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Rules for the Knowledge Operator

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in The Knowability Paradox

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199282593
eISBN:
9780191603587
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282595.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter examines the idea that the logical principles governing the knowledge operator are the root cause of the paradox. There are two such principles: the first is that knowledge implies ... More


Against Etiological Semantics

Joseph Mendola

in Anti-Externalism

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199534999
eISBN:
9780191715969
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language but in which history is crucial. It argues that the etiological teleosemantics ... More


Knowledge of Perception

Daniel Stoljar

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

According to Fred Dretske’ evidence argument I cannot know that that I am seeing my son (and other simple first-personal present tense psychological facts). However, since I can and do know these ... More


Knowing What I See

Alex Byrne

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I know that a pig is present by seeing it, but how do I know that I see a pig? Surprisingly little attention has been paid to this difficult question. (Evans and Dretske are notable exceptions.) The ... More


Self‐Representation, Objectivity, and Intentionality

J.T. Ismael

in The Situated Self

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780195174366
eISBN:
9780199872121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195174366.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that the formal requirements on self-describing media shed light on two elusive questions in the philosophy of mind. The first is a question that Dretske raised in Naturalizing ... More


Laws of Nature

David M. Armstrong

in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199590612
eISBN:
9780191723391
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Once one has ‘sparse’ universals it is natural to think that an account of laws of nature can be given in terms of relations between these universals. Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and myself all ... More


Skepticism and Epistemic Closure

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0027
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter gives the first extended discussion of a gamut of positions on closure.


Klein on Closure and Skepticism

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0031
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines Peter Klein's ingenious defense of closure and raises a number of problems for it.


Sensory Concepts

Mohan Matthen

in Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199268504
eISBN:
9780191602283
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199268509.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

A number of influential positions in the philosophy of perception are grounded in the idea that the sensory image is raw and unprocessed. Dretske holds that sensation is analogue: he neglects ... More


The Regularity Theory II: Laws and Accidental Generalizations

Bernard Berofsky

in Nature's Challenge to Free Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199640010
eISBN:
9780191738197
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640010.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

The critiques of the regularity theory by Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and D. M. Armstrong are shown to fail. A categorization of “accidental generalizations” is offered. The failures of the best ... More


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