Ian W. McLean
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154671
- eISBN:
- 9781400845439
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154671.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
This introductory chapter provides an inquiry into why Australia is rich—which adopts a historical approach because the roots of prosperity are embedded in the past. The levels of income observed in ...
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This introductory chapter provides an inquiry into why Australia is rich—which adopts a historical approach because the roots of prosperity are embedded in the past. The levels of income observed in the currently rich economies are in every case the result of very long-run processes. Economies do not move rapidly from poverty and backwardness to advanced industrial status and concomitant prosperity despite the achievements of some being described as “economic miracles.” Even with the impressive growth rates recently recorded in a number of poor countries such as India and China, attaining incomes comparable to the rich countries takes many decades. The need for a historical perspective arises also because any persuasive explanation for Australia's current high-income status must highlight long-established features of its economy and society.Less
This introductory chapter provides an inquiry into why Australia is rich—which adopts a historical approach because the roots of prosperity are embedded in the past. The levels of income observed in the currently rich economies are in every case the result of very long-run processes. Economies do not move rapidly from poverty and backwardness to advanced industrial status and concomitant prosperity despite the achievements of some being described as “economic miracles.” Even with the impressive growth rates recently recorded in a number of poor countries such as India and China, attaining incomes comparable to the rich countries takes many decades. The need for a historical perspective arises also because any persuasive explanation for Australia's current high-income status must highlight long-established features of its economy and society.
Kenneth Pomeranz
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280681
- eISBN:
- 9780191602467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199280681.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
Attempts to reconstruct basic aspects of the standard of living in late eighteenth century China, focusing primarily on the Yangzi Delta (China’s richest region) but also briefly considering other ...
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Attempts to reconstruct basic aspects of the standard of living in late eighteenth century China, focusing primarily on the Yangzi Delta (China’s richest region) but also briefly considering other areas, and arguing that for most of the population it was probably broadly comparable to Western Europe at the same time. Food supply is evaluated in terms of average availability of calories and protection from fluctuations; protein intake is also discussed, though more speculatively. Income distribution and evidence concerning consumption of textiles, sugar, tea, and so on are also considered. Since the estimates in this study in many cases are higher than what was found in early twentieth-century surveys, the chapter also explains why it is plausible to think that the standard of living may have declined between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries.Less
Attempts to reconstruct basic aspects of the standard of living in late eighteenth century China, focusing primarily on the Yangzi Delta (China’s richest region) but also briefly considering other areas, and arguing that for most of the population it was probably broadly comparable to Western Europe at the same time. Food supply is evaluated in terms of average availability of calories and protection from fluctuations; protein intake is also discussed, though more speculatively. Income distribution and evidence concerning consumption of textiles, sugar, tea, and so on are also considered. Since the estimates in this study in many cases are higher than what was found in early twentieth-century surveys, the chapter also explains why it is plausible to think that the standard of living may have declined between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Bozhong Li
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280681
- eISBN:
- 9780191602467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199280681.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
Contrary to the conventional view, labour productivity on farms in Jiangnan, the Yangzi Delta in East China, did not deteriorate or stagnate but instead improved between 1620 and 1850. Changes in the ...
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Contrary to the conventional view, labour productivity on farms in Jiangnan, the Yangzi Delta in East China, did not deteriorate or stagnate but instead improved between 1620 and 1850. Changes in the factors of major production of farming and in the peasant economy both contributed to the improvement and this development resulted in a rising standard of living of peasants. Neither an old, misleading Malthusian conception nor conventional wisdom on the standard of living, therefore, squares with what we know of Jiangnan history.Less
Contrary to the conventional view, labour productivity on farms in Jiangnan, the Yangzi Delta in East China, did not deteriorate or stagnate but instead improved between 1620 and 1850. Changes in the factors of major production of farming and in the peasant economy both contributed to the improvement and this development resulted in a rising standard of living of peasants. Neither an old, misleading Malthusian conception nor conventional wisdom on the standard of living, therefore, squares with what we know of Jiangnan history.
Robert C. Allen
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280681
- eISBN:
- 9780191602467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199280681.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wage rates in Japan, India, and China were lower than their counterparts in Europe when the wages are compared at the exchange rates implied by the silver ...
