Josephine Nock-Hee Park
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332735
- eISBN:
- 9780199868148
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332735.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry, American, 20th Century Literature
The conclusion briefly elaborates the significance of American Orientalism in the formation of Asian American literature. By reconsidering the complex negotiation with Orientalism in the work of the ...
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The conclusion briefly elaborates the significance of American Orientalism in the formation of Asian American literature. By reconsidering the complex negotiation with Orientalism in the work of the figurehead of the ethnic nationalist movement, Frank Chin, this conclusion suggests the persistence and continuing significance of an Orientalist legacy for Asian American literature.Less
The conclusion briefly elaborates the significance of American Orientalism in the formation of Asian American literature. By reconsidering the complex negotiation with Orientalism in the work of the figurehead of the ethnic nationalist movement, Frank Chin, this conclusion suggests the persistence and continuing significance of an Orientalist legacy for Asian American literature.
Ian Ravenscroft (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267989
- eISBN:
- 9780191708268
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A line-up of seventeen philosophers from the USA, the UK, and Australia present new essays on themes from the work of Frank Jackson, which bridges mind, language, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. ...
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A line-up of seventeen philosophers from the USA, the UK, and Australia present new essays on themes from the work of Frank Jackson, which bridges mind, language, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Central to Jackson's work is an approach to metaphysical issues built on the twin foundations of supervenience and conceptual analysis. In the first part of the book, six essays examine this approach and its application to philosophy of mind and philosophy of colour. The second part focuses on Jackson's highly influential work on phenomenal consciousness. The third part is devoted to Jackson's work in ethics, both normative ethics and metaethics. The last three papers discuss Jackson's ground-breaking work on conditionals. The final section of the book comprises a substantial essay by Jackson in reply to his critics: this offers some of the clearest expressions of the ideas which Jackson has brought to the fore in philosophy.Less
A line-up of seventeen philosophers from the USA, the UK, and Australia present new essays on themes from the work of Frank Jackson, which bridges mind, language, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Central to Jackson's work is an approach to metaphysical issues built on the twin foundations of supervenience and conceptual analysis. In the first part of the book, six essays examine this approach and its application to philosophy of mind and philosophy of colour. The second part focuses on Jackson's highly influential work on phenomenal consciousness. The third part is devoted to Jackson's work in ethics, both normative ethics and metaethics. The last three papers discuss Jackson's ground-breaking work on conditionals. The final section of the book comprises a substantial essay by Jackson in reply to his critics: this offers some of the clearest expressions of the ideas which Jackson has brought to the fore in philosophy.
George Basalla
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171815
- eISBN:
- 9780199786862
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171815.001.0001
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
This book records the long scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI). Although philosophical speculation about alien civilizations dates to antiquity, the invention of the telescope ...
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This book records the long scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI). Although philosophical speculation about alien civilizations dates to antiquity, the invention of the telescope in the 17th century inspired scientists like Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, René Descartes, and Christiaan Huygens to consider the possibility of intelligent creatures living on the Moon or on the planets of our solar system. By the late 19th century, Mars became the focus of attention for astronomers searching for civilized life near the earth. The belief that Mars contained a superior civilization capable of building a global system of irrigation canals on the planet was supported by the Italian astronomer Giovanni Schiaparelli and the American Percival Lowell. In the 1960s and 1970s, data gathered by Soviet and American spacecraft challenged the assumption that Mars was the habitat for life of any sort. As the hunt for alien civilizations in the solar system waned, a new search began for signs of intelligent life in remote parts of the universe. This search used radio telescopes to scan the skies for any messages transmitted to earth by advanced extraterrestrial civilizations. Distinguished modern astronomers and physicists — Frank Drake, Philip Morrison, Carl Sagan — were convinced that electronic technology would allow contact with civilizations located many light years from earth. Unfortunately, the search for extraterrestrial intelligence was compromised by anthropomorphism (attributing human qualities to alien life and culture) and by an unconscious religious outlook that the superior beings living in outer space would help solve pressing social, economic, and technological problems.Less
This book records the long scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI). Although philosophical speculation about alien civilizations dates to antiquity, the invention of the telescope in the 17th century inspired scientists like Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, René Descartes, and Christiaan Huygens to consider the possibility of intelligent creatures living on the Moon or on the planets of our solar system. By the late 19th century, Mars became the focus of attention for astronomers searching for civilized life near the earth. The belief that Mars contained a superior civilization capable of building a global system of irrigation canals on the planet was supported by the Italian astronomer Giovanni Schiaparelli and the American Percival Lowell. In the 1960s and 1970s, data gathered by Soviet and American spacecraft challenged the assumption that Mars was the habitat for life of any sort. As the hunt for alien civilizations in the solar system waned, a new search began for signs of intelligent life in remote parts of the universe. This search used radio telescopes to scan the skies for any messages transmitted to earth by advanced extraterrestrial civilizations. Distinguished modern astronomers and physicists — Frank Drake, Philip Morrison, Carl Sagan — were convinced that electronic technology would allow contact with civilizations located many light years from earth. Unfortunately, the search for extraterrestrial intelligence was compromised by anthropomorphism (attributing human qualities to alien life and culture) and by an unconscious religious outlook that the superior beings living in outer space would help solve pressing social, economic, and technological problems.
Bernard J. Baars
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195102659
- eISBN:
- 9780199864126
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195102659.003.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Sensory and Motor Systems, Behavioral Neuroscience
This chapter presents a brief discussion of the aim of the book. It compares Plato's thoughts on consciousness with that of Frank Crick, arguing that both appear to reflect the same underlying ...
