Alfred R Mele
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195384260
- eISBN:
- 9780199869909
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384260.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not ...
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This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not warranted by the data. These claims (by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and others) include the following: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100‐millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all you can freely do in that window is veto conscious intentions that you were about to execute; intentions and their physical correlates play no role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. The positive aim is to show that there is powerful empirical support for the thesis that there are effective conscious decisions and intentions to act.Less
This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not warranted by the data. These claims (by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and others) include the following: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100‐millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all you can freely do in that window is veto conscious intentions that you were about to execute; intentions and their physical correlates play no role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. The positive aim is to show that there is powerful empirical support for the thesis that there are effective conscious decisions and intentions to act.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195384260
- eISBN:
- 9780199869909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384260.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter examines data Daniel Wegner uses to support his thesis that conscious will is an illusion. The data are shown to be compatible with its being the case that all intentional actions have ...
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This chapter examines data Daniel Wegner uses to support his thesis that conscious will is an illusion. The data are shown to be compatible with its being the case that all intentional actions have intentions among their causes. The chapter also challenges recent claims by Wegner about free will and the self.Less
This chapter examines data Daniel Wegner uses to support his thesis that conscious will is an illusion. The data are shown to be compatible with its being the case that all intentional actions have intentions among their causes. The chapter also challenges recent claims by Wegner about free will and the self.
Alfred R Mele
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0018
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter is a commentary on the others, concentrating on themes that link many of them. It provides conceptual background on free will, distinguishes among distinct philosophical positions on the ...
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This chapter is a commentary on the others, concentrating on themes that link many of them. It provides conceptual background on free will, distinguishes among distinct philosophical positions on the topic (including compatibilist and incompatibilist positions), discusses determinism and laws of nature, connects free will to consciousness, critically examines Benjamin Libet's work on free will and consciousness, and considers the light that Daniel Wegner's contribution to the volume sheds on the “the illusion of conscious will” and free will.Less
This chapter is a commentary on the others, concentrating on themes that link many of them. It provides conceptual background on free will, distinguishes among distinct philosophical positions on the topic (including compatibilist and incompatibilist positions), discusses determinism and laws of nature, connects free will to consciousness, critically examines Benjamin Libet's work on free will and consciousness, and considers the light that Daniel Wegner's contribution to the volume sheds on the “the illusion of conscious will” and free will.
Daniel C Dennett
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Whether free will is real or illusory is such an important topic that many thinkers overreact to it, jumping to invalid conclusions in their desire to fend off what they see as either mystical or ...
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Whether free will is real or illusory is such an important topic that many thinkers overreact to it, jumping to invalid conclusions in their desire to fend off what they see as either mystical or nihilistic visions. This chapter examines three instances of this overshooting in recent work by Daniel Wegner, Richard Dawkins, and Sue Blackmore. It reaches the conclusion that free will, in the only sense worth wanting, is real but not quite what most people think it is. In spite of what many people uncritically suppose, indeterminism is not required for genuine free will.Less
Whether free will is real or illusory is such an important topic that many thinkers overreact to it, jumping to invalid conclusions in their desire to fend off what they see as either mystical or nihilistic visions. This chapter examines three instances of this overshooting in recent work by Daniel Wegner, Richard Dawkins, and Sue Blackmore. It reaches the conclusion that free will, in the only sense worth wanting, is real but not quite what most people think it is. In spite of what many people uncritically suppose, indeterminism is not required for genuine free will.
Thomas Nadelhoffer
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195381641
- eISBN:
- 9780199864911
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Whereas the traditional free will debate focused on the free part of “free will”—with an emphasis on alternative possibilities and the ability to do otherwise—many of the new threats from psychology ...
