Max. M Edling
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195148701
- eISBN:
- 9780199835096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148703.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
It would be a fundamental mistake to assume a priori a complete correspondence between the historical sociology of state formation and the conceptual history of the “state,” or, in more general ...
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It would be a fundamental mistake to assume a priori a complete correspondence between the historical sociology of state formation and the conceptual history of the “state,” or, in more general terms, between institutional and intellectual development, and between political reality and political rhetoric. Equally, it would be a mistake to assume that there is no relation whatsoever, and it would have been remarkable if the great expansion of the fiscal and military capacity of central government in Britain in the early modern period had gone unnoticed by contemporaries, so as to leave no mark on historical, political, and social reflection. Shows that the European process of state formation had indeed influenced political commentary in giving rise to arguments analyzing and criticizing the growth of the state, and that these arguments found their way across the Atlantic from Britain to the American colonies in the form of “Country” thought, which gave rise to a complete vocabulary with which to respond to the growth of the British fiscal‐military state in the Anglo‐American world of political discourse. In fact, Antifederalism can be described as an expression of Country thought, although it cannot at the same time be claimed that Federalism was a repetition of the contrasting central Court defense of state expansion.Less
It would be a fundamental mistake to assume a priori a complete correspondence between the historical sociology of state formation and the conceptual history of the “state,” or, in more general terms, between institutional and intellectual development, and between political reality and political rhetoric. Equally, it would be a mistake to assume that there is no relation whatsoever, and it would have been remarkable if the great expansion of the fiscal and military capacity of central government in Britain in the early modern period had gone unnoticed by contemporaries, so as to leave no mark on historical, political, and social reflection. Shows that the European process of state formation had indeed influenced political commentary in giving rise to arguments analyzing and criticizing the growth of the state, and that these arguments found their way across the Atlantic from Britain to the American colonies in the form of “Country” thought, which gave rise to a complete vocabulary with which to respond to the growth of the British fiscal‐military state in the Anglo‐American world of political discourse. In fact, Antifederalism can be described as an expression of Country thought, although it cannot at the same time be claimed that Federalism was a repetition of the contrasting central Court defense of state expansion.
DOUGLAS NEWTON
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203148
- eISBN:
- 9780191675744
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203148.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, European Modern History
The chapter discusses the willing attitude of Germany towards democracy and the various factors at work in the eventual British decision for armistice. The armistice was a premature suspension of ...
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The chapter discusses the willing attitude of Germany towards democracy and the various factors at work in the eventual British decision for armistice. The armistice was a premature suspension of hostilities that denied Allied arms and British arms in particular, in other words, an imminent ‘knock-out blow’. The chapter seeks to emphasize the importance of three factors, namely, domestic political preoccupations, entrenched hostility to Wilsonianism, and waning confidence in British military capabilities. These factors above all guided the British political elite during the making of the armistice. Moreover, the armistice was accepted not because of confidence in an overwhelming British military strength, but rather from fear of an imminent exposure of military weakness.Less
The chapter discusses the willing attitude of Germany towards democracy and the various factors at work in the eventual British decision for armistice. The armistice was a premature suspension of hostilities that denied Allied arms and British arms in particular, in other words, an imminent ‘knock-out blow’. The chapter seeks to emphasize the importance of three factors, namely, domestic political preoccupations, entrenched hostility to Wilsonianism, and waning confidence in British military capabilities. These factors above all guided the British political elite during the making of the armistice. Moreover, the armistice was accepted not because of confidence in an overwhelming British military strength, but rather from fear of an imminent exposure of military weakness.
Jim Beach
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748646272
- eISBN:
- 9780748684496
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748646272.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the historiography of British military intelligence and considers why it now has a low profile. It also surveys the current literature, in the hope that this may be helpful to ...
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This chapter examines the historiography of British military intelligence and considers why it now has a low profile. It also surveys the current literature, in the hope that this may be helpful to new scholars of the subject. This analysis focuses on the pre-1945 period. It suggests that, in order to get ‘better’, studies of British military intelligence will probably need to get ‘duller’.Less
This chapter examines the historiography of British military intelligence and considers why it now has a low profile. It also surveys the current literature, in the hope that this may be helpful to new scholars of the subject. This analysis focuses on the pre-1945 period. It suggests that, in order to get ‘better’, studies of British military intelligence will probably need to get ‘duller’.
Patrick H. Hase
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9789622098992
- eISBN:
- 9789882207592
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789622098992.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
In 1899, a year after the Convention of Peking leased the New Territories to Britain, the British moved to establish control. This triggered resistance by some of the population of the New ...
