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The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Jonardon Ganeri

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? ... More


Science and Determinism

David Hodgson

in Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199845309
eISBN:
9780199932269
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845309.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

In Chapter 7, I consider whether the general picture of the world suggested by the physical sciences is compatible with my position. I argue that the best contemporary physical theories support two ... More


A Theory of Self

Jonardon Ganeri

in The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0019
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

In a full account of human subjectivity three distinct dimensions in the concept of self are in play, corresponding to three elements in the notion of ownership, each having a naturalistically ... More


Later Malebranche

Walter Ott

in Descartes, Malebranche, and the Crisis of Perception

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
May 2017
ISBN:
9780198791713
eISBN:
9780191839597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198791713.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter looks at two of Malebranche’s later innovations. I argue that the first (imbuing ideas with causal power) is of no help in explaining perception, for a causal connection is ... More


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