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Whereas the traditional free will debate focused on the free part of “free will”—with an emphasis on alternative possibilities and the ability to do otherwise—many of the new threats from psychology pose potential problems for the will part as well. This chapter attempts to shed some light on the nature of these potential psychological threats. It first sets the stage by explaining and clarifying some key terms and exploring some of the key issues from the free will debate. It then examines several potential threats to free will collectively referred to as the Threat of Shrinking Agency. In piecing this general threat together, it discusses the work of several prominent psychologists including Jonathan Bargh, Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and others. The goal is not to argue that these threats actually do undermine free will and responsibility, but simply to trace the boundaries of the potential threats examined and show that they are not dependent on other potential threats such as determinism, mechanism, reductionism, and the like.Less
Whereas the traditional free will debate focused on the free part of “free will”—with an emphasis on alternative possibilities and the ability to do otherwise—many of the new threats from psychology pose potential problems for the will part as well. This chapter attempts to shed some light on the nature of these potential psychological threats. It first sets the stage by explaining and clarifying some key terms and exploring some of the key issues from the free will debate. It then examines several potential threats to free will collectively referred to as the Threat of Shrinking Agency. In piecing this general threat together, it discusses the work of several prominent psychologists including Jonathan Bargh, Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and others. The goal is not to argue that these threats actually do undermine free will and responsibility, but simply to trace the boundaries of the potential threats examined and show that they are not dependent on other potential threats such as determinism, mechanism, reductionism, and the like.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195384260
- eISBN:
- 9780199869909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384260.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter defends answers to a pair of questions: Are intentions essentially conscious, as Daniel Wegner claims? And why do scientists find themselves disagreeing about this? It also develops a ...
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This chapter defends answers to a pair of questions: Are intentions essentially conscious, as Daniel Wegner claims? And why do scientists find themselves disagreeing about this? It also develops a view of what conscious intentions and decisions are.Less
This chapter defends answers to a pair of questions: Are intentions essentially conscious, as Daniel Wegner claims? And why do scientists find themselves disagreeing about this? It also develops a view of what conscious intentions and decisions are.
Timothy Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262162371
- eISBN:
- 9780262281690
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.003.0010
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
This chapter examines Daniel Wegner’s claim that the conscious will is an illusion and argues that the content of the “experience of conscious will” is more complicated than has been assumed. It also ...
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This chapter examines Daniel Wegner’s claim that the conscious will is an illusion and argues that the content of the “experience of conscious will” is more complicated than has been assumed. It also suggests that, although further explanation is required to elucidate the role of the self and intention in the production of action, the phenomenology of agency is unlikely to be systematically misleading. In addition, our experience of ourselves as agents who do things for reasons does not necessarily lead us into error. After describing Wegner’s matching model of the conscious will, the chapter considers whether we experience our actions as caused by consciousness. It also looks at the argument from eliminativism.Less
This chapter examines Daniel Wegner’s claim that the conscious will is an illusion and argues that the content of the “experience of conscious will” is more complicated than has been assumed. It also suggests that, although further explanation is required to elucidate the role of the self and intention in the production of action, the phenomenology of agency is unlikely to be systematically misleading. In addition, our experience of ourselves as agents who do things for reasons does not necessarily lead us into error. After describing Wegner’s matching model of the conscious will, the chapter considers whether we experience our actions as caused by consciousness. It also looks at the argument from eliminativism.
Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262162371
- eISBN:
- 9780262281690
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.001.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
Our intuition tells us that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts. Yet scientists have long questioned this; Thomas Huxley, for example, in 1874 compared mental events to a steam ...
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Our intuition tells us that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts. Yet scientists have long questioned this; Thomas Huxley, for example, in 1874 compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive. New experimental evidence (most notably, work by Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner) has brought the causal status of human behavior back to the forefront of intellectual discussion. This multidisciplinary collection advances the debate, approaching the question from a variety of perspectives. The contributors begin by examining recent research in neuroscience which suggests that consciousness does not cause behavior, offering the outline of an empirically based model which shows how the brain causes behavior and where consciousness might fit in. Other contributors address the philosophical presuppositions that may have informed the empirical studies, raising questions about what can be legitimately concluded about the existence of free will from Libet’s and Wegner’s experimental results. Others examine the effect recent psychological and neuroscientific research could have on legal, social, and moral judgments of responsibility and blame—in situations including a Clockwork Orange-like scenario of behavior correction.Less
Our intuition tells us that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts. Yet scientists have long questioned this; Thomas Huxley, for example, in 1874 compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive. New experimental evidence (most notably, work by Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner) has brought the causal status of human behavior back to the forefront of intellectual discussion. This multidisciplinary collection advances the debate, approaching the question from a variety of perspectives. The contributors begin by examining recent research in neuroscience which suggests that consciousness does not cause behavior, offering the outline of an empirically based model which shows how the brain causes behavior and where consciousness might fit in. Other contributors address the philosophical presuppositions that may have informed the empirical studies, raising questions about what can be legitimately concluded about the existence of free will from Libet’s and Wegner’s experimental results. Others examine the effect recent psychological and neuroscientific research could have on legal, social, and moral judgments of responsibility and blame—in situations including a Clockwork Orange-like scenario of behavior correction.