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In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wage rates in Japan, India, and China were lower than their counterparts in Europe when the wages are compared at the exchange rates implied by the silver contents of coins. The cost of living was also lower in Asia than in Europe. The purchasing power of Asian wages was similar to that of wages in France, Italy, and Germany but less than the purchasing power of wages in the leading economies—England and the Netherlands. Real wage comparisons contradict the opinions of Smith, Malthus, and Marx that Europe was more prosperous than Asia before the industrial revolution.Less
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wage rates in Japan, India, and China were lower than their counterparts in Europe when the wages are compared at the exchange rates implied by the silver contents of coins. The cost of living was also lower in Asia than in Europe. The purchasing power of Asian wages was similar to that of wages in France, Italy, and Germany but less than the purchasing power of wages in the leading economies—England and the Netherlands. Real wage comparisons contradict the opinions of Smith, Malthus, and Marx that Europe was more prosperous than Asia before the industrial revolution.
Marc Flandreau
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199257867
- eISBN:
- 9780191601279
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257868.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
Chapter 7 provides a model of the operation of bimetallism as a global system, 1850-1870. It argues that the limited impact that the Gold Rush had on price levels can be primarily explained as ...
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Chapter 7 provides a model of the operation of bimetallism as a global system, 1850-1870. It argues that the limited impact that the Gold Rush had on price levels can be primarily explained as resulting from a global adjustment process, whereby gold was in part absorbed by gold countries and in part by bimetallic ones, where it displaced silver which got absorbed by silver standard countries: because its effects were spread all over the world, regardless of the underlying standard, the Gold Rush had much more modest effects than contemporary initially feared.Less
Chapter 7 provides a model of the operation of bimetallism as a global system, 1850-1870. It argues that the limited impact that the Gold Rush had on price levels can be primarily explained as resulting from a global adjustment process, whereby gold was in part absorbed by gold countries and in part by bimetallic ones, where it displaced silver which got absorbed by silver standard countries: because its effects were spread all over the world, regardless of the underlying standard, the Gold Rush had much more modest effects than contemporary initially feared.
Alice Amsden
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139693
- eISBN:
- 9780199832897
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139690.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History, International
After a century of struggle, a dozen non‐Western countries with pre‐Second World War manufacturing experience succeeded in entering the orbit of modem industry. The rise of ‘the rest’ was ...
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After a century of struggle, a dozen non‐Western countries with pre‐Second World War manufacturing experience succeeded in entering the orbit of modem industry. The rise of ‘the rest’ was historically unprecedented. For the first time, countries without the competitive asset of proprietary, pioneering technology became economic powers. How industrialization among these prime latecomers succeeded, why it followed a novel path, and what some countries did to advance farther than others are the questions this book addresses. The same seed was contained in the rise of all the rest, a seed that had first germinated in Japan and then grew as might plants in clay pots of differing sizes and shapes, spanning Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico), the Middle East (Turkey) and Asia (India, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand). To industrialize by borrowing already commercialized technology, devoid of the radically new products and processes that had enriched the North Atlantic, the rise of the rest involved intense learning, an extensive role for the government, and the formation of specific types of business enterprise. Indeed, the rest's unique reciprocal control mechanism differed from Adam Smith's invisible hand and served to reduce government failure and firm mismanagement. By the 1990s, two distinct varieties had taken root: all the economies of the rest had become more globalized, but the ‘integrationists’ (epitomized by Mexico's affiliation to the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Argentina's adoption of a dollar‐based currency board) were characterized by heavy reliance on foreign direct investment and minimal local expenditures on skills (as measured by research and development), while the ‘independents’, led by China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, were notable for their nationally controlled firms and surging investments in technological capabilities. Which subspecies of the rest would succeed, and which would serve as the model for later industrializers (‘the remainder’), are questions that challenge the twenty‐first century and are analysed in this book, which is arranged in three main parts: sinking behind, 1850–c. 1950; sneaking ahead, c. 1950–; and squaring off, c. 1980–.Less
After a century of struggle, a dozen non‐Western countries with pre‐Second World War manufacturing experience succeeded in entering the orbit of modem industry. The rise of ‘the rest’ was historically unprecedented. For the first time, countries without the competitive asset of proprietary, pioneering technology became economic powers. How industrialization among these prime latecomers succeeded, why it followed a novel path, and what some countries did to advance farther than others are the questions this book addresses. The same seed was contained in the rise of all the rest, a seed that had first germinated in Japan and then grew as might plants in clay pots of differing sizes and shapes, spanning Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico), the Middle East (Turkey) and Asia (India, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand). To industrialize by borrowing already commercialized technology, devoid of the radically new products and processes that had enriched the North Atlantic, the rise of the rest involved intense learning, an extensive role for the government, and the formation of specific types of business enterprise. Indeed, the rest's unique reciprocal control mechanism differed from Adam Smith's invisible hand and served to reduce government failure and firm mismanagement. By the 1990s, two distinct varieties had taken root: all the economies of the rest had become more globalized, but the ‘integrationists’ (epitomized by Mexico's affiliation to the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Argentina's adoption of a dollar‐based currency board) were characterized by heavy reliance on foreign direct investment and minimal local expenditures on skills (as measured by research and development), while the ‘independents’, led by China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, were notable for their nationally controlled firms and surging investments in technological capabilities. Which subspecies of the rest would succeed, and which would serve as the model for later industrializers (‘the remainder’), are questions that challenge the twenty‐first century and are analysed in this book, which is arranged in three main parts: sinking behind, 1850–c. 1950; sneaking ahead, c. 1950–; and squaring off, c. 1980–.
Alice H. Amsden
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139693
- eISBN:
- 9780199832897
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139690.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History, International
This chapter introduces the phenomenon of the rise of a handful of countries outside the North Atlantic —the rest—to the ranks of world‐class competitors in a wide range of mid‐technology industries, ...
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This chapter introduces the phenomenon of the rise of a handful of countries outside the North Atlantic —the rest—to the ranks of world‐class competitors in a wide range of mid‐technology industries, so that, although in 1965 the rest had supplied less than a twentieth of world manufacturing output, by 1995 it supplied nearly one‐fifth. The divide among backward countries that had already appeared by the end of the Second World War in the form of manufacturing experience is noted: while the rest (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, India, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia) had acquired sufficient manufacturing experience, ‘the remainder’, which had been less exposed to factory life pre‐war, failed to achieve the same industrial diversification. Various characteristic aspects of the rise of the rest are discussed, including: their acquisition of knowledge‐based assets; innovative control mechanisms imposing discipline on economic behaviour and revolving around the principle of reciprocity; globalization in relation to national ownership (with discussion of manufacturing experience and the policy paradox of income distribution); and institution building (with specific reference to Thailand's reciprocal control mechanism).Less
This chapter introduces the phenomenon of the rise of a handful of countries outside the North Atlantic —the rest—to the ranks of world‐class competitors in a wide range of mid‐technology industries, so that, although in 1965 the rest had supplied less than a twentieth of world manufacturing output, by 1995 it supplied nearly one‐fifth. The divide among backward countries that had already appeared by the end of the Second World War in the form of manufacturing experience is noted: while the rest (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, India, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia) had acquired sufficient manufacturing experience, ‘the remainder’, which had been less exposed to factory life pre‐war, failed to achieve the same industrial diversification. Various characteristic aspects of the rise of the rest are discussed, including: their acquisition of knowledge‐based assets; innovative control mechanisms imposing discipline on economic behaviour and revolving around the principle of reciprocity; globalization in relation to national ownership (with discussion of manufacturing experience and the policy paradox of income distribution); and institution building (with specific reference to Thailand's reciprocal control mechanism).
Alice H. Amsden
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139693
- eISBN:
- 9780199832897
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139690.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History, International
The fierce competition triggered after 1815 by Britain's technological revolution in textiles created havoc, and ultimately four defensive strategies among textile‐producing countries: at the high ...