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This chapter presents a brief discussion of the aim of the book. It compares Plato's thoughts on consciousness with that of Frank Crick, arguing that both appear to reflect the same underlying metaphor of our personal experience, the theater metaphor. The importance of theater metaphors to scientists is considered.Less
This chapter presents a brief discussion of the aim of the book. It compares Plato's thoughts on consciousness with that of Frank Crick, arguing that both appear to reflect the same underlying metaphor of our personal experience, the theater metaphor. The importance of theater metaphors to scientists is considered.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so ...
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The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.Less
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.
Torin Alter and Sven Walter
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what ...
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What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. This controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts — knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts — have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room. According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts?Less
What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. This controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts — knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts — have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room. According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts?
Frank Sibley
John Benson, Betty Redfern, and Jeremy Roxbee Cox (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238997
- eISBN:
- 9780191598418
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238991.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Includes some of the most significant of Sibley’s published papers as well as five new essays previously unpublished. The point of the book is not a systematic introduction to aesthetics, but rather ...
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Includes some of the most significant of Sibley’s published papers as well as five new essays previously unpublished. The point of the book is not a systematic introduction to aesthetics, but rather a theoretical discussion of some core topics. The first three papers study the difference and the relation between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. Papers 4–6 show how aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic ones. In papers 7–9 is discussed the difficulty in finding criteria of aesthetic merit. The distinction between attributive and predicative use of adjectives and its application to the cases of beautiful and ugly is considered in Chs 12–14. The nature of aesthetic and the relation between concepts of the aesthetic of art are the arguments of papers 10 and 15. Finally, papers 11 and 16 investigate the impossibility of isolating and defining a ‘purely music’ experience and illustrate the ontological status of works of visual art respectively.Less
Includes some of the most significant of Sibley’s published papers as well as five new essays previously unpublished. The point of the book is not a systematic introduction to aesthetics, but rather a theoretical discussion of some core topics. The first three papers study the difference and the relation between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. Papers 4–6 show how aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic ones. In papers 7–9 is discussed the difficulty in finding criteria of aesthetic merit. The distinction between attributive and predicative use of adjectives and its application to the cases of beautiful and ugly is considered in Chs 12–14. The nature of aesthetic and the relation between concepts of the aesthetic of art are the arguments of papers 10 and 15. Finally, papers 11 and 16 investigate the impossibility of isolating and defining a ‘purely music’ experience and illustrate the ontological status of works of visual art respectively.
Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This essay revisits a position on aesthetic attributions, a position rooted in some seminal essays of Frank Sibley, and which can be labelledaesthetic realism. It reflects on some challenges which ...
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This essay revisits a position on aesthetic attributions, a position rooted in some seminal essays of Frank Sibley, and which can be labelledaesthetic realism. It reflects on some challenges which have emerged on the viability of that position, and determines what accommodations, if any, are called for. This position is sketched, borrowing with modification from an earlier short essay. A number of worries about the position which have lately come into view are considered.Less
This essay revisits a position on aesthetic attributions, a position rooted in some seminal essays of Frank Sibley, and which can be labelledaesthetic realism. It reflects on some challenges which have emerged on the viability of that position, and determines what accommodations, if any, are called for. This position is sketched, borrowing with modification from an earlier short essay. A number of worries about the position which have lately come into view are considered.
Frank Jackson
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250616
- eISBN:
- 9780191597787
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250614.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious ...
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Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious activity discredited by Quine that seeks after the a priori in some hard‐to‐understand sense. It is, rather, something familiar to everyone, philosophers and non‐philosophers alike—or so I argue. Another reason for its unpopularity is a failure to appreciate the need for conceptual analysis. The cost of repudiating it has not been sufficiently appreciated; without it, we cannot address a whole raft of important questions.I have always been suspicious of excessively abstract theorizing in philosophy. I think that an important test of metaphilosophical claims is whether they make good sense in the context of particular problems. The discussion in the book is, accordingly, anchored in particular philosophical debates. The basic framework is developed in the first three chapters via a consideration of the role of conceptual analysis in the debate over the doctrine in metaphysics known as physicalism, with digressions on free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, and then applied in the last three chapters to current debates over colour and ethics.Less
Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious activity discredited by Quine that seeks after the a priori in some hard‐to‐understand sense. It is, rather, something familiar to everyone, philosophers and non‐philosophers alike—or so I argue. Another reason for its unpopularity is a failure to appreciate the need for conceptual analysis. The cost of repudiating it has not been sufficiently appreciated; without it, we cannot address a whole raft of important questions.
I have always been suspicious of excessively abstract theorizing in philosophy. I think that an important test of metaphilosophical claims is whether they make good sense in the context of particular problems. The discussion in the book is, accordingly, anchored in particular philosophical debates. The basic framework is developed in the first three chapters via a consideration of the role of conceptual analysis in the debate over the doctrine in metaphysics known as physicalism, with digressions on free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, and then applied in the last three chapters to current debates over colour and ethics.
Torin Alter
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism — the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness ...
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The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism — the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic formulation, but has since rejected the argument claiming that it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism) — the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. This chapter argues that Jackson's representationalist response to the knowledge argument fails. Physicalists face a representationalist version of the knowledge argument that inherits the force of the original. Reformulating the challenge in representationalist terms does little to help physicalists answer it.Less
The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism — the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic formulation, but has since rejected the argument claiming that it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism) — the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. This chapter argues that Jackson's representationalist response to the knowledge argument fails. Physicalists face a representationalist version of the knowledge argument that inherits the force of the original. Reformulating the challenge in representationalist terms does little to help physicalists answer it.
