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Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness

C. Thomas Powell

Published in print:
1990
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198244486
eISBN:
9780191680779
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244486.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

From Rene Descartes to David Hume, philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries developed a dialectic of radically conflicting claims about the nature of the self. In the Paralogisms of The Critique ... More


Accessing Kant: A relaxed introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason

Jay F. Rosenberg

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199275816
eISBN:
9780191699849
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275816.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book introduces Immanuel Kant's masterwork, the Critique of Pure Reason, from a ‘relaxed’ problem-oriented perspective which treats Kant as an especially insightful practising philosopher, from ... More


Introduction

C. Thomas Powell

in Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness

Published in print:
1990
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198244486
eISBN:
9780191680779
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244486.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The self as experiencing subject has presented a recurring problem for philosophers, from Rene Descartes to David Hume, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Immanuel Kant. In the Paralogisms of Pure ... More


Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics

Julian Wuerth

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780199587629
eISBN:
9780191760907
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587629.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book presents a new interpretation of Kant’s theories of mind, action, and ethics. As the author of a Copernican turn in philosophy, Kant places the mind at the centre of his philosophy, and yet ... More


Paralogisms and First Person Illusions

Christopher Peacocke

in The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199699568
eISBN:
9780191760730
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The theses in the earlier chapters of the book can be used, without commitment to Cartesian egos, to reply to some of Kant’s objections to Descartes. The apparatus developed in the earlier chapters ... More


The Soul and the World: The Master Argument in Kant’s “Paralogisms” and “Antinomy”

R. Lanier Anderson

in The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
March 2015
ISBN:
9780198724575
eISBN:
9780191792199
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198724575.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter explains the role of the master argument (described in Chapter 10) in Kant’s critiques of rational psychology (in the “Paralogisms”) and rational cosmology (in the “Antinomy”). In ... More


Fundamental Singleness: How to Turn the Second Paralogism into a Valid Argument

Galen Strawson

in The Subject of Experience

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780198777885
eISBN:
9780191823350
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777885.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Kant notes that [1] a thought is a unity in some absolute sense (Critique, Paralogisms section). He also grants that [2] the ‘logical unity of every thought’ is inseparable from the ‘absolute…logical ... More


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