International Relations and Politics

Fritz W. Scharpf's renowned joint‐decision trap model has suggested that the requirements of (nearly) unanimous decisions in the EU's Council of Ministers, combined with conflicting preferences among member governments, will systematically limit the problem-solving effectiveness of European policies. Certain conditions have significantly changed during the 25 years of this theory's existence: the unanimity rule has been replaced by qualified-majority voting in most issue areas, and successive rounds of enlargement have augmented the diversity of member state interests and preferences. This book presents a comparative study on the differential politics in EU policies. Looking at the political dynamics in an array of EU activities, it analyses breakthroughs as well as stalemates and asks why leaps occur in some areas whilst blockades characterize others. The dynamics that allow the EU to escape various forms of decision trap are analysed in depth. Such mechanisms are from both the type expected by ‘rationalist’ theorists (supranational-hierarchical steering, Treaty‐base games and arena shifting) and from the kind acknowledged by ‘constructivist’ approaches (socialization). The downside of the findings is that when the EU is confronted with a high degree of problem pressure in a given issue area, these mechanisms will often not be available because most remain outside politicians' immediate grasp.

This book attempts to identify and outline the political, economic, and social norms and values associated with Europe and Europeans. It argues that regardless of the doubts associated with the exercise of European integration and the work of the European Union, and regardless of residual identities with states and nations, Europeans have much in common. The opening chapters deal with the historical development of European ideas, and are followed by chapters addressing European attitudes towards the state (including a rejection of state‐based nationalism, new ideas about patriotism and citizenship, and the importance of cosmopolitanism), the characteristics of politics and government in Europe (with an emphasis on communitarianism and the effects of the parliamentary system of government), European economic models (including the importance of welfarism and sustainable development), European social models, European attitudes towards values such as multiculturalism and secularism, and Europeanist views in regard to international relations (emphasizing civilian power and multiculturalism).

This book takes a relatively obscure episode—the joint Franco-German production of a state-of-the-art and very expensive military helicopter, the Tiger Helicopter (used in the James Bond film Goldeneye)—to make a groundbreaking theoretical contribution to international relations scholarship. The rivalry between Germany and France in the 19th and 20th centuries is of course well known. It was directly or indirectly responsible for four cataclysmic wars, and until relatively recently, the idea that these two states could become close partners seemed implausible. Yet following World War II and the birth of the European Union, they became the closest of allies. In fact, they collaborated for three decades on the most sophisticated weapon that the EU has produced: the Tiger. How did this occur, and what does this happy albeit unforeseen outcome tell us about how interstate relations really work? Through the lens of the Tiger, the book draws from two theoretical approaches—social constructivism and historical institutionalism—to reframe our understanding of how international relationships evolve. International relations scholars have always focused on relations between states, yet have failed to think in any sustained way about how interstate relationships both remold domestic realities and derive from them. How does a relationship between states impact upon a state internally? And how do the internal institutional dynamics of a state limit such relationships?

From the outset, the European Union's common agricultural policy (CAP) was subject to scathingly criticism. Despite this, no substantial reform was undertaken until 1992. Then, in little more than a decade, from 1992 to 2003, the CAP experienced three significant reforms: the 1992 MacSharry Reform, the 1999 Agenda 2000 Reform, and the 2003 Fischler Reform, profoundly changing its original design. The objective of the book is to contribute to a better understanding of this process of EU decision-making and policy reform. After thirty years of policy stasis, what unlocked policy reform, how was the process managed, and why did it not achieve all of the stated objectives? The text focuses on the role of the Commission and the Commissioner for Agriculture, the Council of Ministers and its Presidency, and the European Parliament. It adopts a heuristic political economy approach, drawing upon the economics and political science literatures as appropriate. The MacSharry reform was much influenced by the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, and the 2003 Fischler reform by the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. A Delphi survey of key decision-makers, assessing their perception of the drivers of policy reform, and an analysis of subsequent CAP reform, including the Health Check in 2008 and preparations for the post-2013 CAP review, round off the discussion. A Foreword is contributed by former Farm Commissioner Franz Fischler.

The regulation of financial markets and companies in Europe has undergone significant changes over the last decade. The Commission, Member States, and Parliament constructed regimes that facilitate new legislation, sanction delegation to the Commission for financial market law, and structure the cross‐border regulation of companies within the single market. The substance of this book is about that regime development. In creating the regimes discussed in this book, European Union (EU) leaders contributed to the ongoing constitutionalization of Europe by contesting and constructing norms. Each of the regimes required an explicit definition of the vertical relationship between the EU and the member states, and of the horizontal relationship among the member states. It defined the kind of regulatory state that would be required, the mix of European and national bodies involved, and the procedures they were to follow in carrying out their functions. It also defined what kinds of national variation in related economic and social policy would be regarded as legitimate. As they made these agreements, European leaders simultaneously articulated what it meant to be a member state in the single market, and what it meant to delegate responsibilities to the EU. This constitutionalized these ideals by sorting out the issues of EU and national responsibilities in a powerfully authoritative way. The theory of this book is about demonstrating the normative foundations of these constitutional agreements and showing how they had to be built on the shoulders of national ones.