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In 1899, a year after the Convention of Peking leased the New Territories to Britain, the British moved to establish control. This triggered resistance by some of the population of the New Territories. There ensued six days of fighting with heavy Chinese casualties. This forgotten war has been researched and recounted for the first time. After a brief discussion of British Imperialism in the 1890s and British military theory of that period on small wars, the heart of the book is a day-by-day account of the fighting and of the differences of opinion between the Governor of Hong Kong (Sir Henry Blake) and the Colonial Secretary (James Stewart Lockhart) as to how the war should be fought. The book uses knowledge of the people and the area to give a picture of the leaders and of the rank-and-file of the village fighters. New estimates of the casualties are provided, as are the implications of why these casualties are down-played in most British accounts.Less
In 1899, a year after the Convention of Peking leased the New Territories to Britain, the British moved to establish control. This triggered resistance by some of the population of the New Territories. There ensued six days of fighting with heavy Chinese casualties. This forgotten war has been researched and recounted for the first time. After a brief discussion of British Imperialism in the 1890s and British military theory of that period on small wars, the heart of the book is a day-by-day account of the fighting and of the differences of opinion between the Governor of Hong Kong (Sir Henry Blake) and the Colonial Secretary (James Stewart Lockhart) as to how the war should be fought. The book uses knowledge of the people and the area to give a picture of the leaders and of the rank-and-file of the village fighters. New estimates of the casualties are provided, as are the implications of why these casualties are down-played in most British accounts.
Alexander Zahar
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199643288
- eISBN:
- 9780191749070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199643288.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter examines the war crimes process in Hong Kong. It uses three benchmarks of assessment: the degree of departure from the normally applicable court-martial procedure current at the time; ...
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This chapter examines the war crimes process in Hong Kong. It uses three benchmarks of assessment: the degree of departure from the normally applicable court-martial procedure current at the time; the degree to which the stated principles governing the trials were complied with in practice by the courts and the authorities associated with them; and the aftermath of the trials, in particular, the way that the military-court system was wound up. It is argued that the proceedings were summary, offering a standard that was not just highly problematic by the identified benchmarks, but also much lower than that which applied to British servicemen at the time.Less
This chapter examines the war crimes process in Hong Kong. It uses three benchmarks of assessment: the degree of departure from the normally applicable court-martial procedure current at the time; the degree to which the stated principles governing the trials were complied with in practice by the courts and the authorities associated with them; and the aftermath of the trials, in particular, the way that the military-court system was wound up. It is argued that the proceedings were summary, offering a standard that was not just highly problematic by the identified benchmarks, but also much lower than that which applied to British servicemen at the time.
Nigel D. White
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218592
- eISBN:
- 9780191705595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218592.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
The government's decisions to deploy troops since 1945 have been increasingly made within international institutional frameworks. The UK, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and as an ...
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The government's decisions to deploy troops since 1945 have been increasingly made within international institutional frameworks. The UK, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and as an original party to the NATO Treaty of 1949, is both a member of a deficient arguably idealist global security system (the UN), and party to a discretionary realist regional defence alliance (NATO) that has its historical roots in the 19th century balance-of-power system. The end of the Cold War saw both the re-vitalization of the UN system and the reinvention of NATO, so that both organizations now claim to operate within similar legal and political contexts. The changing functions of both organizations and Britain's role within them are key features examined in this chapter in that they are essential for understanding the decisions to go to war or to deploy troops under international authority.Less
The government's decisions to deploy troops since 1945 have been increasingly made within international institutional frameworks. The UK, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and as an original party to the NATO Treaty of 1949, is both a member of a deficient arguably idealist global security system (the UN), and party to a discretionary realist regional defence alliance (NATO) that has its historical roots in the 19th century balance-of-power system. The end of the Cold War saw both the re-vitalization of the UN system and the reinvention of NATO, so that both organizations now claim to operate within similar legal and political contexts. The changing functions of both organizations and Britain's role within them are key features examined in this chapter in that they are essential for understanding the decisions to go to war or to deploy troops under international authority.
Richard J. Reid
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199211883
- eISBN:
- 9780191725135
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211883.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter explores the nature and significance of the period of European colonial rule in the region, encompassing the Italian administration of Eritrea and Somalia, and the British Military ...
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This chapter explores the nature and significance of the period of European colonial rule in the region, encompassing the Italian administration of Eritrea and Somalia, and the British Military Administration in Eritrea. The tangible impact of European colonialism is examined, notably in terms of the hardening of perceived divisions and increasingly militarized identities; of particular importance is the impact of Italian rule in Eritrea in exacerbating extant ‘trans-Mereb’ patterns of violence and resistance, and creating certain new ones. Equally, the role of the British Military Administration (BMA) was important in creating conditions whereby identities might be more forcefully articulated than had been the case previously. Yet in many respects European colonial rule was co-opted into extant patterns of regional conflict. Alongside the shifta insurgency in Eritrea in the 1940s and the emergence of competing nationalisms, pro-independence and unionist, there is also discussion of the Somali ‘question’, and in particular of the Ogaden.Less
This chapter explores the nature and significance of the period of European colonial rule in the region, encompassing the Italian administration of Eritrea and Somalia, and the British Military Administration in Eritrea. The tangible impact of European colonialism is examined, notably in terms of the hardening of perceived divisions and increasingly militarized identities; of particular importance is the impact of Italian rule in Eritrea in exacerbating extant ‘trans-Mereb’ patterns of violence and resistance, and creating certain new ones. Equally, the role of the British Military Administration (BMA) was important in creating conditions whereby identities might be more forcefully articulated than had been the case previously. Yet in many respects European colonial rule was co-opted into extant patterns of regional conflict. Alongside the shifta insurgency in Eritrea in the 1940s and the emergence of competing nationalisms, pro-independence and unionist, there is also discussion of the Somali ‘question’, and in particular of the Ogaden.
