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Obligations from Artifacts

Brian H. Bix

in Law as an Artifact

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
October 2018
ISBN:
9780198821977
eISBN:
9780191861147
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198821977.003.0008
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

A persistent question in modern legal philosophy is whether or how (human-created) legal rules and legal systems can produce moral obligations for citizens. Contemporary theorists have sought answers ... More


Authoritative Input: Dyadic Duties and Rights

Henry Richardson

in Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780190247744
eISBN:
9780190247768
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190247744.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter shows that the input stage of the moral community’s exercise of its moral authority arises from the delimited moral power of duty-holders (alone or in concert with the correlative ... More


Introducing New Moral Norms

Henry Richardson

in Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780190247744
eISBN:
9780190247768
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190247744.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter characterizes the convergence stage, the second stage of the process of introducing new moral norms and addresses some general objections to the possibility of doing so. This involves a ... More


Reasons, Indeterminacy, and Compromise

Henry Richardson

in Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780190247744
eISBN:
9780190247768
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190247744.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter addresses objections to the book’s account of moral authority. Metaphysically, it may be argued that since what we ought to do is determined by the balance of reasons, there are no moral ... More


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