James Halteman and Edd Noell
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199763702
- eISBN:
- 9780199932252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199763702.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
The moral reflections of the medieval Scholastics on trade and loans are discussed in this chapter. Institutional change in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Europe facilitated specialization, the ...
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The moral reflections of the medieval Scholastics on trade and loans are discussed in this chapter. Institutional change in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Europe facilitated specialization, the widening of markets, and the spread of monetary exchange. Thomas Aquinas and others respond to these developments with instruction on the Christian duties of merchants, borrowers, and lenders. Drawing on Aristotle, Roman law, and the Scriptures, they identify the criteria for justice in a particular product exchange by focusing on its purpose and identifying practices of fraud and economic compulsion. Scholastic opposition to usury is grounded in the phenomenon of economic duress, though several extrinsic titles to interest are eventually extended. By the sixteenth century, Scholastics are laying greater stress on the impersonal dimensions of exchange and the manner in which competition fosters commutative justice in product and labor markets. The vignette “Medieval Scholastics and Moral Values for the Subprime Mortgage Crisis” is included.Less
The moral reflections of the medieval Scholastics on trade and loans are discussed in this chapter. Institutional change in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Europe facilitated specialization, the widening of markets, and the spread of monetary exchange. Thomas Aquinas and others respond to these developments with instruction on the Christian duties of merchants, borrowers, and lenders. Drawing on Aristotle, Roman law, and the Scriptures, they identify the criteria for justice in a particular product exchange by focusing on its purpose and identifying practices of fraud and economic compulsion. Scholastic opposition to usury is grounded in the phenomenon of economic duress, though several extrinsic titles to interest are eventually extended. By the sixteenth century, Scholastics are laying greater stress on the impersonal dimensions of exchange and the manner in which competition fosters commutative justice in product and labor markets. The vignette “Medieval Scholastics and Moral Values for the Subprime Mortgage Crisis” is included.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ...
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People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.Less
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are ...
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Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.Less
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.
Jane Idleman Smith
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195307313
- eISBN:
- 9780199867875
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307313.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This chapter considers three ways in which the question of Islam and pluralism has been addressed by contemporary American Muslims. The first is how the term pluralism is applied by some Muslims to ...
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This chapter considers three ways in which the question of Islam and pluralism has been addressed by contemporary American Muslims. The first is how the term pluralism is applied by some Muslims to past and present political realities. The second relates to ethical concerns raised by some as to whether Islam is as internally pluralistic as it is called to be. The third deals with the relationship of Islam to other religious traditions and whether Islam is theologically open, especially to Christianity. It is important for anyone interested in moving from introductory to deeper levels of discourse between Muslims and Christians to have an understanding of each of these modes of interpretation.Less
This chapter considers three ways in which the question of Islam and pluralism has been addressed by contemporary American Muslims. The first is how the term pluralism is applied by some Muslims to past and present political realities. The second relates to ethical concerns raised by some as to whether Islam is as internally pluralistic as it is called to be. The third deals with the relationship of Islam to other religious traditions and whether Islam is theologically open, especially to Christianity. It is important for anyone interested in moving from introductory to deeper levels of discourse between Muslims and Christians to have an understanding of each of these modes of interpretation.
Dan P. McAdams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176933
- eISBN:
- 9780199786787
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176933.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter considers the life stories of American adults who score low on psychological tests measuring generativity. Research suggests that less generative adults tend to construct life stories ...
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This chapter considers the life stories of American adults who score low on psychological tests measuring generativity. Research suggests that less generative adults tend to construct life stories that feature contamination sequences — scenes that begin very good but become irrevocably ruined or spoiled — and circular plots wherein protagonists fail to show progress or growth over time. The chapter traces the ideas of contamination sequences and circular narratives in the theoretical writings of Freud and Silvan Tomkins, and describes efforts to undo contamination in life stories of recovery, rehabilitation, and reform. Among the most powerful redemptive narratives in contemporary American culture are those associated with Alcoholics Anonymous and criminals' efforts to reform their lives.Less
This chapter considers the life stories of American adults who score low on psychological tests measuring generativity. Research suggests that less generative adults tend to construct life stories that feature contamination sequences — scenes that begin very good but become irrevocably ruined or spoiled — and circular plots wherein protagonists fail to show progress or growth over time. The chapter traces the ideas of contamination sequences and circular narratives in the theoretical writings of Freud and Silvan Tomkins, and describes efforts to undo contamination in life stories of recovery, rehabilitation, and reform. Among the most powerful redemptive narratives in contemporary American culture are those associated with Alcoholics Anonymous and criminals' efforts to reform their lives.
Tapio Luoma
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151893
- eISBN:
- 9780199834419
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151895.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Torrance's view of the relationship between theology and the natural sciences is based on the doctrine of the Incarnation, involving the patristic term homoousion, and the three ideas detectable in ...
