Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-4 of 4 items

  • Keywords: de se content x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication

Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre (eds)

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780198713265
eISBN:
9780191781711
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything ... More


The First Person Concept and its Nonconceptual Parent

Christopher Peacocke

in The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199699568
eISBN:
9780191760730
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Concepts are individuated by their fundamental reference rules; the first person concept is individuated by the ‘thinker-rule’, that in any thinking it refers to the agent who produced the thinking. ... More


The De Se and the Semantics of PRO Constructions

Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever

in The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199686742
eISBN:
9780191766824
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686742.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter addresses the question of whether the semantics of PRO constructions can be helpful to those who think there is a distinctive kind of de se content. First, it argues that even if the ... More


A Brief Note on Perceptual Content and the De Se

Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever

in The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199686742
eISBN:
9780191766824
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686742.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explains why indexicality does not play an essential or irreducible role in an account of the contents of perception. If de se content really plays an essential or irreducible role in an ... More


View: