the potential both to enhance democratic checks and balances and to legitimize the role of administrative and regulatory bodies in the modern state. Explaining how developments in modern governance have subverted the principles originally underpinning the separation of powers, the book identifies the ways in which lawyers and administrators have sought to apply these democratic principles to contemporary systems of decentralized third-party governance. These piecemeal efforts are gathered together in the book into a cohesive account of a radical overarching framework for institutional reform. A new separation of constituencies system is proposed, in accordance with which power is distributed between institutions on the basis of their ability to represent those interests which comprise the core constituent elements of the social and constitutional order.Less
This book develops a new model of the separation of powers theory for the administrative state. The traditional tripartite separation of powers theory does not reflect the way in which modern government actually works. Accordingly this book argues for the replacement of the traditional theory with a new model which has the potential both to enhance democratic checks and balances and to legitimize the role of administrative and regulatory bodies in the modern state. Explaining how developments in modern governance have subverted the principles originally underpinning the separation of powers, the book identifies the ways in which lawyers and administrators have sought to apply these democratic principles to contemporary systems of decentralized third-party governance. These piecemeal efforts are gathered together in the book into a cohesive account of a radical overarching framework for institutional reform. A new separation of constituencies system is proposed, in accordance with which power is distributed between institutions on the basis of their ability to represent those interests which comprise the core constituent elements of the social and constitutional order.
Michelle Madden Dempsey
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199562169
- eISBN:
- 9780191705298
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562169.001.1
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
What should public prosecutors do when victims withdraw support for domestic violence prosecutions? This book defends the claim that (within the realm of justified/permissible action) prosecutors ...
More
What should public prosecutors do when victims withdraw support for domestic violence prosecutions? This book defends the claim that (within the realm of justified/permissible action) prosecutors should respond effectively; which is to say that ceteris paribus domestic-violence prosecutors should respond as feminists. This claim is intended as a provocative formulation of the proposition that domestic violence prosecutors should act for reasons generated by the value of reconstituting their states (and communities) as less patriarchal. In defending this claim, the book first sets out a general theory of prosecutorial practical reasoning and then considers the prosecution of domestic-violence offences in particular. Along the way, it provides an original account of the nature of prosecutorial action, the values that can be realized through such action, and the relationship between these values and the practical reasoning of criminal prosecutors. Moreover, it provides analyses of two key concepts — domestic violence and patriarchy — and explains the relevance of the latter to a proper understanding of the former. Putting these insights to work in answering the question stated above, this book provides an account of what prosecutors would be justified in doing in such cases and what prosecutors should do in order to be effective as domestic violence prosecutors. Later chapters apply this general framework in addressing the rights and duties of domestic violence victims to participate in criminal prosecutions and responding to some general objections that might be raised against envisioning the role of domestic-violence-prosecutor-as-feminist.Less
What should public prosecutors do when victims withdraw support for domestic violence prosecutions? This book defends the claim that (within the realm of justified/permissible action) prosecutors should respond effectively; which is to say that ceteris paribus domestic-violence prosecutors should respond as feminists. This claim is intended as a provocative formulation of the proposition that domestic violence prosecutors should act for reasons generated by the value of reconstituting their states (and communities) as less patriarchal. In defending this claim, the book first sets out a general theory of prosecutorial practical reasoning and then considers the prosecution of domestic-violence offences in particular. Along the way, it provides an original account of the nature of prosecutorial action, the values that can be realized through such action, and the relationship between these values and the practical reasoning of criminal prosecutors. Moreover, it provides analyses of two key concepts — domestic violence and patriarchy — and explains the relevance of the latter to a proper understanding of the former. Putting these insights to work in answering the question stated above, this book provides an account of what prosecutors would be justified in doing in such cases and what prosecutors should do in order to be effective as domestic violence prosecutors. Later chapters apply this general framework in addressing the rights and duties of domestic violence victims to participate in criminal prosecutions and responding to some general objections that might be raised against envisioning the role of domestic-violence-prosecutor-as-feminist.
Bert Cannella, Sydney Finkelstein, and Donald C. Hambrick
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195162073
- eISBN:
- 9780199867332
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195162073.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy
This book integrates and assesses the vast and rapidly growing literature on strategic leadership, which is the study of top executives and their effects on organizations. The basic premise is that, ...
