Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-8 of 8 items

  • Keywords: Edgington x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Jonathan Bennett

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199258871
eISBN:
9780191597046
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199258872.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Conditionals are of two basic kinds, often called ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’. This book expounds and evaluates the main literature about each kind. It eventually defends the view of Adams and ... More


Syntactic Restriction Strategies

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in The Knowability Paradox

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199282593
eISBN:
9780191603587
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282595.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter examines approaches to the paradox that wish to save anti-realism from the paradox by denying that the knowability assumption is a commitment of anti-realism. Such approaches contend ... More


Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability

Jonathan Bennett

in A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199258871
eISBN:
9780191597046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199258872.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

By Lewis's account, it may be unduly hard for subjunctive conditionals to be outright true. We could weaken them by deeming each one to be true if its antecedent makes its consequent highly probable. ... More


Unifying the Two Kinds of Conditional

Jonathan Bennett

in A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199258871
eISBN:
9780191597046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199258872.003.0023
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Critical discussion of attempts by Davis, Stalnaker, Ellis, and Edgington to unify indicative and subjunctive conditionals within a single smooth theory. Edgington's work on this goes a long way, but ... More


Structural Unknowability

Timothy Williamson

in Knowledge and its Limits

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199256563
eISBN:
9780191598678
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019925656X.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explores the limits on what can be known that are revealed by an argument first published by Fitch, sometimes known as the Paradox of Knowability. The argument shows that if some truths ... More


The Equation Attacked

Jonathan Bennett

in A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199258871
eISBN:
9780191597046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199258872.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Presents and evaluates a series of attacks on The Equation, i.e. the view that an indicative conditional ‘If A, C’ is a proposition whose subjective probability for you is always your conditional ... More


The Problem of Evaluating Counterfactuals

Moritz Schulz

in Counterfactuals and Probability

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780198785958
eISBN:
9780191831713
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785958.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter introduces the problem of systematizing the data concerning the evaluation of counterfactuals. It critically discusses proposals by E. Adams, D. Edgington, and B. Skyrms. The chapter ... More


Logical Necessity

Ian Rumfitt

in The Boundary Stones of Thought: An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
June 2015
ISBN:
9780198733638
eISBN:
9780191798016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198733638.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Aristotle discerned a modal element in the notion of consequence: if a conclusion follows from some premisses, it is necessary that the conclusion is true whenever all the premisses are true. This ... More


View: