Daniel M. T. Fessler
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Socially-transmitted information allows humans to survive in diverse social and ecological systems, a pattern that is as old as — and perhaps even predates — our species. This suggests that natural ...
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Socially-transmitted information allows humans to survive in diverse social and ecological systems, a pattern that is as old as — and perhaps even predates — our species. This suggests that natural selection can be expected to have shaped the human mind to enhance the ability to acquire and exploit such information. After reviewing existing approaches to the question, this chapter argues for a dissection of the cognitive and motivational architectures underlying this ability. Key questions addressed include how models for imitative learning are selected; the ultimate benefits of conformism, normative moralization, and moral outrage; and the nature and function of internalization.Less
Socially-transmitted information allows humans to survive in diverse social and ecological systems, a pattern that is as old as — and perhaps even predates — our species. This suggests that natural selection can be expected to have shaped the human mind to enhance the ability to acquire and exploit such information. After reviewing existing approaches to the question, this chapter argues for a dissection of the cognitive and motivational architectures underlying this ability. Key questions addressed include how models for imitative learning are selected; the ultimate benefits of conformism, normative moralization, and moral outrage; and the nature and function of internalization.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659982
- eISBN:
- 9780191745409
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
Various attempts to account for singular thought within a (refined) descriptivist framework are discussed and criticized. Rigidity and truth-conditional singularity can be achieved in a ...
More
Various attempts to account for singular thought within a (refined) descriptivist framework are discussed and criticized. Rigidity and truth-conditional singularity can be achieved in a two-dimensional framework (with the help of actuality operators), but the relational character of reference determination keeps missing from the descriptivist picture even after the two-dimensional move. It is still missing even if we make the descriptive content token-reflexive by ‘internalizing’ the acquaintance relations and letting them be represented.Less
Various attempts to account for singular thought within a (refined) descriptivist framework are discussed and criticized. Rigidity and truth-conditional singularity can be achieved in a two-dimensional framework (with the help of actuality operators), but the relational character of reference determination keeps missing from the descriptivist picture even after the two-dimensional move. It is still missing even if we make the descriptive content token-reflexive by ‘internalizing’ the acquaintance relations and letting them be represented.
