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Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Daniel Stoljar

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195306583
eISBN:
9780199786619
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195306589.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The ... More


Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality

Stephen Yablo

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199266463
eISBN:
9780191709111
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book presents a collection of twelve essays which together constitute a modern-day examination of Cartesian themes in the metaphysics of mind. The book offers penetrating discussions of such ... More


Introduction: The Slugs and the Tiles

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195306583
eISBN:
9780199786619
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195306589.003.intro
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The main position to be defended and debated in this book — called “the epistemic view” — can be stated by first formulating a hypothesis about our epistemic situation that the author calls “the ... More


Three Problems of Experience

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195306583
eISBN:
9780199786619
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195306589.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The problem to be discussed is the logical problem of experience, which focuses on three inconsistent theses: there are experiential truths; if there are experiential truths, every truth is entailed ... More


 The Skeptical Challenge

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195306583
eISBN:
9780199786619
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195306589.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses the idea that it is mistaken to suppose that there is a genuinely philosophical problem of experience at all. According to one version of the challenge, the problem should be ... More


 A Posteriori Entailment

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195306583
eISBN:
9780199786619
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195306589.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view ... More


Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

Christopher S. Hill

in The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199275731
eISBN:
9780191706103
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Cartesian modal arguments for property dualism presuppose that facts about the essential natures of pain and other qualitative properties can be grasped a priori by merely conceiving of them or ... More


Meta‐conceivability and Thought Experiments

Roy Sorensen

in The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199275731
eISBN:
9780191706103
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

A meta-conception is a hypothetical one. It answers a question by imagining someone (usually a more able conceiver) answering that question via an act of imagination. Thus, meta-conceptions stand to ... More


The Real Distinction between Mind and Body

Stephen Yablo

in Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199266463
eISBN:
9780191709111
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter pursues two ideas. The first is that Descartes' argument cannot be faulted simply for relying on an inference from de re conceivability to de re possibility; that inference is implicated ... More


Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts

Stephen Yablo

in Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199266463
eISBN:
9780191709111
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter analyzes the Textbook Kripkeanism about conceivability and possibility. It argues that Textbook Kripkeanism is not right. The ‘good news’ that E's conceivability ensures its possibility ... More


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