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Torrance's view of the relationship between theology and the natural sciences is based on the doctrine of the Incarnation, involving the patristic term homoousion, and the three ideas detectable in his work, namely those of contribution, compulsion, and reminder. In all of the three, ideas coincide with other concepts such as realism, relativity theory, quantum physics, Christology, contingency, openness, and rationality. The power of Torrance's arguments lie in three points: first, he is able to get the Christian Church involved in the theology–science dialog; second, he adheres to a realist position; and, third, because both theology and the natural sciences share in the same Logos‐based rationality, revealed in the incarnate Christ, both the disciplines are homoousioi, of same being.Less
Torrance's view of the relationship between theology and the natural sciences is based on the doctrine of the Incarnation, involving the patristic term homoousion, and the three ideas detectable in his work, namely those of contribution, compulsion, and reminder. In all of the three, ideas coincide with other concepts such as realism, relativity theory, quantum physics, Christology, contingency, openness, and rationality. The power of Torrance's arguments lie in three points: first, he is able to get the Christian Church involved in the theology–science dialog; second, he adheres to a realist position; and, third, because both theology and the natural sciences share in the same Logos‐based rationality, revealed in the incarnate Christ, both the disciplines are homoousioi, of same being.
David Hodgson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845309
- eISBN:
- 9780199932269
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845309.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
In Chapter 11, I give reasons why I contend it is important to maintain ideas of responsibility and retribution in the criminal law. I argue that both consequentialist considerations and ...
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In Chapter 11, I give reasons why I contend it is important to maintain ideas of responsibility and retribution in the criminal law. I argue that both consequentialist considerations and considerations of retribution are important in justifying punishment, and that ideas of retribution place appropriate constraints on the exercise of State compulsion. I suggest that while compatibilist views do support retribution, it is are more strongly and reliably supported by the version of free will that I support. I conclude by considering the future of retribution having regard to ongoing developments in science.Less
In Chapter 11, I give reasons why I contend it is important to maintain ideas of responsibility and retribution in the criminal law. I argue that both consequentialist considerations and considerations of retribution are important in justifying punishment, and that ideas of retribution place appropriate constraints on the exercise of State compulsion. I suggest that while compatibilist views do support retribution, it is are more strongly and reliably supported by the version of free will that I support. I conclude by considering the future of retribution having regard to ongoing developments in science.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0012
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
Excuses are seen as what are needed to move from prima facie culpability, to actual culpability. Excuses give the conditions under which an otherwise culpable choice is not blameworthy (either at ...
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Excuses are seen as what are needed to move from prima facie culpability, to actual culpability. Excuses give the conditions under which an otherwise culpable choice is not blameworthy (either at all, or to a lesser degree). The nature of excuses, the kinds of excuses there are, and the nature of a theory of them, constitute the topics preliminarily explored in this chapter. A causal theory of excuse is elaborated at length, including the facets of such a theory that make it tempting to some. The causal theory is then rejected both on the ground that it does not fit established categories of excuse, and on the ground that it is morally implausible. The combination of such a theory of excuse with determinism is considered at length.Less
Excuses are seen as what are needed to move from prima facie culpability, to actual culpability. Excuses give the conditions under which an otherwise culpable choice is not blameworthy (either at all, or to a lesser degree). The nature of excuses, the kinds of excuses there are, and the nature of a theory of them, constitute the topics preliminarily explored in this chapter. A causal theory of excuse is elaborated at length, including the facets of such a theory that make it tempting to some. The causal theory is then rejected both on the ground that it does not fit established categories of excuse, and on the ground that it is morally implausible. The combination of such a theory of excuse with determinism is considered at length.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
Having rejected the causal theory of excuse in chapter 12, it remains to ascertain what would be a good theory of the excuses. Two such theories are examined, the choice theory and the character ...
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Having rejected the causal theory of excuse in chapter 12, it remains to ascertain what would be a good theory of the excuses. Two such theories are examined, the choice theory and the character theory. Both theories of excuse depend on deeper theories about the true desert basis for responsibility. The choice theory regards choice as the touchstone of culpability, so that excuses have the function of filtering out when either diminished capacity or limited opportunity render otherwise culpable choices non-blameworthy. The character theory regards character as the touchstone of culpability, so that excuses have the function of filtering out those actions not expressive of bad character and exempting those actors from blame. Reasons are given to prefer the choice theory of excuse.Less
Having rejected the causal theory of excuse in chapter 12, it remains to ascertain what would be a good theory of the excuses. Two such theories are examined, the choice theory and the character theory. Both theories of excuse depend on deeper theories about the true desert basis for responsibility. The choice theory regards choice as the touchstone of culpability, so that excuses have the function of filtering out when either diminished capacity or limited opportunity render otherwise culpable choices non-blameworthy. The character theory regards character as the touchstone of culpability, so that excuses have the function of filtering out those actions not expressive of bad character and exempting those actors from blame. Reasons are given to prefer the choice theory of excuse.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0014
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
The insanity defence is the criminal law’s most self-conscious home for its otherwise presupposed theory of the person. This point is only seen, however, by stripping away centuries of legal doctrine ...
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The insanity defence is the criminal law’s most self-conscious home for its otherwise presupposed theory of the person. This point is only seen, however, by stripping away centuries of legal doctrine about the insanity defence that purports to cabin the defence to situations of excusable ignorance, mistake, compulsion, lack of free will, lack of intention, etc. The defence rather deals with a fundamental attribute of both personhood and moral agency, which is rationality. A sketch of the nature of rationality is given in terms of practical reason.Less
The insanity defence is the criminal law’s most self-conscious home for its otherwise presupposed theory of the person. This point is only seen, however, by stripping away centuries of legal doctrine about the insanity defence that purports to cabin the defence to situations of excusable ignorance, mistake, compulsion, lack of free will, lack of intention, etc. The defence rather deals with a fundamental attribute of both personhood and moral agency, which is rationality. A sketch of the nature of rationality is given in terms of practical reason.
