Eric Lesser and Lawrence Prusak (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195165128
- eISBN:
- 9780199835751
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195165128.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
The mid-1990s saw the rise of an important movement: a recognition that organizational knowledge, in its various forms and attributes, could be an important source of competitive advantage in the ...
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The mid-1990s saw the rise of an important movement: a recognition that organizational knowledge, in its various forms and attributes, could be an important source of competitive advantage in the marketplace. Knowledge management has become one of the core competencies in today's competitive environment, where so much value in companies resides in their people, systems, and processes. This book examines a variety of important knowledge-related topics, some of which has been previously published in such journals as the Harvard Business Review, California Management Review, and the Sloan Management Review, such as the use of informal networks, communities of practice, the impact of knowledge on successful alliances, social capital and trust, narrative and storytelling and the use of human intermediaries in the knowledge management process. The book includes contributions from such leading thinkers as Lawrence Prusak, Dorothy Leonard, Eric Lesser, Rob Cross, and David Snowden. This book synthesizes some of the best thinking by the IBM Institute for Knowledge-Based Organizations, a think tank whose research agenda focuses on the management methods for deriving tangible business value from knowledge management and their real-world application.Less
The mid-1990s saw the rise of an important movement: a recognition that organizational knowledge, in its various forms and attributes, could be an important source of competitive advantage in the marketplace. Knowledge management has become one of the core competencies in today's competitive environment, where so much value in companies resides in their people, systems, and processes. This book examines a variety of important knowledge-related topics, some of which has been previously published in such journals as the Harvard Business Review, California Management Review, and the Sloan Management Review, such as the use of informal networks, communities of practice, the impact of knowledge on successful alliances, social capital and trust, narrative and storytelling and the use of human intermediaries in the knowledge management process. The book includes contributions from such leading thinkers as Lawrence Prusak, Dorothy Leonard, Eric Lesser, Rob Cross, and David Snowden. This book synthesizes some of the best thinking by the IBM Institute for Knowledge-Based Organizations, a think tank whose research agenda focuses on the management methods for deriving tangible business value from knowledge management and their real-world application.
Andrei A. Znamenski
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172317
- eISBN:
- 9780199785759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172317.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The increased attention given to shamanism in humanities studies and in popular culture since the 1960s is usually associated with two names: Mircea Eliade and Carlos Castaneda. Eliade, a ...
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The increased attention given to shamanism in humanities studies and in popular culture since the 1960s is usually associated with two names: Mircea Eliade and Carlos Castaneda. Eliade, a Romanian-born philosopher and religious scholar, released Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaiques de l'extase, the first grand treatise on shamanism, which became an academic bestseller after its revised translation was published in English as Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy (1964). Also an immigrant, Castaneda published an experiential novel, The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge (1968), he captivated the minds of numerous spiritual seekers and served as an inspiration for many literary emulators. Eventually, Castaneda became one of the informal apostles of the “New Age” community. This chapter discusses the contribution of Eliade and Castaneda to shamanology and places them in the context of a time that contributed to the rise of interest in shamanism.Less
The increased attention given to shamanism in humanities studies and in popular culture since the 1960s is usually associated with two names: Mircea Eliade and Carlos Castaneda. Eliade, a Romanian-born philosopher and religious scholar, released Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaiques de l'extase, the first grand treatise on shamanism, which became an academic bestseller after its revised translation was published in English as Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy (1964). Also an immigrant, Castaneda published an experiential novel, The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge (1968), he captivated the minds of numerous spiritual seekers and served as an inspiration for many literary emulators. Eventually, Castaneda became one of the informal apostles of the “New Age” community. This chapter discusses the contribution of Eliade and Castaneda to shamanology and places them in the context of a time that contributed to the rise of interest in shamanism.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical ...
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The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.Less
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.
On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.
Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.
Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.
Ned Block
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter criticizes the property dualism argument. It argues that one version of the argument conflates two different notions of mode of presentation: the “cognitive mode of presentation,” which ...
