John Symons and Paco Calvo
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262027236
- eISBN:
- 9780262322461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027236.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In this introductory chapter we set the stage for Fodor and Pylyshyn's systematicity challenge to connectionist theory, and provide an overview of the chapters included in the volume. We spell out ...
More
In this introductory chapter we set the stage for Fodor and Pylyshyn's systematicity challenge to connectionist theory, and provide an overview of the chapters included in the volume. We spell out the terms of the disagreement by locating the systematicity debate in the context of the historical precedents and the development of cognitive science in the second half of the twentieth century, identifying a number of central features, and considering potential consequences that the advent of a “post-connectionist” era in the last decade could bring.Less
In this introductory chapter we set the stage for Fodor and Pylyshyn's systematicity challenge to connectionist theory, and provide an overview of the chapters included in the volume. We spell out the terms of the disagreement by locating the systematicity debate in the context of the historical precedents and the development of cognitive science in the second half of the twentieth century, identifying a number of central features, and considering potential consequences that the advent of a “post-connectionist” era in the last decade could bring.
Paco Calvo and John Symons (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262027236
- eISBN:
- 9780262322461
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027236.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In 1988, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn challenged connectionist theorists to explain the systematicity of cognition. In a highly influential critical analysis of connectionism, they argued that ...
More
In 1988, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn challenged connectionist theorists to explain the systematicity of cognition. In a highly influential critical analysis of connectionism, they argued that connectionist explanations, at best, can only inform us about details of the neural substrate; explanations at the cognitive level must be classical insofar as adult human cognition is essentially systematic. More than twenty-five years later, however, conflicting explanations of cognition do not divide along classicist-connectionist lines, but oppose cognitivism (both classicist and connectionist) with a range of other methodologies, including distributed and embodied cognition, ecological psychology, enactivism, adaptive behavior, and biologically based neural network theory. This volume reassesses Fodor and Pylyshyn's “systematicity challenge” for a post-connectionist era. The contributors consider such questions as how post-connectionist approaches meet Fodor and Pylyshyn's conceptual challenges; whether there is empirical evidence for or against the systematicity of thought; and how the systematicity of human thought relates to behavior. The chapters offer a representative sample and an overview of the most important recent developments in the systematicity debate.Less
In 1988, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn challenged connectionist theorists to explain the systematicity of cognition. In a highly influential critical analysis of connectionism, they argued that connectionist explanations, at best, can only inform us about details of the neural substrate; explanations at the cognitive level must be classical insofar as adult human cognition is essentially systematic. More than twenty-five years later, however, conflicting explanations of cognition do not divide along classicist-connectionist lines, but oppose cognitivism (both classicist and connectionist) with a range of other methodologies, including distributed and embodied cognition, ecological psychology, enactivism, adaptive behavior, and biologically based neural network theory. This volume reassesses Fodor and Pylyshyn's “systematicity challenge” for a post-connectionist era. The contributors consider such questions as how post-connectionist approaches meet Fodor and Pylyshyn's conceptual challenges; whether there is empirical evidence for or against the systematicity of thought; and how the systematicity of human thought relates to behavior. The chapters offer a representative sample and an overview of the most important recent developments in the systematicity debate.
Ron Sun
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199794553
- eISBN:
- 9780190460570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794553.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures, Cognitive Psychology
In this chapter, as an introduction to what is to be detailed in this book, I attempt to justify the very endeavor of developing a generic computational model of the mind (i.e., a computational ...
More
In this chapter, as an introduction to what is to be detailed in this book, I attempt to justify the very endeavor of developing a generic computational model of the mind (i.e., a computational cognitive architecture), through addressing a series of questions. Then I discuss a few issues fundamental to such an endeavor.Less
In this chapter, as an introduction to what is to be detailed in this book, I attempt to justify the very endeavor of developing a generic computational model of the mind (i.e., a computational cognitive architecture), through addressing a series of questions. Then I discuss a few issues fundamental to such an endeavor.
Farid Masrour
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027786
- eISBN:
- 9780262319270
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
It is common to hold that our conscious experiences at a single moment are often unified. But when consciousness is unified, what are the fundamental facts in virtue of which it is unified? It is ...
More
It is common to hold that our conscious experiences at a single moment are often unified. But when consciousness is unified, what are the fundamental facts in virtue of which it is unified? It is common to hold the Newtonian view that the most fundamental fact that grounds unity is a form of singularity or oneness. In this chapter, FaridMasrour sketches and defends an alternative Leibnizian view according to which experiences are unified when they are connected in the right way. This view has significant implications for our understanding of the metaphysics of conscious experience, the cognitive architecture of the mind and our assessment of the conditions under which unity of consciousness breaks down.Less
It is common to hold that our conscious experiences at a single moment are often unified. But when consciousness is unified, what are the fundamental facts in virtue of which it is unified? It is common to hold the Newtonian view that the most fundamental fact that grounds unity is a form of singularity or oneness. In this chapter, FaridMasrour sketches and defends an alternative Leibnizian view according to which experiences are unified when they are connected in the right way. This view has significant implications for our understanding of the metaphysics of conscious experience, the cognitive architecture of the mind and our assessment of the conditions under which unity of consciousness breaks down.