More
This book integrates and assesses the vast and rapidly growing literature on strategic leadership, which is the study of top executives and their effects on organizations. The basic premise is that, in order to understand why organizations do the things they do, or perform the way they do, we need to comprehend deeply the people at the top—their experiences, abilities, values, social connections, aspirations, and other human features. The actions—or inactions—of a relatively small number of key people at the apex of an organization can dramatically affect organizational outcomes. The scope of strategic leadership includes individual executives, especially chief executive officers (CEOs), groups of executives (top management teams, or TMTs), and governing bodies (particularly boards of directors). Accordingly, the book addresses an array of topics regarding CEOs (e.g., values, personality, motives, demography, succession, and compensation); TMTs (including composition, processes, and dynamics); and boards of directors (why boards look and behave the way they do, and the consequences of board profiles and behaviors). The book synthesizes what is known about strategic leadership and indicates new research directions.Less
This book integrates and assesses the vast and rapidly growing literature on strategic leadership, which is the study of top executives and their effects on organizations. The basic premise is that, in order to understand why organizations do the things they do, or perform the way they do, we need to comprehend deeply the people at the top—their experiences, abilities, values, social connections, aspirations, and other human features. The actions—or inactions—of a relatively small number of key people at the apex of an organization can dramatically affect organizational outcomes. The scope of strategic leadership includes individual executives, especially chief executive officers (CEOs), groups of executives (top management teams, or TMTs), and governing bodies (particularly boards of directors). Accordingly, the book addresses an array of topics regarding CEOs (e.g., values, personality, motives, demography, succession, and compensation); TMTs (including composition, processes, and dynamics); and boards of directors (why boards look and behave the way they do, and the consequences of board profiles and behaviors). The book synthesizes what is known about strategic leadership and indicates new research directions.
Andrew Kuper
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199274901
- eISBN:
- 9780191601552
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274908.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The conclusion compares the theories of global justice and democracy developed by Rawls, Habermas, and Kuper. It does so along ten dimensions: (1) Sources of Normativity, (2) Moral Scope, (3) ...
More
The conclusion compares the theories of global justice and democracy developed by Rawls, Habermas, and Kuper. It does so along ten dimensions: (1) Sources of Normativity, (2) Moral Scope, (3) Political Scope, (4) Spheres of Governance, (5) Political Interests, (6) Constraints on Governance, (7) Political Judgement, (8) Political Discretion, (9) Political Participation, and (10) Sites of Governance. The chapter argues that Kuper’s theory of Responsive Democracy has advantages along all these axes. These advantages are due to, above all, deep differences in the three theorists’ assumptions about power, knowledge, and the role of ideals in politics.Less
The conclusion compares the theories of global justice and democracy developed by Rawls, Habermas, and Kuper. It does so along ten dimensions: (1) Sources of Normativity, (2) Moral Scope, (3) Political Scope, (4) Spheres of Governance, (5) Political Interests, (6) Constraints on Governance, (7) Political Judgement, (8) Political Discretion, (9) Political Participation, and (10) Sites of Governance. The chapter argues that Kuper’s theory of Responsive Democracy has advantages along all these axes. These advantages are due to, above all, deep differences in the three theorists’ assumptions about power, knowledge, and the role of ideals in politics.
Samuel Walker
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195078206
- eISBN:
- 9780199854202
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195078206.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Since the American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice (1953–69) “discovered” the phenomenon of discretion in criminal justice, it has become something of a truism that ...
More
Since the American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice (1953–69) “discovered” the phenomenon of discretion in criminal justice, it has become something of a truism that the administration of criminal justice in the United States consists of a series of discretionary decisions by officials in regard to police discretion, bail, plea bargaining, and sentencing. This book is a history of the attempts over the past forty years to control these discretionary powers in the criminal justice system. In a field which largely produces short-ranged “evaluation research”, this study, in taking a wider approach, distinguishes between the role of the courts and the role of administrative bodies (the police) and evaluates the longer-term trends and the successful reforms in criminal justice history. It focuses on four critical decision points in the criminal justice system: police discretion, bail setting, plea bargaining, and sentencing. It examines the various reforms that have been proposed, the major ones implemented, and the impact of those reforms.Less
Since the American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice (1953–69) “discovered” the phenomenon of discretion in criminal justice, it has become something of a truism that the administration of criminal justice in the United States consists of a series of discretionary decisions by officials in regard to police discretion, bail, plea bargaining, and sentencing. This book is a history of the attempts over the past forty years to control these discretionary powers in the criminal justice system. In a field which largely produces short-ranged “evaluation research”, this study, in taking a wider approach, distinguishes between the role of the courts and the role of administrative bodies (the police) and evaluates the longer-term trends and the successful reforms in criminal justice history. It focuses on four critical decision points in the criminal justice system: police discretion, bail setting, plea bargaining, and sentencing. It examines the various reforms that have been proposed, the major ones implemented, and the impact of those reforms.
Sydney Finkelstein, Donald C. Hambrick, and Albert A. Cannella
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195162073
- eISBN:
- 9780199867332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195162073.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy
The chapter commences with an overview of the literature on executive roles, but then primarily addresses the central debate over whether top executives really have much influence on what happens to ...