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This chapter criticizes the property dualism argument. It argues that one version of the argument conflates two different notions of mode of presentation: the “cognitive mode of presentation,” which is defined in terms of its role in determining reference and/or explaining cognitive significance; and the “metaphysical mode of presentation,” which is a property of the referent in virtue of which the cognitive mode of presentation plays its semantic and cognitive roles. It also examines John Perry's (2001) book, which discusses both Max Black's argument and the Knowledge Argument as well as some arguments drawn from Stephen White's (1986) essay on the topic and arguments inspired by unpublished papers by White.Less
This chapter criticizes the property dualism argument. It argues that one version of the argument conflates two different notions of mode of presentation: the “cognitive mode of presentation,” which is defined in terms of its role in determining reference and/or explaining cognitive significance; and the “metaphysical mode of presentation,” which is a property of the referent in virtue of which the cognitive mode of presentation plays its semantic and cognitive roles. It also examines John Perry's (2001) book, which discusses both Max Black's argument and the Knowledge Argument as well as some arguments drawn from Stephen White's (1986) essay on the topic and arguments inspired by unpublished papers by White.
David B. Audretsch, Max C. Keilbach, and Erik E. Lehmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195183511
- eISBN:
- 9780199783663
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183511.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that entrepreneurship makes a unique contribution to economic growth by permeating the knowledge filter and ...
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This chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that entrepreneurship makes a unique contribution to economic growth by permeating the knowledge filter and commercializing ideas that would otherwise remain uncommercialized. Entrepreneurial opportunities are not at all exogenous, or given, in the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship. Rather, they are endogenously generated by the extent of investments in new knowledge. Thus, a context rich in knowledge will generate more entrepreneurial opportunities than a context with impoverished knowledge.Less
This chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that entrepreneurship makes a unique contribution to economic growth by permeating the knowledge filter and commercializing ideas that would otherwise remain uncommercialized. Entrepreneurial opportunities are not at all exogenous, or given, in the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship. Rather, they are endogenously generated by the extent of investments in new knowledge. Thus, a context rich in knowledge will generate more entrepreneurial opportunities than a context with impoverished knowledge.
David B. Audretsch, Max C. Keilbach, and Erik E. Lehmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195183511
- eISBN:
- 9780199783663
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183511.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter asks whether the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship also has a spatial component in that the startups tend to cluster within geographic proximity to knowledge sources. It ...
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This chapter asks whether the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship also has a spatial component in that the startups tend to cluster within geographic proximity to knowledge sources. It examines whether the role of location in transmitting knowledge spillovers to entrepreneurial startups is heterogeneous, and varies systematically across different scientific and academic fields and for different spillover mechanisms. Evidence provides general support for the Localization Hypothesis. Universities with greater investment in knowledge and where the regional investment in knowledge is greater tend to generate more technology startups, suggesting that university spillovers tend to be localized and spatially constrained. However, the contribution of geographical proximity to accessing and absorbing university spillovers is apparently highly nuanced and varies systematically across different scientific fields and academic disciplines as well as different spillover mechanisms. The exact role that geographic proximity plays in facilitating university spillovers depends on the degree to which the type of knowledge and actual spillover mechanism are based on tacit, rather than codified knowledge.Less
This chapter asks whether the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship also has a spatial component in that the startups tend to cluster within geographic proximity to knowledge sources. It examines whether the role of location in transmitting knowledge spillovers to entrepreneurial startups is heterogeneous, and varies systematically across different scientific and academic fields and for different spillover mechanisms. Evidence provides general support for the Localization Hypothesis. Universities with greater investment in knowledge and where the regional investment in knowledge is greater tend to generate more technology startups, suggesting that university spillovers tend to be localized and spatially constrained. However, the contribution of geographical proximity to accessing and absorbing university spillovers is apparently highly nuanced and varies systematically across different scientific fields and academic disciplines as well as different spillover mechanisms. The exact role that geographic proximity plays in facilitating university spillovers depends on the degree to which the type of knowledge and actual spillover mechanism are based on tacit, rather than codified knowledge.
Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199281701
- eISBN:
- 9780191713088
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281701.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The main focus in this chapter is the relationship between Plotinus' ontology and his epistemology. It is argued that at the level of Intellect being and knowledge coincide, that to be is to be known ...
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The main focus in this chapter is the relationship between Plotinus' ontology and his epistemology. It is argued that at the level of Intellect being and knowledge coincide, that to be is to be known or thought. It is further argued that this is a necessary consequence of a principle in Plotinus' philosophy claiming that to know something as it is in itself is to know that thing from its internal activity, and that this kind of knowledge is impossible unless the activity of the knower coincides with the activity constituting the being known.Less
The main focus in this chapter is the relationship between Plotinus' ontology and his epistemology. It is argued that at the level of Intellect being and knowledge coincide, that to be is to be known or thought. It is further argued that this is a necessary consequence of a principle in Plotinus' philosophy claiming that to know something as it is in itself is to know that thing from its internal activity, and that this kind of knowledge is impossible unless the activity of the knower coincides with the activity constituting the being known.
