Anthony Brueckner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585861
- eISBN:
- 9780191595332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0033
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is a reply to Ted Warfield's claim that you cannot refute closure by showing that some necessary condition for knowledge is not closed.
This chapter is a reply to Ted Warfield's claim that you cannot refute closure by showing that some necessary condition for knowledge is not closed.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245369
- eISBN:
- 9780191598036
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245363.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged ...
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There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged humanwise—composite human organisms.The ontology of Objects and Persons is motivated, in large part, by causal considerations. One of the central conclusions is that physical objects are causally non‐redundant: physical objects cause things that are not wholly overdetermined by their parts. I ‘eliminate’ statues and other inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would—if they existed—be at best completely causally redundant.I defend our existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we human beings cause things that are not already caused by our parts.A second strand of argument for the book's overall ontology involves a variety of philosophical puzzles, puzzles that are dealt with in illuminating and often novel ways. These puzzles support eliminativism regarding statues and rocks and chairs, but—I argue—do not support eliminating us human organisms.Many other issues are addressed along the way, including free will, the ‘reduction’ of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can ‘for practical purposes’ be a matter of convention.Less
There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged humanwise—composite human organisms.
The ontology of Objects and Persons is motivated, in large part, by causal considerations. One of the central conclusions is that physical objects are causally non‐redundant: physical objects cause things that are not wholly overdetermined by their parts. I ‘eliminate’ statues and other inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would—if they existed—be at best completely causally redundant.
I defend our existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we human beings cause things that are not already caused by our parts.
A second strand of argument for the book's overall ontology involves a variety of philosophical puzzles, puzzles that are dealt with in illuminating and often novel ways. These puzzles support eliminativism regarding statues and rocks and chairs, but—I argue—do not support eliminating us human organisms.
Many other issues are addressed along the way, including free will, the ‘reduction’ of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can ‘for practical purposes’ be a matter of convention.
Theodore Sider
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244430
- eISBN:
- 9780191598425
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924443X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to ‘four‐dimensionalism’, temporally extended things are composed of temporal parts. Most four‐dimensionalists identify ordinary continuants—the persisting objects ordinary language ...
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According to ‘four‐dimensionalism’, temporally extended things are composed of temporal parts. Most four‐dimensionalists identify ordinary continuants—the persisting objects ordinary language quantifies over and names—with aggregates of temporal parts (‘space‐time worms’), but an attractive alternate version of four‐dimensionalism identifies ordinary continuants with instantaneous temporal slices and accounts for temporal predication using temporal counterpart theory. Arguments for four‐dimensionalism include the following: (1) Either substantivalism or relationalism about space‐time is true, but given substantivalism one might as well identify continuants with regions of space‐time, which have temporal parts, or with instantaneous slices of space‐time, whereas relationalism about space‐time cannot be made to work without temporal parts. (2) It can never be vague how many objects exist; if temporal parts do not exist, then a restrictive account of which filled regions of space‐time contain objects must be given, but no such account can be given that is plausible and non‐vague. (3) Four‐dimensionalism—especially the alternate, counterpart‐theoretic version—provides the most satisfying overall account of the ‘paradoxes of material constitution’, in which numerically distinct material objects (e.g. statues and lumps of clay) apparently share exactly the same parts. Objections to four‐dimensionalism (involving, e.g., motion in homogeneous substances and de re modal properties) may be answered. While logically independent of the question of four‐dimensionalism, the book also defends related theses, including (1) a robust meta‐ontology according to which unrestricted existence‐statements are non‐vague, non‐analytic, and uninfected by human convention; (2) the B‐theory of time (the opposite of presentism); (3) unrestricted composition; and (4) counterpart theory (both modal and temporal).Less
According to ‘four‐dimensionalism’, temporally extended things are composed of temporal parts. Most four‐dimensionalists identify ordinary continuants—the persisting objects ordinary language quantifies over and names—with aggregates of temporal parts (‘space‐time worms’), but an attractive alternate version of four‐dimensionalism identifies ordinary continuants with instantaneous temporal slices and accounts for temporal predication using temporal counterpart theory. Arguments for four‐dimensionalism include the following: (1) Either substantivalism or relationalism about space‐time is true, but given substantivalism one might as well identify continuants with regions of space‐time, which have temporal parts, or with instantaneous slices of space‐time, whereas relationalism about space‐time cannot be made to work without temporal parts. (2) It can never be vague how many objects exist; if temporal parts do not exist, then a restrictive account of which filled regions of space‐time contain objects must be given, but no such account can be given that is plausible and non‐vague. (3) Four‐dimensionalism—especially the alternate, counterpart‐theoretic version—provides the most satisfying overall account of the ‘paradoxes of material constitution’, in which numerically distinct material objects (e.g. statues and lumps of clay) apparently share exactly the same parts. Objections to four‐dimensionalism (involving, e.g., motion in homogeneous substances and de re modal properties) may be answered. While logically independent of the question of four‐dimensionalism, the book also defends related theses, including (1) a robust meta‐ontology according to which unrestricted existence‐statements are non‐vague, non‐analytic, and uninfected by human convention; (2) the B‐theory of time (the opposite of presentism); (3) unrestricted composition; and (4) counterpart theory (both modal and temporal).
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
The thesis that ordinary material objects are mereological sums in the standard sense has been remarkably popular among three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists alike. This chapter considers ...
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The thesis that ordinary material objects are mereological sums in the standard sense has been remarkably popular among three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists alike. This chapter considers two prominent representatives: Judith Jarvis Thomson, for the three-dimensionalist camp; and David Lewis, for the four-dimensionalist camp. The question of why Thomson's temporalized and modalized version of standard mereology still does not adequately capture the characteristics of ordinary material objects is postponed until Chapter 4. The remainder of the chapter considers Lewis' argument in favor of Unrestricted Composition, in particular in the recently expanded version offered in Theodore Sider's, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time; as well as Lewis' defence of the Composition-as-Identity Thesis in his Parts of Classes. It is argued that the three-dimensionalist need not be swayed by either component of Lewis' view, since they are ultimately founded on question-begging reasoning.Less
The thesis that ordinary material objects are mereological sums in the standard sense has been remarkably popular among three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists alike. This chapter considers two prominent representatives: Judith Jarvis Thomson, for the three-dimensionalist camp; and David Lewis, for the four-dimensionalist camp. The question of why Thomson's temporalized and modalized version of standard mereology still does not adequately capture the characteristics of ordinary material objects is postponed until Chapter 4. The remainder of the chapter considers Lewis' argument in favor of Unrestricted Composition, in particular in the recently expanded version offered in Theodore Sider's, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time; as well as Lewis' defence of the Composition-as-Identity Thesis in his Parts of Classes. It is argued that the three-dimensionalist need not be swayed by either component of Lewis' view, since they are ultimately founded on question-begging reasoning.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Peter van Inwagen, Terence Horgan, and Matjaž Potrč argue against ordinary inanimate objects on grounds that no view that accepts them can provide a satisfactory answer to the special composition ...
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Peter van Inwagen, Terence Horgan, and Matjaž Potrč argue against ordinary inanimate objects on grounds that no view that accepts them can provide a satisfactory answer to the special composition question: the question of when a plurality of things composes some other thing. That question involves the existence question of when there is some thing composed (by other things). If “thing” is used in a sortal or covering sense, however, the argument against ordinary objects does not go through. But if “thing” is used generically in asking the question, then (given the results of chapter 6) this is an ill-formed question to which we can expect no uniform answer. However we understand it, then, the special composition question cannot be used to argue against ordinary objects.Less
Peter van Inwagen, Terence Horgan, and Matjaž Potrč argue against ordinary inanimate objects on grounds that no view that accepts them can provide a satisfactory answer to the special composition question: the question of when a plurality of things composes some other thing. That question involves the existence question of when there is some thing composed (by other things). If “thing” is used in a sortal or covering sense, however, the argument against ordinary objects does not go through. But if “thing” is used generically in asking the question, then (given the results of chapter 6) this is an ill-formed question to which we can expect no uniform answer. However we understand it, then, the special composition question cannot be used to argue against ordinary objects.
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
The main purpose of this book is to give an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. ...
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The main purpose of this book is to give an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. Particular focus is placed on the question of how the parts of such objects are related to the wholes which they compose. Many philosophers today find themselves in the grip of an exceedingly deflationary conception of what it means to be an object, according to which any plurality of objects, no matter how disparate or gerry-mandered, itself composes an object, even if the objects in question fail to exhibit interesting similarities, internal unity, cohesion, or causal interaction amongst each other. This commitment to initially counterintuitive objects follows from the belief that no principled set of criteria is available by means of which to distinguish intuitively gerry-mandered objects from common-sensical ones. The project of this book is to persuade the reader that systematic principles by means of which composition can be restricted can be found, and hence, that we need not embrace this deflationary approach to the question of what it means to be an object. To this end, a more full-blooded neo-Aristotelian account of parthood and composition is developed according to which objects are structured wholes: it is integral to the existence and identity of an object, on this conception, that its parts exhibit a certain manner of arrangement. This structure-based conception of parthood and composition is explored in detail, along with some of its historical precursors as well as some of its contemporary competitors.Less
The main purpose of this book is to give an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. Particular focus is placed on the question of how the parts of such objects are related to the wholes which they compose. Many philosophers today find themselves in the grip of an exceedingly deflationary conception of what it means to be an object, according to which any plurality of objects, no matter how disparate or gerry-mandered, itself composes an object, even if the objects in question fail to exhibit interesting similarities, internal unity, cohesion, or causal interaction amongst each other. This commitment to initially counterintuitive objects follows from the belief that no principled set of criteria is available by means of which to distinguish intuitively gerry-mandered objects from common-sensical ones. The project of this book is to persuade the reader that systematic principles by means of which composition can be restricted can be found, and hence, that we need not embrace this deflationary approach to the question of what it means to be an object. To this end, a more full-blooded neo-Aristotelian account of parthood and composition is developed according to which objects are structured wholes: it is integral to the existence and identity of an object, on this conception, that its parts exhibit a certain manner of arrangement. This structure-based conception of parthood and composition is explored in detail, along with some of its historical precursors as well as some of its contemporary competitors.
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
The positive view adopted later in this book defends a conception of parthood and composition which carries genuine ontological commitment: contrary to the Lewisian Composition-as-Identity model, ...
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The positive view adopted later in this book defends a conception of parthood and composition which carries genuine ontological commitment: contrary to the Lewisian Composition-as-Identity model, wholes according to this alternative conception are in no way to be identified with their parts; rather, a commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities that are numerically distinct from their parts. A crucial piece of apparatus which supports this ontologically loaded conception of parthood and composition is a certain style of argument which reasons from Leibniz's Law to the numerical distinctness of wholes and their parts: according to this style of argument, wholes and their parts are numerically distinct by Leibniz's Law, because they do not share all of their properties. This present chapter defends this style of argument for the numerical distinctness of wholes and their parts.Less
The positive view adopted later in this book defends a conception of parthood and composition which carries genuine ontological commitment: contrary to the Lewisian Composition-as-Identity model, wholes according to this alternative conception are in no way to be identified with their parts; rather, a commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities that are numerically distinct from their parts. A crucial piece of apparatus which supports this ontologically loaded conception of parthood and composition is a certain style of argument which reasons from Leibniz's Law to the numerical distinctness of wholes and their parts: according to this style of argument, wholes and their parts are numerically distinct by Leibniz's Law, because they do not share all of their properties. This present chapter defends this style of argument for the numerical distinctness of wholes and their parts.
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter demonstrates that a structure-based neo-Aristotelian mereology for ordinary material objects can be defended utilizing a single relation of parthood with relatively straightforward ...
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This chapter demonstrates that a structure-based neo-Aristotelian mereology for ordinary material objects can be defended utilizing a single relation of parthood with relatively straightforward formal properties. A substantive restriction on composition can be derived from a comparatively minimal and metaphysically neutral independently motivated ontology of kinds. The thoroughly mereological conception of composition defended here recommends itself based on Leibniz's Law and the Weak Supplementation Principle. Among its benefits are the following: it yields the Uniqueness of Composition as a derived principle; it contributes to the Problem of Constitution and, possibly, the Grounding Problem; and it clarifies the relation between a whole and both its material and its structural components. Finally, it is demonstrated how, on the approach defended here, wholes can be thought of as both ontologically committing and genuinely unified, despite the apparent Aristotelian regress caused by a never-ending demand for further principles of unity.Less
This chapter demonstrates that a structure-based neo-Aristotelian mereology for ordinary material objects can be defended utilizing a single relation of parthood with relatively straightforward formal properties. A substantive restriction on composition can be derived from a comparatively minimal and metaphysically neutral independently motivated ontology of kinds. The thoroughly mereological conception of composition defended here recommends itself based on Leibniz's Law and the Weak Supplementation Principle. Among its benefits are the following: it yields the Uniqueness of Composition as a derived principle; it contributes to the Problem of Constitution and, possibly, the Grounding Problem; and it clarifies the relation between a whole and both its material and its structural components. Finally, it is demonstrated how, on the approach defended here, wholes can be thought of as both ontologically committing and genuinely unified, despite the apparent Aristotelian regress caused by a never-ending demand for further principles of unity.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282579
- eISBN:
- 9780191712463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282579.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter contains a number of stage-setting discussions, offering an analysis of the term ‘material object’. It also introduces the book's background metaphysics by identifying and ...
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This introductory chapter contains a number of stage-setting discussions, offering an analysis of the term ‘material object’. It also introduces the book's background metaphysics by identifying and taking sides on substantivalist disputes, on occupation and location relations, on principles of composition and decomposition, on the nature of material simples and material atomless gunk, on theories of persistence for material objects, on eternalism, on modality and recombination principles, on vagueness, on bruteness, and on the epistemic role of intuitions.Less
This introductory chapter contains a number of stage-setting discussions, offering an analysis of the term ‘material object’. It also introduces the book's background metaphysics by identifying and taking sides on substantivalist disputes, on occupation and location relations, on principles of composition and decomposition, on the nature of material simples and material atomless gunk, on theories of persistence for material objects, on eternalism, on modality and recombination principles, on vagueness, on bruteness, and on the epistemic role of intuitions.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282579
- eISBN:
- 9780191712463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282579.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A receptacle is a region of space possibly exactly occupied by a material object. This chapter defends the Liberal View of Receptacles, according to which absolutely every region is a receptacle, ...
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A receptacle is a region of space possibly exactly occupied by a material object. This chapter defends the Liberal View of Receptacles, according to which absolutely every region is a receptacle, regardless of its dimensionality or topology. With the assistance of certain principles of composition, recombination, and simplicity, three prominent rival theories (theories according to which necessarily, all material objects are topologically open or topologically closed or at least three dimensional) are contested.Less
A receptacle is a region of space possibly exactly occupied by a material object. This chapter defends the Liberal View of Receptacles, according to which absolutely every region is a receptacle, regardless of its dimensionality or topology. With the assistance of certain principles of composition, recombination, and simplicity, three prominent rival theories (theories according to which necessarily, all material objects are topologically open or topologically closed or at least three dimensional) are contested.