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The fierce competition triggered after 1815 by Britain's technological revolution in textiles created havoc, and ultimately four defensive strategies among textile‐producing countries: at the high end of the capabilities scale, France exploited its traditional artisanship in hand spinning and hand weaving, and the USA adopted a mass production system similar to that of England, but produced coarse rather than line fabrics; at the low end of the capabilities scale, Mexico followed the USA into mass production. China, India and the Ottoman Empire tried to imitate France while simultaneously struggling to produce industrial yarn and cloth for mass consumption. Despite superficial similarities, the history of the rest's pre‐war textile industries could not have been more different from those of France, the USA, or Japan: the latter innovated their way out of trouble whereas the former did not. Whatever the strategy—mass production or artisan—and whatever the degree of economic openness—protectionist (as in Mexico and Brazil) or free trade (as in China, India and the Ottoman Empire)—the textile industries of the rest failed to become dynamic world players until after the Second World War. This chapter begins to explore the reasons behind the failure of the rest, and, to convey the extent of their skill deficit, the capabilities of France, the USA, and Japan are examined to the extent necessary to establish a benchmark.Less
The fierce competition triggered after 1815 by Britain's technological revolution in textiles created havoc, and ultimately four defensive strategies among textile‐producing countries: at the high end of the capabilities scale, France exploited its traditional artisanship in hand spinning and hand weaving, and the USA adopted a mass production system similar to that of England, but produced coarse rather than line fabrics; at the low end of the capabilities scale, Mexico followed the USA into mass production. China, India and the Ottoman Empire tried to imitate France while simultaneously struggling to produce industrial yarn and cloth for mass consumption. Despite superficial similarities, the history of the rest's pre‐war textile industries could not have been more different from those of France, the USA, or Japan: the latter innovated their way out of trouble whereas the former did not. Whatever the strategy—mass production or artisan—and whatever the degree of economic openness—protectionist (as in Mexico and Brazil) or free trade (as in China, India and the Ottoman Empire)—the textile industries of the rest failed to become dynamic world players until after the Second World War. This chapter begins to explore the reasons behind the failure of the rest, and, to convey the extent of their skill deficit, the capabilities of France, the USA, and Japan are examined to the extent necessary to establish a benchmark.
Alice H. Amsden
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139693
- eISBN:
- 9780199832897
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139690.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History, International
Countries in the successful late industrializing countries (the rest) that industrialized rapidly after the Second World War had accumulated manufacturing experience in the pre‐war period, and this ...
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Countries in the successful late industrializing countries (the rest) that industrialized rapidly after the Second World War had accumulated manufacturing experience in the pre‐war period, and this differentiated them from countries in the unsuccessful ‘remainder’. In the previous chapter an analysis was made of how premodern artisanship and North Atlantic emigration affected the accumulation of manufacturing experience. In this chapter an analysis is made of how colonial rule and Chinese emigration affected it, focusing on Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand (with no formal colonial ties), and South Korea (with no Chinese emigration). The strengths and weaknesses of different types of manufacturing experience are then summed up for the rest as a whole. The introduction to the chapter presents a statistical analysis of aggregate cross‐country data that demonstrates that manufacturing performance (per capita output) in a given period depends on the accumulation of prior experience in manufacturing as opposed to other types of economic activity.Less
Countries in the successful late industrializing countries (the rest) that industrialized rapidly after the Second World War had accumulated manufacturing experience in the pre‐war period, and this differentiated them from countries in the unsuccessful ‘remainder’. In the previous chapter an analysis was made of how premodern artisanship and North Atlantic emigration affected the accumulation of manufacturing experience. In this chapter an analysis is made of how colonial rule and Chinese emigration affected it, focusing on Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand (with no formal colonial ties), and South Korea (with no Chinese emigration). The strengths and weaknesses of different types of manufacturing experience are then summed up for the rest as a whole. The introduction to the chapter presents a statistical analysis of aggregate cross‐country data that demonstrates that manufacturing performance (per capita output) in a given period depends on the accumulation of prior experience in manufacturing as opposed to other types of economic activity.
Niv Horesh
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300143560
- eISBN:
- 9780300143621
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300143560.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
As China emerges as a global powerhouse, this book examines its economic past and the shaping of its financial institutions. A comparative study of foreign banking in prewar China, it surveys the ...
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As China emerges as a global powerhouse, this book examines its economic past and the shaping of its financial institutions. A comparative study of foreign banking in prewar China, it surveys the impact of British overseas banknotes on China's economy before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Focusing on the two leading British banks in the region, the book assesses the favorable and unfavorable effects of the British presence in China, with particular emphasis on Shanghai, and traces instructive links between the changing political climate and banknote circulation volumes. Drawing on recently declassified archival materials, the author revises previous assumptions about China's prewar economy, including the extent of foreign banknote circulation and the economic significance of the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925.Less
As China emerges as a global powerhouse, this book examines its economic past and the shaping of its financial institutions. A comparative study of foreign banking in prewar China, it surveys the impact of British overseas banknotes on China's economy before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Focusing on the two leading British banks in the region, the book assesses the favorable and unfavorable effects of the British presence in China, with particular emphasis on Shanghai, and traces instructive links between the changing political climate and banknote circulation volumes. Drawing on recently declassified archival materials, the author revises previous assumptions about China's prewar economy, including the extent of foreign banknote circulation and the economic significance of the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925.