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Conceptions of Self: An Analytical Taxonomy

Jonardon Ganeri

in The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

This chapter develops an analytical framework within which conceptions of self can be identified and classified. A conception about self supplies an answer to the question “What am I?” Until very ... More


Historical Prelude: Varieties of Naturalism

Jonardon Ganeri

in The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

The author identifes forms of naturalistic thinking in ancient India, in particular Cārvāka emergentism, early Buddhist trope dualism, and the minimal physicalism of Nyāya‐Vaiśeṣika. It is from a ... More


The Composition of Consciousness

Jonardon Ganeri

in The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

There are two ways to account for the nature of phenomenologically presented ownership constitutive of the “immersed” self. One sees it as fundamentally a relationship of bodily ownership: the theory ... More


A Theory of Self

Jonardon Ganeri

in The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0019
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

In a full account of human subjectivity three distinct dimensions in the concept of self are in play, corresponding to three elements in the notion of ownership, each having a naturalistically ... More


Body: Disorders of Embodiment

Jennifer Radden (ed.)

in The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780195149531
eISBN:
9780199870943
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195149531.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter analyzes how disorders of embodiment can affect the minimal self—the nonconceptual, prereflective sense of self that comes along with being an embodied and conscious being—and its ... More


Nirvana and Ownerless Consciousness

Miri Albahari

in Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199593804
eISBN:
9780191595691
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Religion

Buddhists maintain that the enlightened person is freed from the illusion of ‘self’ with its ideas of ‘me’ and ‘mine’. What notion of self is at stake here? What must be the case, with regard to the ... More


Reasons and Responsibility

Gary Watson

in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199272273
eISBN:
9780191709968
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

It is an ancient idea that our capacity as responsible agents has chiefly to do with our capacities as rational creatures. This chapter is a critical study of the development of this idea in John ... More


Subjects and Consciousness

Christopher Peacocke

in The Self and Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199590650
eISBN:
9780191741043
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

The first part of the paper proposes a positive account of de se intentional content. De se content is individuated by the condition that it refers de jure to the owner of the mental state or event ... More


Complex Structures and Common Dynamics of Self‐Awareness

Shaun Gallager (ed.)

in How the Body Shapes the Mind

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199271948
eISBN:
9780191603112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199271941.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Understanding the dynamics of agency and the sense of bodily ownership of action can be clarified by considering cases where these aspects of experience break down. In schizophrenic symptoms of ... More


Whose Consciousness? The Illusory Self

Jesse J. Prinz

in The Conscious Brain

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780195314595
eISBN:
9780199979059
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314595.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Many authors, including Descartes and Kant, have assumed that the self is somehow presented to us in experience. Those who believe in a phenomenal self sometimes try to reduce it to something else, ... More


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