More
The chapter commences with an overview of the literature on executive roles, but then primarily addresses the central debate over whether top executives really have much influence on what happens to their organizations. On one side of the debate is much of the work in strategic management, which asserts that top executives can greatly affect—for good or for ill—the form and fate of their companies. On the other side, various schools within organizational theory—notably population ecology, contingency theory, and institutional theory—have argued that executives are greatly constrained by inertial, environmental, and normative forces. The chapter primarily elaborates on Hambrick and Finkelstein's introduction of the concept of “managerial discretion” as a theoretical lever for resolving this debate. The amount of managerial discretion, or latitude of action, that a given executive possesses arises from environmental, organizational, and individual factors. The chapter concludes with an overview of the literature on “the romance of leadership,” or the human tendency to believe that managers make a difference.Less
The chapter commences with an overview of the literature on executive roles, but then primarily addresses the central debate over whether top executives really have much influence on what happens to their organizations. On one side of the debate is much of the work in strategic management, which asserts that top executives can greatly affect—for good or for ill—the form and fate of their companies. On the other side, various schools within organizational theory—notably population ecology, contingency theory, and institutional theory—have argued that executives are greatly constrained by inertial, environmental, and normative forces. The chapter primarily elaborates on Hambrick and Finkelstein's introduction of the concept of “managerial discretion” as a theoretical lever for resolving this debate. The amount of managerial discretion, or latitude of action, that a given executive possesses arises from environmental, organizational, and individual factors. The chapter concludes with an overview of the literature on “the romance of leadership,” or the human tendency to believe that managers make a difference.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the ...
More
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, this book seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration. The book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book analyses the historical and functional patterns of delegation to the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament, suggesting that delegation to the first two is motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, as predicted by principal‐agent models. By contrast, the delegation of powers to the Parliament fits poorly with such models, and primarily reflects the concern of member governments to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The second part of the book focuses on the role of supranational agents in both the liberalization and re‐regulation of the European market, and suggests that the Commission, Court and Parliament have played a causally important role alongside member governments as the ‘engines of integration’, but that their ability to do so has varied historically and across issue‐areas as a function of the discretion delegated to them by the member governments.Less
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, this book seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration. The book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book analyses the historical and functional patterns of delegation to the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament, suggesting that delegation to the first two is motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, as predicted by principal‐agent models. By contrast, the delegation of powers to the Parliament fits poorly with such models, and primarily reflects the concern of member governments to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The second part of the book focuses on the role of supranational agents in both the liberalization and re‐regulation of the European market, and suggests that the Commission, Court and Parliament have played a causally important role alongside member governments as the ‘engines of integration’, but that their ability to do so has varied historically and across issue‐areas as a function of the discretion delegated to them by the member governments.
Vernon Bogdanor
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293347
- eISBN:
- 9780191598821
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293348.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Normally, in a first past the post‐electoral system in which majority single‐party government is the rule, the sovereign has no choice as to who to call to the Palace. But, in cases of emergency—war ...
More
Normally, in a first past the post‐electoral system in which majority single‐party government is the rule, the sovereign has no choice as to who to call to the Palace. But, in cases of emergency—war or economic crisis, as in 1931—the sovereign may enjoy discretion. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to create a coalition government, as in 1915, 1916, 1931, or 1940, and the sovereign's role may then be crucial. The danger is that, in using his or her discretion, the sovereign's actions may appear partisan, and the sovereign's actions will then be labelled `unconstitutional’.Less
Normally, in a first past the post‐electoral system in which majority single‐party government is the rule, the sovereign has no choice as to who to call to the Palace. But, in cases of emergency—war or economic crisis, as in 1931—the sovereign may enjoy discretion. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to create a coalition government, as in 1915, 1916, 1931, or 1940, and the sovereign's role may then be crucial. The danger is that, in using his or her discretion, the sovereign's actions may appear partisan, and the sovereign's actions will then be labelled `unconstitutional’.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to ...
More
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.Less
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control ...
More
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control mechanisms to limit the discretion of the Commission in the policy process. Examines the record of delegation to the Commission throughout the EU's history, measuring the extent of delegation and Commission discretion across 35 different issue‐areas. Almost without exception, member states delegate to the Commission precisely the functions hypothesized by principal‐agent models, including most notably monitoring compliance, setting the legislative agenda and laying down expert and credible market regulations. Similarly, however, the Commission is closely monitored by member governments, which have adopted a carefully designed and calibrated system of appointment and censure mechanisms, ‘comitology’ or oversight committees and administrative law and judicial review by the European Court of Justice.Less
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control mechanisms to limit the discretion of the Commission in the policy process. Examines the record of delegation to the Commission throughout the EU's history, measuring the extent of delegation and Commission discretion across 35 different issue‐areas. Almost without exception, member states delegate to the Commission precisely the functions hypothesized by principal‐agent models, including most notably monitoring compliance, setting the legislative agenda and laying down expert and credible market regulations. Similarly, however, the Commission is closely monitored by member governments, which have adopted a carefully designed and calibrated system of appointment and censure mechanisms, ‘comitology’ or oversight committees and administrative law and judicial review by the European Court of Justice.
