DANIELA DONNO
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199991280
- eISBN:
- 9780199363230
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199991280.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics
This chapter uses quantitative evidence to assess the effects of international conditionality and diplomatic engagement on electoral conduct and outcomes. It shows, in short, that enforcement works. ...
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This chapter uses quantitative evidence to assess the effects of international conditionality and diplomatic engagement on electoral conduct and outcomes. It shows, in short, that enforcement works. Specifically, post-election conditionality—the wielding of concrete sticks and carrots—is associated with improvements in electoral quality in the next election, while pre-election conditionality is associated with opposition electoral victories. Softer tools of diplomatic engagement—mediation, diplomatic missions and shaming—instead are associated with immediate post-election concessions, namely, a decision by the incumbent to step down or cancel electoral results. Crucially, the efforts of international actors interact with, and augment, the effect of opposition protests, indicating that international validation and support are indeed key ingredients for the success of mass mobilization after flawed elections. The chapter concludes by probing the robustness and nuances of these findings. It shows, first, that enforcement by regional organizations proves to have the strongest and most consistent positive effects, which points to these organizations’ unique combination of leverage and legitimacy. Second, no evidence is found to support the idea that enforcement is imposed disproportionately in “easy” cases that are otherwise more likely to democratize. On the contrary, conditionality tends to be imposed in more intransigent regimes where change is harder to achieve.Less
This chapter uses quantitative evidence to assess the effects of international conditionality and diplomatic engagement on electoral conduct and outcomes. It shows, in short, that enforcement works. Specifically, post-election conditionality—the wielding of concrete sticks and carrots—is associated with improvements in electoral quality in the next election, while pre-election conditionality is associated with opposition electoral victories. Softer tools of diplomatic engagement—mediation, diplomatic missions and shaming—instead are associated with immediate post-election concessions, namely, a decision by the incumbent to step down or cancel electoral results. Crucially, the efforts of international actors interact with, and augment, the effect of opposition protests, indicating that international validation and support are indeed key ingredients for the success of mass mobilization after flawed elections. The chapter concludes by probing the robustness and nuances of these findings. It shows, first, that enforcement by regional organizations proves to have the strongest and most consistent positive effects, which points to these organizations’ unique combination of leverage and legitimacy. Second, no evidence is found to support the idea that enforcement is imposed disproportionately in “easy” cases that are otherwise more likely to democratize. On the contrary, conditionality tends to be imposed in more intransigent regimes where change is harder to achieve.
Michael W. Doyle
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780300172638
- eISBN:
- 9780300210781
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300172638.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The chapter summarizes the lessons of Millian nonintervention and intervention and notes the continuing tendencies toward intervention in a world politics characterized by deepening globalization. It ...
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The chapter summarizes the lessons of Millian nonintervention and intervention and notes the continuing tendencies toward intervention in a world politics characterized by deepening globalization. It concludes with a plea for increased reliance of multilateral authorization.Less
The chapter summarizes the lessons of Millian nonintervention and intervention and notes the continuing tendencies toward intervention in a world politics characterized by deepening globalization. It concludes with a plea for increased reliance of multilateral authorization.
Catherine Gegout
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190845162
- eISBN:
- 9780190943288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190845162.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Chapter four shows that France has reduced its economic impact in Africa in comparison with other world powers; but as core realists would expect, France still maintains an important ad hoc and ...
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Chapter four shows that France has reduced its economic impact in Africa in comparison with other world powers; but as core realists would expect, France still maintains an important ad hoc and permanent diplomatic and military presence in Africa. Case studies of French intervention and non-intervention show that French leaders have always acted first and foremost to ensure security interests, that is, the support for ‘cooperative’ regimes and the removal of ‘uncooperative’ regimes in African states, the safety of France’s own military bases and citizens, and the fight against terrorism. They also want to gain personal prestige, prestige for French citizens, and prestige for France in the international community (the United States, the United Nations, and the Arab world). France promoted its economic interests through intervention in the 1990s, but after 2000 it merely made sure those were not harmed. France is still tied to its colonial past, even if it has declined to help only three former colonies in the past ten years. Humanitarianism is never the only motive for French intervention, but it has been one of the motives, especially in operations since 2004.Less
Chapter four shows that France has reduced its economic impact in Africa in comparison with other world powers; but as core realists would expect, France still maintains an important ad hoc and permanent diplomatic and military presence in Africa. Case studies of French intervention and non-intervention show that French leaders have always acted first and foremost to ensure security interests, that is, the support for ‘cooperative’ regimes and the removal of ‘uncooperative’ regimes in African states, the safety of France’s own military bases and citizens, and the fight against terrorism. They also want to gain personal prestige, prestige for French citizens, and prestige for France in the international community (the United States, the United Nations, and the Arab world). France promoted its economic interests through intervention in the 1990s, but after 2000 it merely made sure those were not harmed. France is still tied to its colonial past, even if it has declined to help only three former colonies in the past ten years. Humanitarianism is never the only motive for French intervention, but it has been one of the motives, especially in operations since 2004.