Raymond Plant
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199281756
- eISBN:
- 9780191713040
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281756.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter has as its main focus the nature and scope of markets in neo‐liberal thought. The first part of the chapter looks at the critique of economic planning of the economy and of government ...
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This chapter has as its main focus the nature and scope of markets in neo‐liberal thought. The first part of the chapter looks at the critique of economic planning of the economy and of government intervention in the economy more generally developed by neo‐liberal thinkers. The second part of the chapter deals with the issue of whether in a nomocratic order allied to free markets and rational utility maximization can be made to work without some sense of an orientation to the common good or a diffused sense of civic virtue. Such ideas fit rather badly into neo‐liberal perspectives because they look to be more teleocratic, oriented towards some conception of the good rather than a nomocratic order based upon rules. The chapter looks at recent ways in which neo‐liberal have sought to answer this question of what might be called social capital.Less
This chapter has as its main focus the nature and scope of markets in neo‐liberal thought. The first part of the chapter looks at the critique of economic planning of the economy and of government intervention in the economy more generally developed by neo‐liberal thinkers. The second part of the chapter deals with the issue of whether in a nomocratic order allied to free markets and rational utility maximization can be made to work without some sense of an orientation to the common good or a diffused sense of civic virtue. Such ideas fit rather badly into neo‐liberal perspectives because they look to be more teleocratic, oriented towards some conception of the good rather than a nomocratic order based upon rules. The chapter looks at recent ways in which neo‐liberal have sought to answer this question of what might be called social capital.
William Taussig Scott and Martin X. Moleski
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195174335
- eISBN:
- 9780199835706
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019517433X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
In view of his work in the humanities, Polanyi was transferred from the Chemistry Department at the University of Manchester to a chair in the Faculty of Economics and Social Studies in 1948. Thanks ...
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In view of his work in the humanities, Polanyi was transferred from the Chemistry Department at the University of Manchester to a chair in the Faculty of Economics and Social Studies in 1948. Thanks to his work on the Gifford Lectures (1951–1952) and after ten years of research and writing, Polanyi was able to consolidate his fiduciary program in Personal Knowledge. In this work, he argued that impersonal, objectivist interpretations of science destroy fabric of the scientific community and society as a whole; he proposed that all knowledge is "either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing," so that objectivity is understood as the accomplishment of responsible subjects who strive to serve transcendent ideals of truth.Less
In view of his work in the humanities, Polanyi was transferred from the Chemistry Department at the University of Manchester to a chair in the Faculty of Economics and Social Studies in 1948. Thanks to his work on the Gifford Lectures (1951–1952) and after ten years of research and writing, Polanyi was able to consolidate his fiduciary program in Personal Knowledge. In this work, he argued that impersonal, objectivist interpretations of science destroy fabric of the scientific community and society as a whole; he proposed that all knowledge is "either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing," so that objectivity is understood as the accomplishment of responsible subjects who strive to serve transcendent ideals of truth.
Timothy Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops analogues of the anti-luminosity considerations for probabilistic concepts in place of the concept of knowledge. Such analogues generalize the original argument and act as a ...
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This chapter develops analogues of the anti-luminosity considerations for probabilistic concepts in place of the concept of knowledge. Such analogues generalize the original argument and act as a test of its soundness and significance. It is argued that anti-luminosity arguments of Knowledge and its Limits are robust. They are not symptoms of an isolated pathological quirk in the ordinary concept of knowledge. Rather, they can be replicated from a probabilistic starting point, and reflect the general predicament of creatures with limited powers of discrimination in their attempt to learn from experience.Less
This chapter develops analogues of the anti-luminosity considerations for probabilistic concepts in place of the concept of knowledge. Such analogues generalize the original argument and act as a test of its soundness and significance. It is argued that anti-luminosity arguments of Knowledge and its Limits are robust. They are not symptoms of an isolated pathological quirk in the ordinary concept of knowledge. Rather, they can be replicated from a probabilistic starting point, and reflect the general predicament of creatures with limited powers of discrimination in their attempt to learn from experience.