Neil Levy
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198704638
- eISBN:
- 9780191774249
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704638.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter describes the scientific basis for the claim that consciousness is epiphenomenal, stemming from the work of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner. It argues that the perceived challenge to ...
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This chapter describes the scientific basis for the claim that consciousness is epiphenomenal, stemming from the work of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner. It argues that the perceived challenge to responsibility is misplaced: it does not matter whether or not Libet and Wegner are right. The real question turns on the role that information plays in our cognition, not on questions concerning the timing of our conscious states. I then define the thesis to be defended in more detail: that consciousness of the facts that give to our actions their moral significance is a necessary condition of moral responsibility for those acts. It is emphasized that the consciousness at issue is an informational state, not phenomenal consciousness.Less
This chapter describes the scientific basis for the claim that consciousness is epiphenomenal, stemming from the work of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner. It argues that the perceived challenge to responsibility is misplaced: it does not matter whether or not Libet and Wegner are right. The real question turns on the role that information plays in our cognition, not on questions concerning the timing of our conscious states. I then define the thesis to be defended in more detail: that consciousness of the facts that give to our actions their moral significance is a necessary condition of moral responsibility for those acts. It is emphasized that the consciousness at issue is an informational state, not phenomenal consciousness.
Susan Pockett, William P. Bank, and Shaun Gallagher
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262162371
- eISBN:
- 9780262281690
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.003.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
The notion that consciousness does not cause voluntary behavior in humans has found support in William James and Sigmund Freud. In his 1890 classic The Principles of Psychology, James argued against ...
More
The notion that consciousness does not cause voluntary behavior in humans has found support in William James and Sigmund Freud. In his 1890 classic The Principles of Psychology, James argued against what he terms “the automaton theory” proposed by Thomas Huxley, who compared mental events to a steam whistle that does not contribute anything to the work of a locomotive. Meanwhile, Freud suggested that consciousness has nothing to do with much of our everyday behavior. This book examines two recent lines of evidence suggesting that consciousness in fact causes human behavior: one ascribed to Benjamin Libet and the other to Daniel Wegner. It considers an empirical model that explains how the brain causes behavior; the philosophical presuppositions that have informed the empirical studies of motor control, action, and intention; the concepts of free will and conscious efficacy; and the legal, social, and moral judgments of responsibility and blame. The book also offers a sociological analysis of a public debate that has taken place in Germany regarding the link between consciousness and behavior.Less
The notion that consciousness does not cause voluntary behavior in humans has found support in William James and Sigmund Freud. In his 1890 classic The Principles of Psychology, James argued against what he terms “the automaton theory” proposed by Thomas Huxley, who compared mental events to a steam whistle that does not contribute anything to the work of a locomotive. Meanwhile, Freud suggested that consciousness has nothing to do with much of our everyday behavior. This book examines two recent lines of evidence suggesting that consciousness in fact causes human behavior: one ascribed to Benjamin Libet and the other to Daniel Wegner. It considers an empirical model that explains how the brain causes behavior; the philosophical presuppositions that have informed the empirical studies of motor control, action, and intention; the concepts of free will and conscious efficacy; and the legal, social, and moral judgments of responsibility and blame. The book also offers a sociological analysis of a public debate that has taken place in Germany regarding the link between consciousness and behavior.