Theo Farrell and Tim Bird
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804763776
- eISBN:
- 9780804781800
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804763776.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter investigates the development of the three elements of British military transformation: network-enabled capability (NEC), effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), and expeditionary ...
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This chapter investigates the development of the three elements of British military transformation: network-enabled capability (NEC), effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), and expeditionary warfare. Some general observations concerning the trajectory of British military transformation are also evaluated. Factors that are rooted in British military culture influenced the British approach to NEC. EBAO thinking also shaped British plans and operations. It is clearly shown that the major driver in the development of expeditionary capabilities was the changed strategic environment. The Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) was far less technologically ambitious than the next generation US medium-weight land platform, the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Even if FRES is postponed for many years, Britain will still have the best equipped and most experienced expeditionary army of any European state.Less
This chapter investigates the development of the three elements of British military transformation: network-enabled capability (NEC), effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), and expeditionary warfare. Some general observations concerning the trajectory of British military transformation are also evaluated. Factors that are rooted in British military culture influenced the British approach to NEC. EBAO thinking also shaped British plans and operations. It is clearly shown that the major driver in the development of expeditionary capabilities was the changed strategic environment. The Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) was far less technologically ambitious than the next generation US medium-weight land platform, the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Even if FRES is postponed for many years, Britain will still have the best equipped and most experienced expeditionary army of any European state.
Patrick H. Hase
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9789622098992
- eISBN:
- 9789882207592
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789622098992.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
The Six-Day War cannot be seen as a shining example of British military genius. In fact, it was a “text-book case of how not to conduct a campaign”. The problems of poor military intelligence are ...
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The Six-Day War cannot be seen as a shining example of British military genius. In fact, it was a “text-book case of how not to conduct a campaign”. The problems of poor military intelligence are covered. It also describes the logistical failures in supplies and transport. It then evaluates the problems of command and the inadequate reports. Capt. E.L.C. Berger's actions in the Six-Day War show his understanding of what a standard British colonial war should consist of: it was, in every respect, a copy-book example of a small-scale British military operation. At the same time, Military Headquarters in Hong Kong do not seem to have taken any of these late nineteenth century writers' advice to heart at all. Every error that could be committed was committed: all of Reginald Clare Hart's and Charles Callwell's maxims failed to be observed. It must be a matter of conjecture as to what Lord Roberts would have done with William Gascoigne if this campaign had come under his command, and if the facts of how it was managed had been drawn to his attention.Less
The Six-Day War cannot be seen as a shining example of British military genius. In fact, it was a “text-book case of how not to conduct a campaign”. The problems of poor military intelligence are covered. It also describes the logistical failures in supplies and transport. It then evaluates the problems of command and the inadequate reports. Capt. E.L.C. Berger's actions in the Six-Day War show his understanding of what a standard British colonial war should consist of: it was, in every respect, a copy-book example of a small-scale British military operation. At the same time, Military Headquarters in Hong Kong do not seem to have taken any of these late nineteenth century writers' advice to heart at all. Every error that could be committed was committed: all of Reginald Clare Hart's and Charles Callwell's maxims failed to be observed. It must be a matter of conjecture as to what Lord Roberts would have done with William Gascoigne if this campaign had come under his command, and if the facts of how it was managed had been drawn to his attention.
David Ucko and Robert Egnell
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231164276
- eISBN:
- 9780231535410
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231164276.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This book provides a detailed account of the British army's involvement in the Basra and Helmand campaigns. It looks at the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, and ...
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This book provides a detailed account of the British army's involvement in the Basra and Helmand campaigns. It looks at the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, and exposes a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. The book recounts how the British military, long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, has encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. It shows how, in its effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, the British army has failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume provides an assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. It calls attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by under-governed spaces. It underscores the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.Less
This book provides a detailed account of the British army's involvement in the Basra and Helmand campaigns. It looks at the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, and exposes a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. The book recounts how the British military, long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, has encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. It shows how, in its effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, the British army has failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume provides an assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. It calls attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by under-governed spaces. It underscores the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
